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a very, very basic answer: facts are a) induced from observations, b) expressed in language. Observations and language are both theory-laden acts (i.e. not free of ideology - language should be pretty obvious, for observations see... um. Almost every philosopher of science since Kuhn), therefore facts cannot be induced or expressed in an ideological void.
Induction, also, is problematic as a method for ascertaining truth. As any number of observations doesn't mean you'll get the same result next time.
It's also the case that the scientific method is not merely a collection of facts, but a collection of metaphysics, ideologies, assumptions and facts, and also incorrect observations, flawed experimental design etc. Despite which, it does seem to be a fairly effective way of engaging with certain aspects of existence. But yeah, it can't be reduced to a 'collection of facts' because that ignores the sociological influences on/of science/scientists, etc. It's a social institution and an authority which legitimises many things - see advertising brandishing 'n scientists agree', scientifically formulated, etc etc, which wouldn't hold if scientists were just keepers of collections of facts.
Feyerabend has some good criticisms of the typical model of science which I can't bring to mind clearly enough to summarise/explicate. If you can get your hands on a book called 'What is this thing called science' by Chalmers, it's a very clear introduction to many influential past and present theories of science, written for a course at Sydney Uni but also pretty complete as is, simple to understand and not tedious (except if you've spent any time on any of the individual figures/theories discussed, in depth, previously, which will make that section kind of skippable).
hope that helps, at least some. |
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