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Stupid theory (or politics) questions

 
  

Page: 123(4)5678

 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
10:02 / 03.12.04
New thread! Here.
 
 
Jack Vincennes
10:50 / 21.01.05
This is actually an anthropology question, but I thought that it would fit better in this thread than in random Q & A in the conversation...

In my first year of university, I studied anthropology, disliked it, and probably didn't pay as much attention as I should have done. As time has gone by, I have largely forgotten that the lectures consisted, to a great extent, of academic pissing contests in which each lecturer tried to outdo the others in descriptions of the initiation ceremonies they have endured, and all that I 'learned' during that period now seems like it would be very interesting and relevant if only I could remember it.

So, two questions. Firstly, is there anything you'd recommend reading, just to get me back into the subject -if not research, just a good introduction to any aspect of it.

The second is, what is the current thinking on structural anthropology? It was the part of my course I enjoyed the most, but I wondered what the criticisms of it were, or if something better if similar has overtaken it.
 
 
unheimlich manoeuvre
03:24 / 22.01.05
Vincennes: Firstly, is there anything you'd recommend reading, just to get me back into the subject -if not research, just a good introduction to any aspect of it.

I did Anthropology at Goldsmiths College a few years back and it really was a pissing contest. (Either that or the theology of liberal humanism.)
Trying to remember what I actually enjoyed...
Small Places, Large Issues by Eriksen was a good general introduction which also covered Anthroplogy-at-home (which is Sociology in disguise but don't tell.)
The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Weber was (I want to say wicked) thought provoking. WASP's know thyself!
Haraway's book on cyborg anthropology (cyborg manifesto?) was a look at the future of us.
(It's late morning, I'll think of others.)
 
 
Jack Vincennes
10:30 / 24.01.05
inchocolate, my thanks -not least for letting me know that it "wasn't just me" as far as lack of enthusiasm for the lectures goes...

I've found the Erikcson on amazon for not much money, so I'm going to get that when I get paid -as for the Weber, that was something I almost studied in Sociology, and have wanted to read it for a while as I like Weber's political work.
 
 
Axolotl
16:20 / 24.01.05
I did joint anthropology degree and I hated it. It's wierd how academic anthropologists have managed to suck out all joy and interest out of what should be the most vibrant and fascinating field of study around.
 
 
solomon
23:00 / 25.02.05
Q: as a person of fairly radical lefty humanistic bias who is wary of subscribing to any ideology, when arguing politics with someone, what do you do when someone accuses you of being a comunist?
 
 
charrellz
23:00 / 26.02.05
Ummm....just say no? Seriously though, it's kinda like someone accusing you of being a flamingo. Just simply explain to them that no, you are not a large pink bird fond of standing on one leg. You believe in allowing religion and Stalin was dumb etc. etc. If you aren't a damn dirty commie, than it shouldn't be too hard for you to prove that to a semi-rational person.
 
 
Tom Coates
09:32 / 27.02.05
Bigger question - are you a communist? If not, then see above. More seriously, the easiest response to something like that is that it's as much of a mischaracterisation of the centre and left as to call people who believe in the free market Nazis. If they can see any distinction between their own beliefs and those of any rightish party, then they should be able to accept that there are rational positions on the left that don't lead you directly to communism. You might argue that the two extremes of the political spectrum appear to be control by an elite and control by the state, neither of which are particularly attractive, and that the actual idea of control by the people and for the people is based on finding some kind of position between the two. Where that balance point is up for debate.
 
 
Lurid Archive
02:50 / 02.01.06
So someone just described me as "femme" and I'm not really sure what this means. I understand, to an extent, the terms butch and femme as they apply to lesbians at the level of appearance, at any rate. But I think it was intended as to apply to character rather than apprearance.
 
 
Shrug
11:23 / 02.01.06
It can denote anyone that takes a stereotypically feminine role within a relationship really. Perhaps also somebody that displays a stereotypically feminine character or nature. Passivity, submissiveness, emotional intelligence maybe? Other than that?
 
 
*
15:59 / 02.01.06
Femmes can be transgressive.
Femmes come in lots of genders.

Hope those two links help you a bit. Do you have a more specific question?
 
 
*
16:00 / 02.01.06
Also, femme /= submissive, plz.
 
 
Shrug
16:51 / 02.01.06
Well, yes, it is a problematic take on it, and not one I really adhere to but it is possible this was the user's meaning. Once again maybe?
Was there perhaps a context to this remark that would be helpful?
 
 
Shrug
01:26 / 17.02.06
I'm not sure if this is exactly the right place to post this so feel free to inform me then delete if not, mods.

I'm interested in the importance of game playing in relationships for an essay I'm writing on Grant and Hepburn's relationship in Bringing Up Baby. I've very little in-depth knowledge of any of the basis of theory in this but presume a treatment using psychoanalytic language could be slipped more discreetly into a film essay.* Really my only point of reference is hazy memory of a Big Brother psychologist mentioning the importance of gameplay in building relationships and some writings of Stanley Clavell. So if you can help I would be very much appreciative, in the I would say "Thank you, very much" way.

*I say this because I'm told that alot of psychoanalysis has largely been disproved but film theory never seems to have moved on from the use of its language sufficiently.

So then?
 
 
Cat Chant
10:50 / 07.04.06
Wow, no-one ever helped Shrug with game theory. Sorry about that.

I am bumping this thread because I've just realized (after co-teaching an MA class on postcolonial theory in which one of my co-teachers asked me - thanks a lot!) that I have no idea what a subaltern (as in 'Can the Subaltern Speak?') is. I mean, I know roughly that a subaltern is, like, a colonized Other, but how does that fit with the meaning of the term I'm more familiar with (a rank in the colonial army, I thought)? Where did the term develop from and why was it taken up in particular?

kthxbai.
 
 
Disco is My Class War
12:33 / 07.04.06
As far as I know, it started with the loose group of South Asian thinkers known as the Subaltern Studies Group but I have no idea what relationship the term has to the old army term. Maybe it's an Indian colonial reference? There's a number of volumes of Subatern Studies floating around -- about 11, I think. You might find the reference there?

More later.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
12:49 / 07.04.06
I don't think the military term and the Spivak term are related, except through having a common root. A subaltern in the Army is a lower-ranked (i.e. below Captain) commissioned officer. The use of subaltern in subaltern studies, as far as I know, has the same root (fr. subalterne, of inferior rank), but is not directly connected - as far as I know, the subaltern studies usage was coined by Gramsci, who used it to describe any group deprived of voice by hegemony - so, primarily the workers, from his point of view, without specifically colonial overtones.
 
 
Shrug
13:11 / 07.04.06
Wow, no-one ever helped Shrug with game theory. Sorry about that.

C'est la vie, Deva, no matter. However, this information is still needed should anyone care to help.
 
 
ORA ORA ORA ORAAAA!!
12:33 / 08.04.06
This might need a thread of its own, but I'm not game to post a new thread here, so:

Saussure, eh? I have no problem with many of the things he (or his ghostwriters, perhaps) say in his Course on General Linguistics - the essential unity of signifier and signified in a sign, the arbitrary nature of signifiers, etc.

But I can't for the life of me accept the idea that meaning is constructed out of differences, and is solely negative. For instance, [red] is composed out of [not everything] which is not [red], which is fine if there's a positive value for [red], but since there isn't, according to him, I can't see how you can possibly distinguish between any two concepts.

His argument about this starts with the alphabet, he claims that the only distinguishing characteristic that the letter 'a' has is 'is not all the other letters'. However, since the definition for 't' is also 'is not all the other letters', and there's absolutely no positive content in any 'other letter', doesn't that mean that t=a='not all the other letters'? Does it not also mean that if I slap a fish down on a piece of paper, and write b through z on it, 'fish' = 'a', because it is 'not the other letters'? (I'd probably answer that myself by saying that 'fish' could well be 'a', in that system, but generally is not included in the alphabet system, and so generally isn't = 'a', but I'm not sure that's a good answer).

Anyway, this composing of meaning out of negatives in opposition leads to weird situations in my mind: say, for instance, two children are raised to have the exact same set of concepts, but neither of them have been introduced to [pig] or [elephant]. You then take each child into a different room, and you introduce one of them to [pig], and one of them to [elephant]. If, as Saussure says, the meaning of [pig] is [not every other possible meaning], and [elephant] is the same, in this circumstance, these children now have ideas about [pig] and [elephant] which are identical, because their sign-sets were identical before, and the only definition these new concepts can have is 'not everything else'.

Even if they've seen pictures.

I don't know, I must be failing to grasp something here, so this is a cry for help, and also for elucidation. If someone here's a semiologist, or an interested amateur, I'd love to have this cleared up. Feel free to laugh at my complete lack of understanding, too.

Thanks!
 
 
Disco is My Class War
15:52 / 12.04.06
On the subaltern, I was going to come back to the Gramsci reference.

Gayatri Spivak gives a great lecture on the history/circulation of the term 'subaltern' and her usage of it here.
 
 
Shrug
21:32 / 26.04.06
"The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the processes of history's destruction of the body".

It may be just because of sleep deprivation (probably not) but what the fuck does this even begin to mean? I've barely encountered Foucault and have little time delve deeper, however, this is the basis of something I do need to delve deeper into. Some paraphrasing might help.
 
 
elene
11:31 / 27.04.06
Perhaps all it means is that the body and the self that inhabit it are other than ourselves, that this construct is continually being sustained by our speech and decomposed by our thought, in our thought we go into ourselves and there is no body, in our speech we go out to our body and there is only the (dissociated) self of the body, and that genealogy extends this activity in some sense into the domain of history?
 
 
sam i am
12:36 / 27.04.06
I'll have a crack at this, clumsily weilding my rudimentary knowledge.

There has recently (i'd guess, the past 40 years) been a move towards "the body" as the unit on which identities or social inequalities are built, away from a notion of "the individual". This was done for a large number of philosophical reasons. For example, instead of imagining society as free-floating individuals that make autonomous decisions (perhaps on the basis of some essential qualities: e.g. their existence as men), subjectivity is made through discourses (i.e. to put it loosely, the influence of society). Therefore your existence as a person begins from societal influence (which gives you the 'effect' of being a person), rather than a single consciousness (which 'common sense' would have us begin: "but, I AM a person"). As I say, this has been useful for a number of reasons (e.g. the former understanding has a heightened sensitivity to how bodies are made, away from the latters essentialism). So ...

"The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas)..."
I'm not entirely sure about all of these ideas here, but imagine your body like a chalkboard. In different situations, different things will be written onto your body (e.g. in secondary school, working as a lawyer, or being a houseworker) - each of these situations will make a different body. But they don't just make your body, they are also the things that allow you to understand yourself as a self. You don't just understand it because you are: different historical and spatial contexts will give you a different understanding of what you are. So crutially ...

"...the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration."
You aren't a single self. There are many influences on your body, and through, say, the course of a day, you can be affected by each one differently, giving you a different understanding of your self. Say you work during the day in electronics, and at night as a dancer. Instead of seeing yourself as both a dancer and someone who works with electronics, "the body" sees you as performing these different roles in different situations. You become either of these roles, you aren't both at once. Again, this is useful for a number of reasons, not only because it emphasises the enacted nature of identities (they are temporary, and effects), over the idea that you 'hold' such identities at your core (that you 'are' X, Y, and Z)

"Genealogy as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the processes of history's destruction of the body".
Genealogy is a method of tracing the past, as used by Foucault (and indeed Nietzsche). If you see the body as 'made', then the certain types of bodies that we can see today all have a history. Even, say, a deeply essentialised unit like "woman" has such a history that can be traced (or histories, because genealogy doesn't seek to isolate a chain of events, but to highlight the many stories that are used). Through these histories we can see how "woman" has functioned as a category - to make certain bodies do certain things. This approach avoids seeing stable ahistorical referents, but asks how these referents have worked to produce certain bodies. Again, very useful for a number of reasons (e.g. if you want to move away from discussions about men's and women's ahistorical characteristics, and what gender roles should be mapped onto these individuals. Instead, you will see that the very meaning of such bodies, such starting points, are also products of discourse - of society).

Right, I hope this confused explaination has somehow worked to give a little clarity.
 
 
Shrug
11:58 / 28.04.06
Hey guys thanks very much for the responses! They helped me immensely. This is why I love the Barb.
 
 
Cat Chant
13:57 / 02.05.06
Hello Red Frog Rising, sorry if this is now too late to be any use to you. I've been thinking about it for a while, as I teach Saussure and haven't come across the objections you raise - though interestingly I think they clarify for me why I tend to stress two bits of Saussure's theory of linguistics:

(a) it's synchronic, not diachronic.

That is, it can't cope with changes within a system (the introduction of new signs): it can only be used to analyze a system which is already total - which covers the whole field of signs available to a society. I think that term is important, too - as I understand it, Saussurian linguistics is designed to analyze whole systems, rather than individuals within that system. Roland Barthes did a bit of work on this area - he moved on from Saussure to talk about how individual knowledge intersects with total systems to form 'idiolects' (like dialects, but ideological). On the whole, though, it's not a form of analysis which deals with individuals or with learning - I'd love to hear from anyone who knows how Saussurian linguistics dovetails (or doesn't) with theories of cognition and/or language learning.

(b) The sign is made up of a signifier and a signified/concept: the referent doesn't enter into it.

The thing with your elephant example is that an elephant is not a sign. It's an elephant. The sign is composed of the signifier - E-L-E-P-H-A-N-T - and the signified, which is the *concept of an elephant*. Both of those elements gain meaning from their place in a total system - an 'elephant' is the conceptual cut we make in an amorphous mass of data and sense-inputs. You might think of it as gaining its meaning within the whole system of language/taxonomy from being 'pachyderm-but-not-a-rhinoceros', 'long-nosed-but-not-a-tapir', 'big-but-not-a-whale', etc.

I think, then, that your post identifies weaknesses which are inherent in Saussurian linguistics, but which are known to be inherent, and so Saussurian linguistics just isn't used for those particular situations, because it's the wrong tool - that's not what it was designed for. It is very useful for certain kinds of analysis, though. In fact the idea of meaning deriving from differences within a system, rather than from a relationship with the referent, made structuralism and post-structuralism possible! Yayy Saussure!

I don't know how clear any of the above is. I'm having to be brief as I've been meaning to respond to you for some days now and if I don't do it now I never will, but that also means I have to get to a seminar. I'd like to keep talking about this if you're interested, though, as it's clarifying some of my ideas about the uses and limits of Saussurian linguistics.
 
 
ORA ORA ORA ORAAAA!!
16:23 / 02.05.06
I have just now finished writing an essay on why Saussure is different from all who came before him (also: haha, I knew that'd make someone post about Saussure, being finished), in terms of his understanding of semiotic systems, so my brane does not particularly want to continue to think about this at the moment.

But it does, really, so, yes, I'll come back and poke at this some more later.

You're right, though, I'm using sign wrong for the elephant example, so I'll go and rethink that.

right now, though, I'm still struggling with getting positive definitions out of negative differences. I can see defining things differentially, but... I can't see how you can do it without some positive content. Which is to say, if you're defining things by their position in a semantic network (or something like it), until at least one of the nodes contains a value, you can't get values in the others, as it's empty pointers all the way down. Which I vaguely understand to be Derrida's position, all the signifiers point to is more signifiers, and there's never any point where it 'touches down' on a real referent. I can accept it when the design is deliberately pointers all the way down, as in Derrida, but when, in Saussure, it's claimed to produce positive values immediately without the infinite recursive references, I don't get it. How does anyone expect that to work?

side note: I'm apparently educated in psycholinguistics from both a psychological and a linguistic point of view, and to be honest, there's some overlap, but not much. Depending on what model you accept, some look much like Saussure's model, in diagram form, but all the nodes are full of actual information (in theory), not empty. It's 3:20am and I should sleep, not type garbled half-arsed versions of things into the internet, so... I'll be back later. Thanks for your response, I'm looking forward to hashing things out.
 
 
Cat Chant
20:36 / 02.05.06
I'm apparently educated in psycholinguistics from both a psychological and a linguistic point of view, and to be honest, there's some overlap, but not much.

Ooh. When you're not burned out and exhausted, I'd be very interested to talk more about this - I don't know anything about the psycho/neuro side of pyscholinguistics and would like to.

Will also think more about the 'pointers' (rather than elephants) 'all the way down' thing and come back to you on that.
 
 
ORA ORA ORA ORAAAA!!
02:20 / 03.05.06
Ok, I hope these diagrams clear things up. Last night after I went to bed I sent myself an sms saying "S. nodes seem to be attributes and signifieds at the same time. discuss. The only diff between any two random nodes is their signifier!"

Which reflects more my state of mind than any great insight, but I am attempting to reconstruct whatever it was that wouldn't let me sleep til I wrote it down. There was something else which was probably more important, but I assumed it would stick in my mind, and it's melted.

Ok. Here's my first diagram. It's a Saussurian semantic network as I understand it (actually... it's one of the ways I understand them, I need to clarify that, too):

So here we have a network in which the nodes are empty and they're defined by their differences to other nodes. Possibly they should merely have ">not the same>" on all the lines linking them up, for the purpose of the demonstration of my problem, I don't think it matters.

Say we take the top left node and we're trying to use it. Its value becomes [something >more grey> than something which is >laughed at> by something which >collects> something which is >eaten> by something which is >not the same> as [1]], where [1] is everything in the brackets, including [1].
That seems problematic to me, and is what I mean by 'pointers all the way down'. All you have is relations, and relations aren't things/values.

On this next map, we've got a label for one of the nodes.

We'll call that our signifier. So the label and the node together form a sign. Except now we've got nothing different, just that [1]= [elephant]=[1].
However, if elephant is a value of the node, then we can begin to put values in the other nodes, too.
An /elephant/ is >more grey> than a /tapir/. /elephant/ is >not the same> as a /pig/, which has >less fur> than a /tapir/. /elephant/ is >bigger than> many things, many things which are >less mobile> than /tapirs/ and >eaten by> /pigs/, but lets say a /flower/, becaus /flowers/ are >collected by> /people/ which >eat> /pigs/ and >laugh> at /tapirs/ and >hunt> /elephants/, which...

Obviously this is a sham network, and the relations would be more graded and so on, but you can (I hope) see that once you've got one solid value in the 'net, you can make a good start at filling things in. But until there's an actual value, the net just goes around in horrific endless loops. Once there's a value, the signifier [elephant] has a signified which has actual properties, and an actual value.

The problem is that if the nodes(signifieds) are empty(valueless), the only thing which has any content which could define them is their signifiers, which is by definition impossible in Saussure's model, I think. We get things like "that which we call elephant is more grey than that which we call tapir", but since we don't have any value in elephant or tapir, the only thing which we can compare is their signifiers. And signifiers aren't grey, per se. And once we start comparing signifiers, they lose their arbitrary relations, because they gain properties in and of themselves, which is also bad and unpossible.

I am not sure if I'm making sense, or if I'm talking into a hat, about things which are not at all the way I'm describing them, but that's how it looks to me at the moment.

I also have some slight confusion with Saussure's values. If we define values in terms of what they are different to (I am going to assume an actual value for values, for this), do signifiers point to one 'lump' of thought-stuff, or do they point to various properties in the thoughstuff? Like with Locke's example of gold, does [gold] point to /gold/, which is defined as (not everything else in the thoughtstuff mass), or does it point to /gold/ which is defined as /not everything else in the thoughstuff mass except yellow, heavy, ductile, metallic, etc/?

And if the latter, why doesn't [gold] just point to the properties yellow, heavy, metallic, etc, rather than explicitly pointing negatively to everything except the properties it does have?

It seems... computationally inefficient for a signified to have, instead of a small set positive values (attributes), a near-infinite set negative values, and for people to have to work out what a word means by computing it from everything it does not mean. People understand words in milliseconds, and also different parts of the brain light up for different words/categories. If they were computing values by 'not everything but' methods, all the parts of the brain which store semantic information would light up except the parts which correspond to the actual value of the word, you'd assume. But this does not happen...

But my query could easily be based on me misreading and my tutor misunderstanding my question, leaving me with a poor understanding.

I'm trying to find exactly what I'm after in my old notes, but they're amazingly badly organised, and I think I'm merging several classes into one in my memory anyway. If you PM me an email address I can send you a bunch of readings on and around the topic of speech comprehension/production from a psych point of view, and quite possibly some which examine neural activation with speech/hearing/etc.

Thanks again for your time!
 
 
Cat Chant
18:18 / 19.05.06
I've been thinking about this Saussure thing a lot, and am not sure whether I've got anywhere useful, but (as I keep reading in the Temple) the best thing is probably to jump in and try out where I've got so far. First of all I should probably say that I have no training in linguistics as such, having always read and taught Saussure firmly in the context of post-structuralist theory, and I'm not even anything like a Saussure expert (in fact I'm not sure I've read all of the Course in General Linguistics), so I may not be the ideal person to address your technical questions. On the other hand, I am firmly convinced of Saussure's usefulness for certain sorts of analysis - though entirely unconvinced (partly through just not knowing enough to know what would convince me) about his pragmatic value to psycholinguistics (or any kind of linguistics, really). Another thing I just don't know is whether, if he's no use to linguists any more, that necessarily means his model isn't useful for certain kinds of analysis: I suppose it would depend exactly where he was wrong, and about what.

Oh - another quick thing - due to not being a specialist by any means, I'm not entirely sure about the technical meaning of the word 'value' in your post, so I won't be able to engage with that as lucidly as I might. Can you explain?

To take something from near the end of your post:

It seems... computationally inefficient for a signified to have, instead of a small set positive values (attributes), a near-infinite set negative values, and for people to have to work out what a word means by computing it from everything it does not mean.

I think you are confusing signifieds and signs here (though I'm not sure whether clearing up that confusion is going to clear a way to rehabilitate Saussure). There are two sets of relations:* (1) the relation between signifier and signified, which is arbitrary-and-conventional but not produced through difference; and (2) the relation between all the signs in a system, which is produced through difference.

Saussure laid great stress on the indissociability of signifier and signified (hereafter S'r and S'd). He defined a sign as 'a two-sided psychological entity', and said that S'r and S'd were like 'two sides of a piece of paper'. So it's impossible either to think of 'gold' (S'd) without using the S'r g-o-l-d, or to encounter the S'r g-o-l-d without thinking of the S'd 'gold' - it's not the case that the movement from S'r to S'd has to go through the whole system of differences.

Where the differences come in is that both signifiers and signifieds, in different ways, have no positive value (?if I'm using that term correctly) but are distinguished from each other by only through their differences. One example that Saussure gives on the level of the signifier is that it's possible, in Roman script, to write a given letter - say 'r' - in several different ways, but as long as the total system is consistent, the handwriting will still be legible. So say I write my 'r' in the same way that you write your 'v': at first you'll read it as a 'v', but when you see that I write my 'v' differently, you'll be able to go back and figure out that the first one was an 'r'. (Which brings me back to this, from your first set of questions:

Does it not also mean that if I slap a fish down on a piece of paper, and write b through z on it, 'fish' = 'a', because it is 'not the other letters'?:

I think the answer is 'kinda'. What's becoming clear to me is that this kind of analysis seems to assume a knowledge of the whole system - you have to know that there is an 'r' in the system for my/Saussure's example above to work? Not sure what the implications of that are - do you have any ideas? Oh, except that the work that Saussure is often called on to do in post-structuralist theory is to show how systems stake a claim to completeness: the idea is that a given sign-system (or code) claims to cover the whole field of possibility (at least on the level of the signified, I think). So the example I often use is the man/woman icons on toilet doors, which only mean anything by being different from each other - that's what they're for - and which also implicitly claim that man+woman='all humans' (ie the system covers the whole conceptual field).

Um, anyway. It's my understanding (from my mum, who trained as a linguist in Poland and England in the 1960s) that, to some extent, phonemes do work through difference, and this has been verified empirically/experimentally: there are two or three ways of pronouncing 't', for example, and after a certain age, if the language you are being raised in does not differentiate between those pronunciations - if the difference between the sounds is not meaningful - you lose the ability to hear the difference.

Okay, and then the same thing happens on the level of the signified: the signified 'horse' is constituted by its definition out of a fluid field of animals/mammals/quadrupeds/equines (not-a-pony); the signified 'happiness' is constituted by its edges, where it meets 'contentment', 'bliss', etc. Saussure draws a diagram, which I don't have scanned so can't post - do you know it? It has two wiggly horizontal lines one above the other: one is the undifferentiated stream of mental content and the other is the undifferentiated stream of possible noises. Then you make a sign by cutting through, so that you differentiate one 't' from another, but also differentiate, say 'happiness' from 'contentment', or 'pink' from 'magenta', or 'pleasure' from 'bliss', by saying 'this is where one ends and the other begins.

I think the question is where this process of 'cutting up' the conceptual field relates to our actual experience of using, producing, and understanding language? It's very unclear in Saussure how, where, when, by whom that cutting-up takes place, and how the totality of the system is conveyed to individual users...


Okay, that was a very long mental process to lead to a very short question. Let me know if any of it was helpful and/or has challenged or indeed clarified any of your concerns about Saussure - I'll try and get back to some of your other points in a few days but now I think my gf has got dinner ready, and I try to be a good husband!**

*I hope this kind of thing doesn't sound patronizing here: it's obvious you know a lot more about this stuff than I do - I'm just trying to set out what I think about Saussure and where I think it differs from your understanding of him as clearly as possible, mostly for my own benefit.

**tries to formulate Saussurian-style joke about available models of interaction within closed systems, fails.
 
 
Cat Chant
18:21 / 19.05.06
Perhaps I should put in a request to change the title of this thread to 'Stupid theory answers'...
 
 
Cat Chant
07:46 / 24.05.06
Possibly more on Saussure another time, but meanwhile, before I unleash the full extent of my wrath on a student, could anyone tell me whether it is, by any stretch or loop of the differantial chain, possible to say that Derrida says that 'context limits meaning' and 'overrules' the infinite possibilities of differance? Because my understanding of, say, 'Signature - Event - Context' is that he says the complete opposite of that (ie that context is not even determinable, let alone determining).
 
 
Disco is My Class War
17:55 / 24.05.06
I'm with you: Derrida makes no claims about context limiting meaning. Where does Derrida say that anything limits meaning? And what is your student citing from?

On with the questions... I remember reading an essay or a book chapter a while ago linking BDSM and Poe's story "The Pit and the Pendulum." I need the essay again, but can't remember what it's called or where to find it. Does anyone know what I'm talking about? (I've done Google Scholar searches and some database checking, but no dice.) It's definitely deconstructionist, possibly involving Deleuze... This is probably way too vague.
 
 
Cat Chant
09:40 / 25.05.06
Thanks, Mister Disco - it was one of those moments where I started doubting myself because there just seems no way anyone could say he says 'context limits meaning', seeing as how he is famous for saying the opposite of that, so I wondered whether I was missing something.

At no point does the student cite any bit of Derrida which says anything about context. When ze introduces the idea of context limiting meaning, it's in hir own words, following a summary of Derrida's thought taken from some book called Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers.

'The Pit and the Pendulum' doesn't ring a bell, sorry. Have you tried Web of Science and/or the MLA database? They should give you everything with 'Poe' (or indeed BDSM) in the title or abstract.
 
 
grant
17:33 / 25.05.06
If this sexy little number doesn't fit you, I bet you'll find the right one in either the works cited or scholar.google's "cited by" entries.
 
 
ORA ORA ORA ORAAAA!!
12:44 / 26.05.06
So, I've written something like 1,500 words trying to explain myself. Since this is not a good thing to have done, without having a clear idea of what I am talking about, I went and actually re-read the part of the cours I was worried about, and it turns out what my problem was was not reading properly. And also I have a small problem of having written 1,500 useless words, heh.

With a s'r, for instance, a phoneme, it can be constructed out of differences from other phonemes, but there is, at base, a physical disturbance of the air from which to draw your differences.
The way I had previously read the s'd side of this argument was that there was no such substance from which to draw your semantic differences. This is the problem of reading 'the value of a signified is only comprised of its difference from other signifieds' out of context. In context, there is some substance, like a sea of attributes, and a s'd is a random swipe of those. That's the key issue, because I can fully accept the whole idea of definitions by difference if there's something to make those differences in, rather than the relations of difference themselves (though those are important).

I think, then, that I've cleared everything up to my own satisfaction, but possibly not to yours - if you have any questions about anything I've said, feel free to ask.

re: value, I was using it as Saussure himself, to the best of my knowledge. I.e. the value of a knight in chess is not its form, but its function, etc. Value is the essence of comparison. Without it, you can't really make a comparison, which is why I was getting so upset about comparing all these apparently value-less nodes in my imaginary network.


I can't say I have any clear ideas how you go about cutting up the conceptual field in the 'real world'. My intuition is that the conceptual field itself does not begin as a completed system, but grows all the time, especially as part of the development of language and cognition in youngsters. So, your average baby takes in massive amounts of data through the senses, and all of this data is eventually synched up with itself (i.e. touch and sight synching up so that you can associate the pink thing coming closer to the yellow thing with the sensation of your hand suddenly touching something plastic-y), via some mysterious inbuilt mechanism. And once you've mastered the idea that one thing can have more than one result (in basic sensory terms at least), then you have a vague idea of category abstraction which you then use to cut up the sum total of your experience, slowly, into chunks which then get labels etc etc etc.

Which is a nice idea but requires serious expanding to be even remotely workable, and relies on inbuilt tendencies in the brain regardless (which may or may not be acceptable, depending on who you ask), and even then doesn't really answer the question you've asked.

I need to stop writing so goddamn much about things I don't understand. 2000 words now...

Thank you for being patient and helpful, I appreciate it.
 
  

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