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Theoretical Language

 
  

Page: 12(3)45

 
 
Phex: Dorset Doom
19:52 / 05.06.08
I don't know if it counts as 'specifics', but this article discusses what we've been discussing with reference to the work of Theodor Adorno ("It avails nothing ascetically to avoid all technical expressions, all allusions to spheres of culture that no longer exist...The logic of the day, which makes so much of its clarity, has naively adopted this perverted notion of everyday speech") and George Orwell ("Good prose is like a window pane").
Interestingly, the writer roots Adorno's defense of 'over-complicated' style in the aesthetics of modernism (though it's not stated, Orwell would have to be 19th century realism). This I have a problem with- modernism, for all of its faults, produced some writing that is genuinely interesting to read, regardless of the subject, whereas I have yet to enjoy a theoretical text on a purely aesthetic basis. Then there's the question of why post-modernist theorists are writing in a modernist style, why didn't a post-modern style develop? Or did it?
 
 
DecayingInsect
21:28 / 05.06.08
Off-topic, but are we sure that string theory turned out to be 'largely bunk'? Has anyone informed Lubos Motl yet?

With some of the other posters, I'd dispute that particle physics need be 'incomprehensible': have a look at Feynman's QED lectures. On a related note here is John Baez decompressing Einstein's field equation into plain english.

Isn't this debate over 'theoretical language' the latest round in a rather familiar academic Kulturkampf? You can find accusations of obfuscation and vacuity in Russell and Moore on the Hegelians, Ayer on Satre and Heidegger, and more recently of course Chomsky, Quine and Searle on Derrida. There is a suspicion that the underlying notions of 'Ideology', 'Critique', 'Dialectic', 'Aesthetics' and their subsequent elaborations and developments remain ill-defined vehicles of obscurantism in a manner quite different from, say, the extended metaphors in the later Wittgenstein. There is also a sense of frustration that it is not recognised that Marx and Freud's contributions to the empirical portions of their respective fields are seen as discredited and pseudo-scientific, so that there is as much point in appealing to their ideas as if they were correct as there would be to those of Julius Evola, except possibly on grounds of taste and decency.

There's also the lack of separation between style and content: Haus suggests some prerequisites for an understanding of a certain text. But to fully understand Einstein I don't need ever to have read a line he wrote: a precis in a modern textbook suffices. Clearly I need a prior understanding some of Newton's ideas, but again, there is no need for me to have read him, because he can be distilled into a few pages of modern notation, and there is no need for me to consider how his ideas arose in turn from those of Kepler and Galileo. An Einstein paper, or a textbook of particle physics, appears to contain a kernel of information that can be extracted, transformed, redacted or expanded in uncontroversial fashion.

I don't get that from the opening poster's Yingling quote: it reads like something churned out by the postmodernism generator.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
22:37 / 05.06.08
As Foust says:

There are always going to be people that write bullshit, but there are always going to be people who can write things that you don't understand. How on earth can anyone deny this? Why would someone be so arrogant as to assume they should be able to understand every last piece of philosophical or theoretical writing without effort?

You may be confident that your inability to understand Yingling is Yingling's problem and not yours, but without some corroboration of that this confidence is not a useful measure for others.
 
 
Dusto
23:38 / 05.06.08
If what Yingling says can be translated into generally comprehensible language, and if relatively few people understand him untranslated, that seems to me like criteria enough to suggest that he is using the language of theory poorly.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
05:26 / 06.06.08
OK - so that gives us criteria for whether theoretical language is good theoretical language or not, yes? That he (in this case) can be "translated" without losing any of the quality of his writing, and that pre-translation few can understand what he says (barring the translators). Well, then, we should put these two projects to the proof. Let one among us go and read Yingling's piece, decide whether it can be rendered in Ordnance Survey English without losing a single droplet of the experience, report back and give specifics.

Interestingly, we are seeing here a bit of a microcosmic representation of the instincts which might end up in the sort of willfully difficult writing that is being criticised. At the moment this thread feels a bit heavy on appeals to authority, or simply ten-dollar words, without integration of that authority. As Wittgenstein said, Foucault might disagree with you about what Frederic Jameson calls epigrams (which, by the way, means something written on something - clue's in the question) on the Kulturkampf. Arousing though these high-class names and words are to a hod-carrying layman like myself, I'm reminded of astrojax's complaints about an sich.

Decayinginsect said something quite interesting about the value of summaries and precis, but am in a bit of a rush, so will pick up on that later.
 
 
Lurid Archive
09:15 / 06.06.08
Miller's article (linked by Phex) on Adorno and Orwell is an interesting read. My sympathies tend towards Orwell's view, somewhat, since I am wary of the elitism that can lie in the other direction. BTW, do people think that Miller is overly critical of Adorno? It all looks a bit one-sided to me.

Having said that, as a mathematician pretty much everything I write is incomprehensible to all but a handful of people on the planet so there is only so far I can insist on clarity in others without risking a double standard. And in that sense, dustos criterion seems to me to be mistaken and overly simplistic.

I do find it interesting to read the frequent comparisons with science and technical writing, though I suspect the comparisons operate rather differently for me as a specialist than for others. For instance, clarity is actually a pretty big deal in science writing and saying that someone writes obscurely, no matter how cutting edge, is a serious criticism. Of course, one needs an *informed* evaluation and not just a facile argument from ignorance - anyone can throw up their hands in despair and declare a text incomprehensible.

I also find the infighting - for want of a better term - pretty alien and I'm not sure how to interpret it. The fact that Nussbaum mounts such a strong criticism of Butler seems to me like it should be significant. Again, I am basing this on my own local experience of academia in which that kind of spat would leave me almost certainly agreeing with the critique or dismissing the attacker as a loon. (Eg. the frequent dismissals of evolutionary psychology are present because of deep flaws in the discipline.) I get that things aren't so cut and dried here, but I find it a little tricky to adjust.
 
 
Dusto
13:27 / 06.06.08
OK - so that gives us criteria for whether theoretical language is good theoretical language or not, yes? That he (in this case) can be "translated" without losing any of the quality of his writing, and that pre-translation few can understand what he says (barring the translators). Well, then, we should put these two projects to the proof. Let one among us go and read Yingling's piece, decide whether it can be rendered in Ordnance Survey English without losing a single droplet of the experience, report back and give specifics.

It's what Nussbaum did with the Butler quote. It could probably use one more sentence of elaboration, but I do think it nicely highlights one of the two brands of bad theoretical writing that it seems to me are under discussion here. That is, bad writing that is theoretically sound, as opposed to bad writing that masks bad theory.

Interestingly, we are seeing here a bit of a microcosmic representation of the instincts which might end up in the sort of willfully difficult writing that is being criticised. At the moment this thread feels a bit heavy on appeals to authority, or simply ten-dollar words, without integration of that authority. As Wittgenstein said, Foucault might disagree with you about what Frederic Jameson calls epigrams (which, by the way, means something written on something - clue's in the question) on the Kulturkampf. Arousing though these high-class names and words are to a hod-carrying layman like myself, I'm reminded of astrojax's complaints about an sich.

I probably didn't need to invoke Wittgenstein, but I thought of it more as attributing the source of my quote rather than appealing to authority. I immediately qualified it by saying that I was taking it completely out of context, using his words but not his meaning.

The Foucault thing was indeed a bit fatuous. I was thinking of his description of how the language of penal institutions preexisted penal institutions, but it was mostly meant as a joke, making fun of appeals to authority. Maybe that didn't come across.

The one authority that I have legitimately invoked in this thread, Jameson, I have used in fairly specific ways, I think. At least in the second instance, I was clarifying what I meant by my overgeneralized "sane academic world" by giving a specific example of someone who belonged to the set of academics to whom I was referring. The first instance is perhaps a bit more questionable, as it may come across as "Jameson says it, so it must be true," but my purpose here was to show that I'm not against theory itself, and in fact here's a theorist I admire who tries to avoid jargon in his writing.

Albert: I haven't read Fink, but I agree that Zizek on Lacan is generally a lot more comprehensible than Lacan.
 
 
Dusto
13:43 / 06.06.08
Having said that, as a mathematician pretty much everything I write is incomprehensible to all but a handful of people on the planet so there is only so far I can insist on clarity in others without risking a double standard. And in that sense, dustos criterion seems to me to be mistaken and overly simplistic.

I haven't settled any specific criteria in my mind, yet. I'm more using this thread as a forum for trying ideas on and seeing how they fit. At this point, I'd take back any remarks I've made about theoretical writing being necessarily intelligble to the "common man" (though I do still find it a tad ironic that the specialized language of Marxist theory tends toward a linguistic elitism).

Trying to settle on some specific criteria for good theoretical writing, I might say that:

1. Good writing is as syntactically clear as possible.
2. Good writing is as semantically clear as possible.

I might add to this later, but these seem like fairly good general rules. It would follow from 2, for instance, that good writers need to be clear about the terms that they're using (whose "ideology" are we talking about?). I think "clear" is a better word for what I value in good writing than "simple."

Also, these rules don't apply, in my mind, to fiction or creative nonfiction ("Speak, Memory," for instance).
 
 
All Acting Regiment
14:58 / 06.06.08
I feel, seeing as I started this thread (and quite obviously planted a lot of bad seeds at the start, i.e. a lot of unbacked assertions) I ought to do some explaining. Put simply, I started this thread when I was on an English Lit degree, and at that time I was having a bad reaction to the way in which theory was being used on said degree (and not just what was being used, but what wasn't).

That's not an excuse for what I seem to have written, which is a bunch of attacks on something called 'cultural studies' and something called 'theory', which become, in my usage, essentially straw men. I've assumed that the problems involved in applying various theories to literature are problems inherent in the theories themselves, which is a mistake ('Judith Butler qua Judith Butler' and 'reading a novel via Judith Butler' are different things). The Head Shop wasn't the right place for the thread I really wanted to write, and by trying to create a HS thread out of my thoughts and feelings at the time I didn't acheive much.

Being the only person who actually enjoyed reading novels, in a room full of people, including a qualified 'tutor', who thought the only thing worth saying about Joseph Conrad was that 'he was racist', without even bothering to discern Conrad the writer from his characters, or to look at his 'politics' in context, or even to think about the structure of the novels or the sentence construction, was fucking horrible; things were being banded about uncritically which have been shot down in seconds on the Barbelith Heart of Darkness thread. You know what it was like? It was like being someone who likes hip-hop in a room full of Joe Satriani fans who have never seriously listened to any, and who are intent on pulling it apart on every level apart from the level of actual musical enjoyment, whilst snorting and scoffing.

The course, at the time, was essentially three different flavours of this for 3 hours each every week, with exam questions and essay titles to suit. And I had a shit job.

So I was surrounded by idiots. This doesn't excuse my blunders on this thread, in which I was surrounding everyone else with idiocy.

Another thing I want to make clear is that I don't actually disagree with Butler's points - having done some research, I've found that a lot of people who do disagree, without having any good reason, like to take the piss out of the way the writing sounds because that allows them to evade making a counter-argument.

As a minor point: Haus, I didn't say that Butler 'could do with some alliteration', I said that there are many ways of making writing effective.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
15:04 / 06.06.08
Let one among us go and read Yingling's piece, decide whether it can be rendered in Ordnance Survey English without losing a single droplet of the experience, report back and give specifics.

Of course it can't, but I'm not sure who actually suggested that this should be a 'zero-sum game' in which everything is made so simple as to be a joke.

What's more important - the experience of reading that piece of writing as it is now or getting across the meaning that the OS English version would? Would changing the experience a little in order to make it clearer be worth it?
 
 
Albert Most
16:27 / 06.06.08
Hell, it's the only Head Shop thread that's sustained any type of activity whatsoever - you must have done something right.
 
 
Dusto
22:48 / 13.06.08
Hell, it's the only Head Shop thread that's sustained any type of activity whatsoever - you must have done something right.

You jinxed it!
 
 
Albert Most
15:00 / 19.06.08
Clearly. This place is depressing.
 
 
EvskiG
18:19 / 08.07.08
Seems to me that this is the difference between clear glass and stained glass.

Clear glass is almost invisible and doesn't get in your way. Stained glass can be ornate and beautiful -- and constitute art in itself -- but it's harder to see through.

You can choose to use one or the other (or a mix of both), depending on your intended audience, goals, and personal preference. But if you're simply trying to communicate your ideas to the widest possible audience, clear glass probably is best.

If you need a Marxist theorist to support that position, here goes:

One is not a writer for having chosen to say certain things, but for having chosen to say them in a certain way. And, to be sure, the style makes the value of the prose. But it should pass unnoticed. Since words are transparent and since the gaze looks through them, it would be absurd to slip in among them some panes of rough glass. Beauty is in this case only a gentle and imperceptible force. In a painting it shines forth at the very first sight; in a book it hides itself; it acts by persuasion like the charm of a voice or a face. It does not coerce; it inclines a person without his suspecting it, and he thinks that he is yielding to arguments when he is really being solicited by a charm that he does not see. The ceremonial of the mass is not faith; it disposes the harmony of words; their beauty, the balance of the phrases, dispose the passions of the reader without his being aware and orders them like the mass, like music, like the dance. If he happens to consider them by themselves, he loses the meaning; there remains only a boring seesaw of phrases.

-- Sartre, What is Literature?
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
00:04 / 09.07.08
I think a possible problem with that metaphor is that language is arguably not a thing through which one might wish to look to see an object but the thing by which the object is created.
 
 
EvskiG
03:36 / 09.07.08
language is arguably not a thing through which one might wish to look to see an object but the thing by which the object is created.

Depends on what you see as the object.

If you see a given piece of expository writing as the object, then you reasonably could argue that it is created out of building blocks of language.

But if you see the thesis of a given piece of expository writing as the object, then you reasonably could argue that one can "see through" the specific choices of language used (which could have been replaced by different choices of words/phrasing/etc.) to the underlying thesis.

After all, an author may want to overwhelm readers with the beauty of his or her prose, but it seems safe to assume that the primary purpose of any given piece of expository writing is to communicate a thesis, or persuade people of the validity of that thesis.

In that case, clear glass is language that does not distract the reader from seeing through to the thesis. Stained glass is language that because of its ornate or unusual nature calls attention to itself and distracts the reader from the thesis.
 
 
grant
18:47 / 09.07.08
Well, I think what Haus was saying was that by your metaphor, a lot of dense theoretical language is clear glass looking at clear glass. Hard to tell what you're seeing there.

When you look close enough, you can see all kinds of things in clear glass....


 
 
DecayingInsect
07:38 / 24.07.08
Well, then, we should put these two projects to the proof. Let one among us go and read Yingling's piece, decide whether it can be rendered in Ordnance Survey English without losing a single droplet of the experience, report back and give specifics

Regarding the gnomic paragraph by Yingling as part of a language game, I'd ask: what are the rules? Ipsedixitisms and appeals to authority (as Haus points out) seem to feature.

And it's not just us rude mechanicals toiling at our lab-benches who are perplexed: here are strong words from a (non-Marxist) linguist.
 
 
clever sobriquet
18:42 / 25.07.08
To add a bit to this not yet dead tread: I tend to have a strong, visceral reaction against the calls for "clarity" in language, as if this is the only meaningful criteria. To me, it comes across as exemplary of privileging a subjective perspective (that of the speaker's, who desires this "clarity") at the expense of even the possibility of others, and then dressing that subjectivity in the clothing of objectivity by appeals (implicit or explicit) to common sense, the masses, or what "everyone" knows. In my experience, this seems particularly pronounced when the text in question is about or influenced by late 20th century continental sociocultural analysis (the 'post-'s, basically). (I admit, this could be a function of my own perspective; I value, and thus read, the related writers and disciplines a bit).

I do not believe that language is or can ever be transparent, that there will ever be a clear path to some Platonic meaning, from the writer's mind to the reader's. It seems almost self-evident to me to say that how a piece is written will affect how it's read (without meaning to fully reject or support Wimsatt and Beardsley, because it's about language, not content, of the writer ) as well as how any meaning can be found/received/created between writer and reader, but it seems like that position is implicitly contested in complaints about impenetrability of language.

For me, quality (by which I mean, particularly enjoyable to me) writing is writing that makes demands on a reader. There is a rhythm, a pace that it is incumbent on me as a reader to find, and not all writing goes for the least common denominator in terms of style, grammar or vocabulary. Specifically in relation to the Yingling extract, or the much maligned Butler example, I find that if I come at it with my own standard expectations of reading approach, it is hard work to get through it. If instead I adjust my style of reading to fit the texts, working with rather than against them, it's much easier going, if not actually pleasurable.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
12:46 / 28.07.08
To add a bit to this not yet dead tread: I tend to have a strong, visceral reaction against the calls for "clarity" in language, as if this is the only meaningful criteria. To me, it comes across as exemplary of privileging a subjective perspective (that of the speaker's, who desires this "clarity") at the expense of even the possibility of others, and then dressing that subjectivity in the clothing of objectivity by appeals (implicit or explicit) to common sense, the masses, or what "everyone" knows

'What everyone knows', 'common sense' and 'the masses' certainly don't equal objectivity (they're usually just rhetorical figures). If we're going to be criticising language use we certainly need other standards.

On the other hand - I'm not sure that the people who ask for, say, the Yingling piece to be clearer are always either a) unthinkingly dismissing it because 'everyone knows' that's not the right way of speaking, or b) asking to be 'priviledged' over the author, or over anyone else. It might be that they're frustrated because they want to communicate with the author and that the style of the piece isn't allowing this.

Also, if I was to post a post on a given Barbelith thread, which post simply said, 'Iran', without explaining what it meant, would I be within my rights to refuse to 'priviledge' any curious respondents by explaining it to them? People have actually done stuff like this and we've usually considered them as trolls or near-trolls.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
12:47 / 28.07.08
I think a possible problem with that metaphor is that language is arguably not a thing through which one might wish to look to see an object but the thing by which the object is created.

Does this refer to physical objects? A book only being 'a book' in as much as we call it a book?
 
 
All Acting Regiment
13:10 / 28.07.08
Another point - a lot of theory relies on the reader having knowledge of theories that came before it, as do those previous theories.

Before judging a piece of writing, then, it's probably best to separate out those bits that are 'difficult by neccesity' (e.g., those bits where the writer, because writing something that follows on from Saussure, makes heavy reference to ideas only explained properly in Saussure's essay) from any bits that are arguably 'difficult without good reason'.

I have sympathy with the writer who wants to take the ideas in (e.g.) Saussure for granted, so as to get on to their own work (for example agreeing or disagreeing with Saussure, pointing out things Saussure might have missed, etc). I wouldn't demand that they do much more than give me a reference to the earlier work.
 
 
Dusto
19:01 / 29.07.08
For what it's worth, I'm simpatico in a lot of ways with what AAR has been saying. For one thing, I'm approaching this discussion from the viewpoint of a literary scholar rather than that of a cultural critic, so I think it's safe to say that this flavors my thoughts on the subject. But yeah, while there may not be any such thing as completely transparent language, it's still valid to speak of the relative transparency and opacity of language. And opaque writing has its place, particularly in areas where the piece of writing in question is itself the subject (primary texts). But criticism by nature is about something else; pieces of criticism are secondary texts. And I think criticism that is couched in relatively transparent language better serves the study of primary texts. If that's not what you want your theory to do--if you're interested in reading A Thousand Plateaus as if it's a record album, playing the tracks (reading the chapters) you like over and over and skipping the rest (as Deleuze and Guattari suggest you should)--that's fine, but at that point it seems to me that theory has become an aesthetic object unto itself, and that's not a use of theory that I personally place much value in.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
19:43 / 29.07.08
Before judging a piece of writing, then, it's probably best to separate out those bits that are 'difficult by neccesity' (e.g., those bits where the writer, because writing something that follows on from Saussure, makes heavy reference to ideas only explained properly in Saussure's essay) from any bits that are arguably 'difficult without good reason'.

I'm a little woozy from having my pulpy brains spill out over the floor, but how exactly do we intend to decide what the good reason is that would justify this? Where is our arbiter of good reason, and in what sense is his or her arbitration less impeachable than the arbitration of common sense or the mass?
 
 
clever sobriquet
20:43 / 29.07.08
Dusto (and AAR as well, I suppose): I may have been less than clear, but the point I was trying to make was that 'opacity' is not, in fact, opaque. I would go further and suggest that 'opacity' is in fact a particular perspective being invoked. That this perspective is often functionally self-blind, or blind to the invokers, makes it easy to assume the position is objective; the most successful lens is one that does not appear to be a lens.

I don't necessarily assume malice in what I see as the attempt to privilege the would-be reader's (possibly invisible) perspective over that of the work itself (I'd also take issue with a writer who claimed their work was inviolable, because that forecloses different reading possibilities), but I do see it as an act of privileging one perspective over all others, and that to me is problematic.
 
 
Lurid Archive
20:59 / 30.07.08
Surely a metephysical position on the status of "objectivity" isn't really needed here? Whats wrong with each person simply stating their opinion as to the meaning, clarity and profundity of a piece or an idea. Now, you might think that there is a right answer in assessing all these, or you might think they are entirely subjective, but in practice it comes to much the same thing since reasonable people have honest disagreements about these things.

Also, one should perhaps bear in mind that a writer may well have a specialised audience in mind, and so in a sense the success of a piece might be best judged with respect to that audience and perhaps the intentions of the author (even if you don't know what they are).

So, I'm perfectly happy to call a piece of writing opaque or clear or trivial or whatever if I feel justified in doing so. You might agree with me, perhaps more so if my reasons seem compelling. And apart from these trivialities, my point would be to say that it is fine to separate the necessary from the not, if you want to, but ultimately this is a recipe that you are choosing to follow. Good luck on that, but it all seems terribly sterile at this level of abstraction.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
10:47 / 31.07.08
I'm a little woozy from having my pulpy brains spill out over the floor, but how exactly do we intend to decide what the good reason is that would justify this? Where is our arbiter of good reason, and in what sense is his or her arbitration less impeachable than the arbitration of common sense or the mass?

If you were writing a science paper on owls, say, you'd probably be referring back to previous articles in ecological journals and referencing scientific data which might make the piece hard to read for a non-scientist, but those things would be acceptable because to go right back to the start and explain everything re: owls until you get to your addition is not the job of a science paper.

On the other hand, if you used deliberately difficult phrasing when talking about owls that wouldn't be acceptable - nor would it be acceptable to use language in such a way that you might obscure faulty reasoning.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
10:49 / 31.07.08
Perhaps they can just read Fowler's Modern English Usage.

It's not so much a case of there being some unimpeachable standard for what 'unnecesarily complex' language is, so much as there being a definite justification for complexity, or linguistic ugliness, if it arises from referencing lots of other work, but that this is an area of controversy, where no doubt we will all disagree, if the ugliness or complexity is being done for some reason other than having to reference pre-existing work.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
11:13 / 31.07.08
To apply that to a concrete example, see again the famous Butler quote:

The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to
structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony
in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and
rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of
structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes
structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into
the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of
hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the
rearticulation of power.


Now as Butler is drawing on all the various schools of thought and ideas mentioned here, as she is specifically writing after them and criticising them, I don't think anyone could hold her use of phrases like 'structuralist account' or 'Althusserian theory' against her. To put that another way - there's nothing wrong with writing about or referencing Structuralism or Althusser; nor with referencing them without giving a long, detailed, beginner-friendly explanation of what they are (because you can go and read up on them in other books).

What is controversial is putting all of this into one long sentence, causing a situation where even though I know what most of the terms in the formula mean individually, I can't read the sentence with any degree of comfort: I can't respond to it or weigh up whether or not it's correct, and I feel frustrated at missing whatever it is Butler is trying to say.

There's a further problem, which is that she doesn't provide footnotes to say when or where this 'move' happened, or who was involved, or what the 'power' was, or who it is who has the renewed conception.

Other people here, perhaps, can deal with the sentence and its lack of breathing space. Others might say that it's somehow good that I'm having trouble with it, for various reasons to do with this difficulty being 'radical'.

My experience might not be any more 'standard' than these others, meaning that my struggling with it doesn't make it objectively hard, but I don't think that an experience of this text as difficult is unique to me.
 
 
Dusto
12:12 / 31.07.08
My other problem with the Butler is that she's using words ambiguously. For hegemony, I'm pretty sure she doesn't mean the dictionary definition and she means the Marxist definition, but I get the sense that she's using a lot of words in undefined, specialized ways. Contingent, for instance, or repetition, convergence, and rearticulation. Now, she might be using those words in a completely straight-forward, dictionary sense, but something in her style suggests otherwise. What does it mean in a literal dictionary sense, for instance, for power relations to be subject to repetition and convergence? I could hazard a guess, but it's not entirely clear as it's phrased. Or at least it could be phrased more clearly. And the repetition of the word contingent suggests that she means something specific by it that can't be expressed in any other way, but I'm unclear about what that specific thing is or how it's different from the dictionary definition of contingent.
 
 
HCE
14:37 / 31.07.08
I find that if I come at it with my own standard expectations of reading approach, it is hard work to get through it. If instead I adjust my style of reading to fit the texts, working with rather than against them, it's much easier going, if not actually pleasurable.

[offtopic]Would you mind posting a bit more about that in this thread on reading?[/o]

To go back to the original thread summary, "The language of theory - is it over-complicated," one way to answer this is to ask how complicated something has to be to meet a specific goal, and who gets to decide, while another way is to ask whether any goal that involves more than X amount of complication is legitimate. But even if you ask the second question, you still have to ask who gets to decide whether any given goal is legitimate, so it seems to me that all these questions ultimately come down to power -- a power to decide what is legitimate, and what is enough -- and who gets to wield it.

I personally am all for people who are going to do something a little different with power wield it, such as women writing in styles in which are often seen as 'men's territory' (like Butler, Kristeva, Weil, Cixious -- all of them are challenging to read, in different ways).

if I was to post a post on a given Barbelith thread, which post simply said, 'Iran', without explaining what it meant, would I be within my rights to refuse to 'priviledge' any curious respondents by explaining it to them?.

Obviously not, because Barbelith is not yours, so you do not get to wield the power to decide individually. The group decides, and that decision is articulated in different ways (but that's another topic).

[offtopic] You know how I remember the spelling of 'privilege' (this may work for you): it's privi/lege, with lege like legislation, so it's like 'private law' -- privilege is having the ability to make your own set of rules. This could be completely wrong etymologically, but it helps me get the 'lege' bit right.[/o]

at that point it seems to me that theory has become an aesthetic object unto itself, and that's not a use of theory that I personally place much value in.

This may be off-topic, but do you reject aestheticism altogether, or only when theorists make use of it?

My other problem with the Butler is that she's using words ambiguously. For hegemony, I'm pretty sure she doesn't mean the dictionary definition and she means the Marxist definition, but I get the sense that she's using a lot of words in undefined, specialized ways.

I don't have the rest of the text around that excerpt so you may know something I don't know, but what in that bit of writing makes you think she's using hegemony in some specialized way? I mean, there is a certain amount liberty that people take with words -- when Wilfred Owen, writing to his mother about his war experiences and leaving out a lot of the gruesome details, letting his questions trail off, describes himself as a "master of elision," he is obviously not referring to himself as a master of the omission of vowel sounds, as one confused classmate of mine recently insisted, but it's not as though he's using 'elision' to mean something totally unrelated, like 'fuel economy'. I don't think Butler is doing here what other people sometimes do, which is either coin new words, or use existing words for their own purposes, to mean something there isn't a word for. I could certainly be wrong about this; I am not intimately familiar with her work and may be missing important nuances.
 
 
Dusto
14:57 / 31.07.08
This may be off-topic, but do you reject aestheticism altogether, or only when theorists make use of it?

Not against aestheticism, I just think it's better suited to primary texts. Though one thing I overlooked: works of criticism can be their own subject when they are articulating the approach that they are going to use when looking at primary texts.

I don't have the rest of the text around that excerpt so you may know something I don't know, but what in that bit of writing makes you think she's using hegemony in some specialized way?

Not in the bit of writing itself, but 99% of the time in works of theory, the word "hegemony" is used according to Antonio Gramsci's definition rather than the dictionary definition, so I'm assuming that Butler is using it that way.
 
 
HCE
15:02 / 31.07.08
I am, just for kicks, going to try what AAR suggested -- breaking up Butler's sentence into smaller parts. Since we seem to be agreed that Butler is allowed to talk about things that only people who have read about them understand, I'll just stick in letters for those bits:

The move from (A) to (B) brought (C) into (D), and marked a shift from (E) to (F).

Well, I have to say I don't see how that sentence could be broken up in a way that would help you, unless you wanted something like:

The move from (A) to (B) brought (C) into (D). The move from (A) also marked a shift from (E) to (F).

But you do realize that you gain a period at the cost of having all of (A) repeated? Would that really help? It seems to me that in order to read that sentence of Butler's, you'd have to know what all the big words mean and also understand the references (what is a structuralist account? what is capital? what are social relations? what does homologous mean?). It's not like Finnegan's Wake or something, where the reference may be totally personal. You don't have to read Butler's biography to understand this, you need Saussure, Marx, a dictionary ... I'm not sure what else because it's not something I've studied.

I don't mean to slur anybody, but are you guys entirely sure that the problem isn't just that you don't really understand her references, rather than the language she uses to refer to them?


The bits I took out, for reference:
(A) a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways

(B) a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation

(C) the question of temporality

(D) the thinking of structure

(E) a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects

(F) one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power
 
 
HCE
15:12 / 31.07.08
Not in the bit of writing itself, but 99% of the time in works of theory, the word "hegemony" is used according to Antonio Gramsci's definition rather than the dictionary definition, so I'm assuming that Butler is using it that way.

Ah, thank you. I had no idea what Gramsci's definition of hegemony was or that it was used so commonly. I looked it up in, forgive me, Wikipedia, which says he wants to distinguish between coercion through armed force, and coercion through social pressures, authority, leadership, etc., thus cultural hegemony? That's helpful, but is it really so far from what dictionary.com gives* that Butler is rendered incomprehensible?

Obviously I am not going to get as much from Butler as somebody who's studied her carefully, but again, this is my problem, not hers, and I don't see why she should change the way she writes to accommodate my ignorance.


*1. leadership or predominant influence exercised by one nation over others, as in a confederation.
2. leadership; predominance.
3. (esp. among smaller nations) aggression or expansionism by large nations in an effort to achieve world domination.
 
 
Dusto
18:54 / 31.07.08
Gramsci's hegemony, in my understanding, is also specifically a condition where one has been controlled so thoroughly that it feels naturalized. That is, you think it's your own idea, but really its the invisible force of culture. That word in particular isn't my problem with Butler's sentence. It's a common enough usage (though it could be confusing for anyone who didn't know that usage). But "a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation" doesn't seem to be relying on any preexisting usage issues, and it's not that clear in terms of literal sense. Just looking at "power relations are subject to repetition," I think she means that they are apt to be reproduced in new contexts, but she might also mean repeated across time (possible, since she's talking about bringing temporality into things), or across modes of production. But it's just not clear, because it has no base, literal meaning. "Subject to convergence" is similarly vague. Power relations are apt to converge with each other? And if so, what would that mean? Or power relations that existed at different times are apt to converge in a given moment? I don't know, and Butler doesn't clarify. The problem with your simplification is that A, B, C, D, E and F aren't simple preexisting concepts that anyone with the right background will get: those are the places where she is writing poorly.
 
  

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