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Richard Dawkins

 
  

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multitude.tv
16:13 / 21.12.06
Nighthawk, One can easily admit that experiences have a biological basis and still make non-scientific claims for them... I can say that an art-work is sublime, for example. If someone said 'ah, but look, these parts of your brain are showing increased activity, so its all in your head', I'd suggest they were somewhat missing the point. Of course our neurobiology engenders our psychic lives, but that doesn't make my appalled reaction to, say, recent events in Ipswich 'all in my head', does it? One could certainly describe it in those terms, but noone would suggest that that was the most important, or only legitimate way of understanding the experience.

Agreed, more or less. Except in the cases of Ice-cream, painting, summers day, etc, we not only have the evaluated experience articulated in speech, and shown in the brain scan, but there is the ice cream, painting, summers day that can be understood without the particular evaluative experience. With god the issue is, that sure you can have brain activity that indicates “religious experience” but there is no evidence (like there would be for ice cream, painting, summers day) for the referent of the experience. Dreams are experiences that may seem “real”, but no one would say that because you have a dream about a giant who eats things in reverse that there is necessarily such a creature that you can observe waking in the world. The obvious religious reply would be something like “god caused those bits of my brain to light up” or “god gave some people the capacity to have these experiences and others not” (which one could imagine horrible social consequences), the point is (if the research bares out), I think that god is superfluous to the “religious experience” in the brain, you don’t need god to explain the phenomenon.

I really like your examples Nighthawk, and I think there is something there, especially in the notion of evaluation, taste, preference and expression. This is, I think, something Dawkins tends to miss, but I basically think it is due to his reactionary position in the face of continental thought. As far as going through Dawkins argument, I guess I was thinking of something more analytic; “Dawkins says this here, does it make sense?” kind of thing. It seems to me these discussions get stuck on what “religion” is.

Wittgenstein:

"What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence" (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 7)

I think Wittgenstein being referred to as a mystic, though a popular enough description, is not exactly what he had in mind (I could be wrong). I think Wittgenstein is taking a rather agnostic position on that which we cannot express rationally.

Two-headed:
: why do you think that I think there is a "soul"? Here we go again. More imagining of what I must obviously believe as a religious person based on what you know about other religions.

I'm sorry, I was conflating "soul" with your notion of "spiritual learning" above:

Internally, as my direct experience of confrontation with what I choose to refer to as "The Divine" prompts personal growth, development and understanding. Externally, as this constant spiritual learning curve shapes the decisions I make on a day-to-day basis, in turn shaping the life I have made for myself, and therefore impacting to some degree on the lives of all those within my orbit.

I shouldn't have used the term "soul" rather "spirit". What my question was getting at is what is "spiritual learning"? What is the learning that you are writing about, is it learning about the spirit, or is there a spirit that learns? What is this notion of spirit?

As for Afro-Caribbean religions, they are in fact not recognized by other major faiths as valid, but are the subject of a great deal of anthropological study; and are of course legally protected as a form of religious expression (in the US).

I think it should be fairly evident that the category of experiences we call "religious" as encompassing the practices, rituals, ceremonies, myth, etc is a fairly recent phenomenon in the West. It wasn't until the 18th century, really, that practices other than Christianity were widely called "religious" in the West. There is debate on if Buddhism should be included or not. For example you will see courses on Buddhist philosophy at some universities that study texts, the coherence, thought, implications in what the texts say, for example the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna. On the other hand, in a Comparative Religion course, or Anthropology, folks will often look at the daily rituals, practices, artifacts, etc. That we call Buddhism a religion at all, and study the practices, is a rather recent development.

I am surprised someone hasn't done an etymology of "religion" here. It comes from the Old Latin "religio" which means something like "taboo" or "restraint" which derives from "re"- to return, and "ligare" "to bind", that is a "return to bondage". The term is a Western notion, which is why some Buddhists don't like folks calling what they do "religious", precisely because doing so is seen as another kind of intellectual imperialism.

The Wiki article on Religion offers up the general ways that folks approach religion. I more or less see religion as a social phenomenon.

Yet I am not allowed to call it religion, simply because it is not recognised as such by western culture. If this means I am cast as "twice a victim" then so be it. I stand by my right to have my own religious freedom and expression, thank you very much, regardless of what you, the Pope, Richard Dawkins or Jimmy Tarbuck might think of it.

Your allowed to call it anything you want. With some understandings of religion, any ritual activity can be understood as religious (going to work for example, or shopping, or a sporting event, or a political rally, etc). Many Academic departments of religion study Afro-Caribbean religions, just as they study Native American religions, South East Asian Religions, etc. But, I think it is obvious from the terms used to designate these various religions, they are understood principally as socio-cultural-geographic.

No one, as far as I know, is assaulting your First Amendment Rights, freedoms, etc, at least on this board. We are trying to understand what you call religion.

My problem with this thread is the seeming inability to understand that the religious experience is not synonymous with the structures of institutional religion - they do exist as separate things in the world - therefore an effective critique of one does not undermine the value of the other.

What is the "religions experience"? Or to ask in another way What experiences are correctly described as "religious"? or, if you like, How do you know when you have an experience it is "religious"? Is the religious experience of a spiritualist comparable to that of a Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist, etc? It seems to me that it would be if we call all of these experiences "religious." Is “religious experience” absolutely distinct from “institutional religion”, you make a distinction, but on what basis? I think that could be a helpful discussion.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
17:14 / 21.12.06
Nighthawk,

Ok makes sense. A few responses... its nonsense to believe that because a statement is not grounded in the scientific method it cannot be true. I did not mean to suggest that existence of god or indeed religious/spiritual experiences can be proven from within the scientific method. And neither does Dawkins. Indeed given that I'm using the word 'Truth' from within an already stated philosophical perspective it wouldn't make any sense to suggest I believed that. Rather it's a question of such things as religion, spiritual experiences being provable from within their own discourse. However I do not think it's a surprise that within this discussion those who have 'faith' are singularly incapable of offering any justification for their faith or explanations for their experiences.

Where you suggest If by 'unquestionable' you mean 'unjustifiable by science', then yes, but its hardly unique in that respect.... I was not suggesting this at all, but was following the same logic as before. So let me get slightly more philosophical for a moment, (strangely I always end up getting all Deluezian at these moments) Because rather than focus on extending scientific justifications into the non-scientific realm. I would suggest it can be considered as 'True' if in the complex construction of propositions and sensations that constitutes the truth, it can express the conditions for the genesis and development of events. The more a proposition expresses about our constructed reality and the inter-relations between objects the more truth the inter-relation will contain. Truth is simply not a property of single propositions 'God exists' or 'I have had a revelatory experience' but must be verifiable in some way. For example an event 'May 68' might be proposed as a truth event because it did produce a range of moral propositions that resulted in a number of moral goods that became struggles between good and evil, falsity and truth and so on. You might then argue that the invention of christianity, with its gradual replacement of earlier indo-european myths with this selected set of myths was a such an argument (which does not in any way justify 'god' or the associated revelatory experiences). Because this does not justify any such faith based statement, nor does it ever justify a knowledge claiming that it can only be considered internally. Bizarrely they obviously have the same status as knowledge and truth as racism or sexism, postmodern theologians often talk about christianity like Herbert Spencer talking evolution as 'survival of fittest' etc.

I guess that what I'm trying to say is that I agree entirely that an argument that only 'scientific knowledge' might generate what we might call truth is nonsensical, but this is of course obvious as can be seen in Dawkins work on the 'selfish gene' and his silly concept of the 'meme' and the deep humanism that is illogically buried in his work. The whole point about 'knowledge' is that it can be interrogated. The consequence of this seems to be that traditional religious discourses and I think I'd include the spiritual and revelatory discourses as well are in deep trouble because they have always been constructed as beyond question.

I can't tell, having read the book only once, whether Dawkins can live with the thought that once you recognize that the religion/science struggle is precisely the ongoing political struggle whether science or religion will occupy the role of the jurist-priest. As far as I can tell religion lost this war at the very start of the scientific-industrial revolution... as it's never been able to respond adequately to the infinite universe. It may appear to be a piece of bizarre logic but I suspect that the consequence of this is that only with the increased marginalization of religion, which is Dawkins desire, can we begin to attack sciences actual role...
 
 
sdv (non-human)
17:57 / 21.12.06
Two Bpy

To reiterate, for the third time now, I am attempting to make clear a distinction between the various destructive dogmas of organised religion that are being critiqued in this thread (such as contraception and creationism) and the values of the religious experience itself, as I understand it and have experienced it ...

The differend between us might be understood in something like the following: that you accept a value for possible non-destructive dogmas, whereas I would argue that given that no proof is possible for any 'deity', (the logical proofs are simply laughable). However whether a dogma is destructive or not is simply irrelevant, it is constructed on something that is no longer useful. Religion is always primarily social and political, whereas your argument depends on accepting that it is primarily spiritual and only secondarily social and political.

I would always insist that the jurist-priest social function is always dominant as even today they support the troops with either political prayers or ever more destructive weapons... (even whilst waiting for the genetic bombs...) The other pole of the differend which is relating to 'religious experience' is so personal that it's simply useless in a discussion that is really, as Dawkins constructs it, about what our societies should become.

(I suspect that Dawkins would not ally science with the state which is what Brecht condemns Galileo for in his wonderful play....)

The gap is made concrete in that I have absolutely no experiences that might be named spiritual/or/religious – in fact, and I am not suggesting that yours are in any sense like this all the secondary experiences I have been close to have always been suspiciously like nervous breakdowns. The real point about a differend is that communication across the identified divide is impossible. Concepts like soul, dieties etc are as nonsensical as snarks and boojums.

So then to say ... religion is something that I actively practice, not something that I passively believe in .... doesn't mean anything to me. Religious practice is precisely and always only social and as such is as ideological as science and any other knowledge. Typically it is typically constituted by a ludicrous and stupid beliefs.(As ludicrous as the reactionary scientific concept of the gay gene).

I think the above may be sufficient to explain that it's not the case that I cannot read and understand what you've written, it's much worse than that ! It is rather that it can never make sense to me, the work it attempts to explain would generate a social, a future that needs resisting even more than the impossible world that Dawkins wants. (There is enough historical evidence to justify this...)

across the differend...

steve
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:35 / 21.12.06
The wittengenstein references are interesting but like multitude.tv i think the claim that he was in some sense a mystic is probably mistakern. I'll check this as it's interesting to think about that...

However in the sections on the truth-function and truth propositions you'll find 6.372 which is more interesting as it's very contrary to both the postmodern understanding of science and religion that we've been struggling with here, courtesy of Dawkins.

"... thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as god and fate were treasted in past ages.
And in fact both are right and wrong: though the view of the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained..."

Even a brief look at the works of his contemporaries such as Haldane or Bernal is enough to show he was misrepresenting science and as I suspect others would say religion as well, hence the mystic query...
 
 
Alex's Grandma
19:21 / 21.12.06
The real point about a differend is that communication across the identified divide is impossible. Concepts like soul, dieties etc are as nonsensical as snarks and boojums.


Without wishing to pile on you sdv, this seems like a terribly flawed argument. Souls and deities are defined concepts - if you genuinely don't understand what a soul or a deity is, or is supposed to be, you can look up the words in a dictionary. As far as I know this isn't the case with the other examples you mention.

And as for the idea that communication between atheists and the religious is impossible - well isn't this thread (mostly, though at points one has to wonder,) 'proof' that this isn't the case?

At source, you seem to arguing that because you personally have never had what might be described as a religious experience (to be clear, this wouldn't have to be a full-blown 'Road to Damascus' psychic fireworks display, it could just be the vague intimation, walking down the road one day, that there's some sort of underlying order behind observed reality; or it could be about something else altogether,) then anyone who has had that sort of experience, and finds the religious/mystical model more useful than the 'scientific' (I won't say rationalist here,) version in terms of understanding said experience is to be treated with suspicion, because they are basically 'wrong.'

With apologies if I've misunderstood you, but if I haven't, that doesn't strike me as an especially scientific line of argument, as it appears to be dismissing, out of hand, a set of phenomena that for any number of really perfectly rational individuals are part of their lived reality.

To put it another way, you can argue, until you're blue in the face, that a given set of individuals are not 'in love,' that it's all just brain chemistry, hormones and so on, but they'd almost certainly reply that if you feel that way then you've never been in love yourself. It could be the one thing, then, or it could be the other - all science really has to say, or should have to say about this, actually, is that at the moment it doesn't really know. But it's interested in looking at the subject rationally.

(With apologies for anthropomorphising 'science.' And for all the scare quotes.)
 
 
nighthawk
08:23 / 22.12.06
The obvious religious reply would be something like “god caused those bits of my brain to light up” or “god gave some people the capacity to have these experiences and others not” (which one could imagine horrible social consequences), the point is (if the research bares out), I think that god is superfluous to the “religious experience” in the brain, you don’t need god to explain the phenomenon.

Yeah, so do I, but the point is that one can't argue either way from this this sort of thing without begging the question. Clearly the fact that particular parts of the brain are active doesn't tell us anything either way. The fact that the condition has been deliberately induced is interesting, but all it might tell us is the neurological basis for such experiences - nothing at all about their origins. I mean, say some scientists induced a feeling of nausea in me, such that I'd say I felt a bit sea-sick. The fact that this happened in a laboratory doesn't make my real-world sea-sickness any less legitimate.

sdv I can agree with most of what you've said on this page, but I think we're a long way from Dawkins, beyond the feeling all three of us share about the uselesness of religion (we might disagree about why its useless, but still). Being an atheist doesn't have to involve infantilising the religious, nor locating all the world's ills in the very fact that people profess faith - that's why I'm reluctant to welcome Dawkins as an ally.
 
 
StarWhisper
09:37 / 22.12.06
I think Wittgenstein being referred to as a mystic, though a popular enough description, is not exactly what he had in mind (I could be wrong). I think Wittgenstein is taking a rather agnostic position on that which we cannot express rationally.

That we cannot express such things rationally is what I though he was aiming for in part.

There are flaws in rationalism and logic, like the paradox of the arrow that occupies a different space each moment it flies and logically ends up in two different places at once, for example.

Wittgenstein was certainly a mystic. Although he never really ventured to speak of his mysticism, hence:

"What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence" (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, proposition 7)

I don't know if he claimed to be agnostic or otherwise.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
16:06 / 22.12.06
wittgenstein is not my area, however I queried this with people who are better informed on wittgenstein and recieved the following:

From Lois Shawyer quoteing Bertand R. : "The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in
the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is
adequate, but for my part, I confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort." Myself, what makes me uncomfortable is calling this "mysticism".
Wittgenstein is responsible for this term himself, but usually we mean something more alien to our ordinary life than Wittgenstein had in mind. At the same time, it struck Wittgenstein as rather magical that would could make sense of things without using words to "tell" what the sense was. Here is another interesting passage of Wittgenstein's that was published in Culture and Value: The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe the fact which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence, without simply repeating the sentence. ... Feelings accompany our apprehension of a piece of music in the way they accompany the events of our life." (p.10)...."

And from Matt Lee who wrote his doctorate on Deleuze and Wittgenstein (Frankly I'm bemused that anyone would write such a thing...but then I'm really only on the deleuzian side of the equation)... :

" well I think there's some debate in Wittgenstein interpretation but in general, no, I don't think the mystical is reducible to the inexpressible but the phrase 'inexpressible region' is more ambiguous and is closer. Black, for instance, in his Companion to the Tractatus, claims that the "what he [W.] called the 'urge to the mystical' is one of the chief motives of the book' (374) and cites, in reference to 6.44, a discussion in the _Ethics Lecture_ about an experience which has 'absolute value' and which is constituted in effect by 'wonder at the existence of the world'. It seems then that it is not as though a kind of linguistic of formalist approach produces the naming of the mystical but something more, something else.... Having said that Wittgenstein will clearly try to suggest later (lecture on religious belief) that anyone wanting to claim something as evidence for a religious belief is irrational and foolish but distinguish this from the having of a religious belief which he thinks understandable and incapable of being dismissed, providing it doesn't entangle itself in the language of proof...."

(Finally then I queried whether they though it was something closer to Badiou's use of the void or Lyotards postmodern rereading of the kantian sublime...)

Matt responded with: "...Now as far as the distinction you're making between a kind of Badiouian void or Lyotardian response to the sublime and a religious or spiritual mysticism, I think Wittgenstein is probably closer to the latter, albeit in a mediated way. The route of mediation is that I think his response to mysticism arises from his response to metaphysics in general, the 'metaphysical urge' being akin to or analogous with 'the urge to the mystical'...."

fascinating ...

steve
 
 
sdv (non-human)
17:21 / 22.12.06
alex,

What i was attempting to say in the quoted sentence is that the conflict going between the religious/spirtual pole and the more extreme atheist pole is not a simple disagreement as you have suggested, but contains a differend that is unbridgeable. (a differend is a case of conflict between two or more parties which cannot be equitably resolved for lact of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments)...

What this thread has shown to me (contrary to what you seem to imagine) is that the divide as defined by the scientist (Dawkins) cannot be bridged by those such as yourself who want to maintain a 'religious model' because you don't appear to have a valid (metaphysical) defence, especially interesting that professed 'atheists' have produced better defences than the religious.

I have no idea when the concept of the 'soul' was invented, though I think we could with a little reseach decide that it was in a particular historical moment - but this does not mean that it refers to an entity that actually exists seperate from human invention, anymore than the 'ether' or 'race'. What surprises me about your response is that it might be thought to imply that just because many people believe something to be true then it should be treated as a useful construct... This does not follow.

As for the 'scientific, brain chemistry...' This is precisely the kind of (faith!!!) scientific research which is not only stupid and worthless but frankly if i'd been on the funding committee they'd have been sent off to play with the daisies.
 
 
multitude.tv
17:55 / 22.12.06
Yeah, so do I, but the point is that one can't argue either way from this this sort of thing without begging the question. Clearly the fact that particular parts of the brain are active doesn't tell us anything either way. The fact that the condition has been deliberately induced is interesting, but all it might tell us is the neurological basis for such experiences - nothing at all about their origins.

I more or less am in agreement with that. Basically; I was saying that the "religious" experience is not necessarily indicative of the activity of any sort of "divine" entity. I was going to make a point in a much longer post I wrote but did not post about the social inclination to make such claims. That is, the whole history and language of religion is a convenient method for describing such experiences.

"the aggregate of accidents in the agent or agents, requisite for the production of the effect"-Hobbes

That is, divinity is not a necessary accident to the "religious" experience. Which is why I tried to posit what a religious response might look like. Because, given the reason of religion, God is uber-cause, the presumed "cause" of everything anyway.

More on the Wittgenstein digression.

"Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense." -W, Lecture on Ethics

Now, granted W's view attitude was much more amenable than Dawkins, as he said that he wouldn't ridicule those who try to speak meaningfully about Ethics or Religion, which itself seems to be an agnostic expression, not to affirm or deny the claims at the limit of language. I have passed this question onto a colleague who works on Wittgenstein, but he's getting ready for the APA conference. It seems that SDV already asked some folks, I agree, the whole Wittgenstein question is fascinating.

I'm really not sure that we can make meaningful statements about W's "spiritual" inclinations, so I pass over such judgments in silence as it were. I meant agnostic, btw, in the sense that he didn't make any claims about the existence or non-existence of god; not a sort of self-identification. Here is a link to the text of the Lecture on Ethics. This whole topic is worthy of its own thread, don’t you think?

*********

Attempt to bring thread back to Dawkins

I should make clear, I am not a huge fan of Dawkins, (a minor fan, in the same way I enjoy Colbert) I don't think he's some sort of hero for reason, etc. I do think he is carving out an interesting socio-cultural position in a rather strong way. Given the piece that aired on channel 4 on the God Delusion "The Root of All Evil?", he is rather polite to the Anglican in Oxford. I think this reveals his principle concern against fundamentalists. By fundamentalist, I mean those folks who take their particular religious text to be absolutely wholly-true, factual, and revealed by god).

In my own experience, fundamentalists tend to be immune to any sort of reasoned argument*; if it be in the super-rationalism of Dawkins, the critique of Morality of Nietzsche, or the contradictions and historical problems discussed by Biblical criticism. I don’t think religion has much to do with reason for believers anyway, I do think it has much more to do (in general) with the social-cultural-geographic context in which the subjectivity is formed, that is, it is a matter for most believers, of social normatively and cultural taste (that is, social-ethical-aesthetic judgment). Unlike Dawkins, I don’t think religion for fundamentalists is about rational truth claims, but rather the grounding for a particular strategy of truth within social-cultural-political discourse.

That Dawkins has been more popular in the US than in other parts of the world has (I imagine) more to do with the socio-political and cultural dominance of Evangelical non-denominational fundamentalist Christianity; and the marginalization of science, education, and divisions in community (the US’s own post ’69 and Conservative Revolution) that have accompanied this most recent religious "awakening" in the US.

In the US, I think you would be hard pressed to find anyone who has not had a personal or familial experience with Evangelical Christianity. If your not part of the Evangelical faith community in the US, you are 1) in need of being saved or 2) (if you can not be persuaded) an agent of secular progressivism actively trying to destroy the Godly foundation of the US. Even the main-line denominations (Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, etc, are being forced, socially to choose sides, see the recent schism in the Episcopal Church. I think that point should be stressed, socially. It isn't by law, or even a conflict in theology, it’s about the social and cultural positions that folks take up in the public sphere. Historically, fundamentalist Christianity in the US can be seen as a reaction to Biblical Criticism, Wiki has a listing on Biblical Criticism with lots of links. Fundamentalist Christianity (as we know it today) has its doctrinal root in the Niagara Bible Conference in the late 19th century, most Evangelical churches still use the 14 point creed (in some form or another) as their interpretive foundation to relating to the text of the Bible.

My own ethical/aesthetic position is that religion (especially in the dominant, orthodox and evangelical varieties) is a "useless error" in "bad taste" and “uninteresting”, more or less in agreement with Nietzsche. What people do in their private lives is up to them, but when religion becomes a foundation for foreign policy, education, or public health, it becomes, I think, problematic.

--------------

*As an undergraduate I did a year long anthropological study of Campus Crusade for Christ, daily with believers, taking the same courses, going on Spring Break (what a downer) learning the strategies of conversion, the methods of performing presentations (sermons), observing the culture of "testimony" (public confession and profession of faith), etc. I did this at a Public University, not a religious college, where CCC was the single largest student organization on the campus; I found it very eye-opening.
 
 
Jack Fear
19:22 / 22.12.06
I have no idea when the concept of the 'soul' was invented, though I think we could with a little reseach decide that it was in a particular historical moment

I'm not so sure about that, and my feeling is that it's unnecessarily reductive to look for the origins of religious experience purely in a historical-political framework. (I know that that framework, and theoretical modes for dealing with it, are your area of expertise; but let's take a tiny step out of your comfort zone for a moment, shall we?)

There's increasing evidence that religious experience is not a human invention as such, but an evolutionary adaptation, dating back to the integration of the two halves of the brain and the subsequent development of full human consciousness. Jaynes posits the voices of the gods were simply the two hemispheres of our brains learning to speak to one another.

More recently; there's some interesting work being done in evolutionary psychology, particularly by David Bjorklund and Jesse Bering, suggesting that the religious experience is not a "concept" as such, not a problem or calculation upon which the system of the human mind can operate, but rather a function (or, as Bering would characterize it, a malfunction) of that operating system itself.

Jesse Bering: "God is not an idea, nor a cultural invention, nor an 'opiate of the masses' or any such thing. God is a way of thinking that was rendered permanent by natural selection."

And, oddly enough, that sounds about right to me. However, Bering's subsequent conclusion—that religious experience is therefore a "cognitive illusion"—seems to me a huge logical leap, since it rests on the supposition that our lingering god-consciousness is a useless vestige, like the vermiform appendix. He offers little effective evidence to that end, and I would argue that the opposite is in fact true—that the capacity for religious faith, for mystery, for experience of the numinous, is a useful adaptation.
 
 
nighthawk
19:56 / 22.12.06
I won't claim any great knowledge of Wittgenstein's earlier work, but I'm a little wary of treating those Tractatus quotes in isolation. I had a friend who would approvingly quote that final line as though it were a profound truth, but I think its worth remebering that it concludes a text in which Wittgenstein has made very specific claims about the scope and function of language, claims which he went on to reject or at least distance himself from in his later work. I do think that's relevant in determining the nature of Wittgenstein's mysticism, particularly as he stresses in the intended preface for the Philosophical Investigations that he wanted both halves of his career to be viewed together: the Tractatus and the PI printed as a complete volume. I'll look up the exact quote later.

I think there's an article in an old volume of the Philosophical Review by B.F. McGuiness that discusses the supposed 'mysticism' of the Tractatus. Its particularly interesting given Russell's hostility to any sort of mysticism, and the way he critcised aspects of Wittgenstein's work on precisely these grounds. Again, I'll look it up some time this weekend if I can...

Jack Fear: Its difficult to say more without reading work by the people you've mentioned, but I'm suspicious of this:

Jesse Bering: "God is not an idea, nor a cultural invention, nor an 'opiate of the masses' or any such thing. God is a way of thinking that was rendered permanent by natural selection."

Its very vague, in so far as its not clear that 'forms of thought' are subject to 'natural selection' in the evolutionary sense, let alone liable to be rendered permanent by it. I can;t help but feel that the writer is leaning on the scientific cachet of the term to make a rather shaky point. But perhaps he supports it properly in his work?
 
 
Jack Fear
20:20 / 22.12.06
Judge for yourself; here's a paper (pdf) on "The natural emergence of afterlife reasoning as a developmental regularity," another on d Death as an Empirical Backdoor to the Representation of Mental Causality, and an abstract to a paper on recursiveness and the evolution of supernatural agency.

Like many atheists studying religious consciousness, he's a bit fixated on punishment and reward; the adaptive behavior at the core of his thesis is the increased tendency to engage in prosocial behaviors when we believe ourselves to be observed and to that end he does research with chimpanzees and robots with big, staring eyes.

He differs there from Jaynes, who focused on numinosity and inspiration), but it's provocative stuff.
 
 
Jack Fear
20:22 / 22.12.06
Just saw this;

its not clear that 'forms of thought' are subject to 'natural selection' in the evolutionary sense, let alone liable to be rendered permanent by it.

Is evolutionary psychology not a valid science in your view, then?
 
 
multitude.tv
23:05 / 22.12.06
I won't claim any great knowledge of Wittgenstein's earlier work, but I'm a little wary of treating those Tractatus quotes in isolation.

Agreed. I'm guilty too, and I repent. More Wittgenstein in a min.

I'm not going to get too much into the Jaynes stuff, I read Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind years ago in a Poly-Sci class (go figure).

But I would say that the fact that the capacity of wonder, mystery, awe, fascination, etc, of course doesn't have any necessary relation to the formulation of a notion of deity, much less religion as expressed in the world today. That is, just because one "hears voices," (for lack of a better description, not meant to be diminutive); doesn't lead one to conclude that you are talking to Apollo, Allah, etc. After all, “philosophy begins in wonder,” to paraphrase Plato, but that wonder doesn't necessarily lead one to knowledge of deity let alone the formulation of moral law; in fact it could take one to a far of island to work out evolution.

If wonder, fascination, awe, mystery, fascination are evolutionary adaptations, I would agree that they may be very useful. But I guess what I would call “religion” or what would make these experiences “religious” would be the interpretation of said feelings in terms of a shared mythic discourse. I do think that “Bering’s God” as “way of thinking” is a little bit interesting, and quite a bit metaphorical, I'd like to know if he elaborates that at all. That’s my initial thought anyway, but I’ll consider it a bit more, thanks.

Also, this Archaeological site was recently covered in the press, it is being touted as evidence for the world's oldest religion. May be interesting to this thread. Spoiler: *It seems to be a 70,000 year old carving of a python, with evidence of ritual going on at the site, check it out though.

********

In more interesting news, I heard by from my Wittgenstein guy (Prof. John Wright). He wrote:

"It depends very much on what you mean by 'mystic.' It is uncontroversial that Wittgenstein talks about 'the mystical' (das Mystiche) in the Tractatus, but it is highly controversial what he meant by it, because Wittgenstein is obscure, even enigmatic.

That said, I guess I would concede that Wittgenstein was in some sense a mystic. It should be underlined that Wittgenstein did not think there was an ineffible truth to get at, something that cannot be said. But this is at the heart of the largest controversy in early Wittgenstein scholarship -- a dispute between the 'resolute' readers (like Cora Diamond and James Conant) who hold that Wittgenstein really wanted us to use the metaphysical structure laid out at the beginning of the TLP to get at a right view language, which would involve dismissing the sense of just those metaphysical claims. The other camp takes Wittgenstein's metaphysics seriously, as getting offering a real, sensible theory of language. This also means getting to the right view of the task of philosophy. Wittgenstein, like Kant, wanted to delimit sharply the task of philosophy. Most importantly, he dismissed the view, sometimes present in Frege and certainly at work in Russell and Whitehead that there were logical laws, i.e., important normative principles governing the formation of sense-making propositions that philosophers were positioned to apprehend and promulgate to the sciences. Instead, he held that language is in shape as it stands, that logic is internal to language, implicit in any sense-making proposition. Another way to see this: to formulate a law governing language one would have to stand outside of language to formulate it, but this is impossible -- the idea of a metalanguage does not help because it TOO would have
to be governed by the same laws that allegedly govern our language. Truth and falsehood, for Wittgenstein are limited to sense-making propositions -- the propositions of logic show us structural features of our sense-making propositions, and that's all there is. Again, then, Wittgenstein's project is to get us to see non-sense as non-sense. Logical form makes non-sense apparent as such (something that can be brought out well by looking at Wittgenstein's formal logical notation).

So, if Wittgenstein is not a mystic in the sense of thinking that there is some ineffable truth that we can apprehend in certain states of mind, then what? I think Wittgenstein thought of the whole of sensible propositions, the world, as something one stands over against, and that one can take different attitudes about -- he speaks of the world waxing and waning as a whole, and of the world of the happy man being different from the world of an unhappy man. Wittgenstein's views were appropriated by logical positivists and their allies in ethical theory -- the emotivists, who put forward a theory of ethics as subjective attitudes toward a world of facts, and who thought they were elaborating Wittgenstein's views. But Wittgenstein would have been embarrassed by this, as his intention was to put an end to philosophical theorizing about ethics by putting it "on the Index" as he would say -- things not to be talked about -- if one cares to avoid spouting non-sense."

*********

Beyond that on Wittgenstein, I got nothing. I hope you all have a great weekend! I’ll be around a bit less for a few days.
 
 
nighthawk
08:33 / 23.12.06
Is evolutionary psychology not a valid science in your view, then?

Ah, yes, I overstated that a little last night didn't I... I've been reading pop-science books this week by people who would perhaps be sceptical of claims made by EP, but I'm in no position to judge its validity. Thanks for those links - I'll have a look and come back to this thread.
 
 
Spaniel
16:36 / 23.12.06
Multitude, isn't that all Tractatus stuff again? I think it's important to note that the man moved a long way from the Tractatus over his career.

Here's an edition of In our Time on Wittgenstein. They discuss whether he should be considered a mystic if, I recall correctly.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
08:54 / 24.12.06
Multitude.tv

Actually, it's worth remembering how everyday and 'british' Dawkins views are...for this is the front page headline of yesterdays Guardian newspaper from a survey they commissioned "...82% say faith causes tension in a country where two thirds are not religious..."

I thought you might enjoy Deleuze on Wittgenstein:

Paraphrase of Deleuze-Parnet ABC interview

"W as in Wittgenstein"

Parnet says, let's move on to W, and Deleuze says, there's nothing in W, and Parnet says, yes, there's Wittgenstein. She knows he's nothing for Deleuze, but it's only a word. Deleuze says, he doesn't like to talk about that... It's a philosophical catastrophe. It's the very type of a "school", a regression of all philosophy, a massive regression. Deleuze considers the Wittgenstein matter to be quite sad. They imposed a system of terror in which, under the pretext of doing something new, it's poverty introduced as grandeur. Deleuze says there isn't a word to express this kind of danger, but that this
danger is one that recurs, that it's not the first time that it has arrived. It's serious especially since he considers the Wittgensteinians to be nasty and destructive . So in this, there could be an assassination of philosophy, Deleuze says, they are assassins of philosophy, and because of that, one must remain very vigilant.

steve also laughs...
 
 
multitude.tv
16:20 / 26.12.06
SDV

Thanks for that last post, I think it sums up my disinterest in Wittgenstein nicely. Though its not so bad to have a "Wittgenstein" resource on hand.

Hope you all have a happy New Year!
 
 
EvskiG
14:55 / 29.12.06
Sorry I'm late to the party, but I thought I'd offer my take on what Dawkins is saying.

1. Generally, religious people believe in a God (or gods).

2. The existence of God can't be proven through reason or objective evidence.

(Here Dawkins sets forth -- and in my opinion refutes -- the classic arguments for the existence of God.)

3. Because the existence of God can't be proven through reason or objective evidence, religious people generally justify their belief in God by resorting to faith.

4. Faith isn't actually proof -- at least outside the realm of the personal and subjective.

5. However, since most people in most societies today are religious, and use faith to justify their religious beliefs, faith has come to be considered an acceptable basis for belief.

6. This causes problems when faith is used as a basis for believing in things outside the purely personal and subjective -- especially when people try to impose their purely faith-based beliefs on others.

Of course, this doesn't mean that religion can't be deeply personally meaningful. It just means that many or most religious beliefs, including a belief in God, can't be proven as empirically, factually true, and that, given this fact, religion shouldn't be used as a justification for behavior or actions that affect the public sphere.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
15:54 / 06.01.07
Reading the Guardian in the last few days - two very different comments which are outright attacks on atheism and the secular. One from a christian perspective and the other from an islamic one... I'm also curious why they stupidly confuse the concepts of the secular and atheism but that is another story perhaps...

What I'm not sure of is whether the attacks are because the tide is beginning to turn against the religious and the spirtual after a few decades in which their reactionary tendencies have been given free reign or whether it is the beginning of a nasty counterattack ?

which do you think it is ?
 
 
Jack Fear
17:48 / 06.01.07
Do you have links to the Guardian articles, so that we can discuss them on their own merits?
 
 
gayscience
13:01 / 07.01.07
Even if we knew [the right equations for Quantum Gravity] we still wouldn't know why the Universe bothers to exist. Stephen Hawking

Excuse the upcoming cliché (part 1) and for probably restating whats already been said. My thoughts:

1. Faith allows us to generate potential answers to questions which science cannot currently answer.

2. Organised religion systematises these speculations and gives them the appearance of truth, in order to reassure people that there are concrete answers to the confusing and sometimes frightening unknowns in our universe.

So part 2 seems to be pretty problematic to me. I think the world is necessarily a mysterious, sometimes scary and always confusing place. We should embrace the unknown and 'unknowable', despite how scary it can be, ponder it just as much as we do what can be known. I'm just not sure such an embrace is something science (alone) can easily accommodate.
 
 
Our Lady Has Left the Building
15:23 / 07.01.07
Jack Fear, the Christian article is here: Secular fundamentalists are the new totalitarians, I'm not sure what the Muslim article is.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
11:00 / 09.01.07
Ok here are two other relevant links... I add in todays comment with the wonderful argument that the "logical inference of intelligent design" is enough to claim the status of science. sigh...

Intelligent design is a science, not a faith...

and

Muslim values....

steve
 
 
sdv (non-human)
11:06 / 09.01.07
gayscience,

The rebuff is surely that just because we might want answers to existential questions of life and death - does not mean that we should adopt false faith based answers. Critically I suppose that it might need adding that nobody is suggesting that science has all the answers...

s
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
11:09 / 09.01.07
The Guardian today also contains Polly Toynbee hating out religions for being basically all about the homophobia, here. Not sure about the connection to Richard Dawkins there, but we seem to be talking about the Guardian's attitude to religion, so thought it might be handy.
 
 
Scrambled Password Bogus Email
12:09 / 09.01.07
The rebuff is surely that just because we might want answers to existential questions of life and death - does not mean that we should adopt false faith based answers.

But I would say, and 2 Headed Rude Boy has already done so, that my engagement with religion is not about 'adopting false faith based answers', but about using a specific lens to view the Universe through - one which has a great deal of utility in particular instances, and much less in others, for sure, but which is useful nonetheless. For investigating the questions, not for adopting easy, ready made answers.

Religious discourse, to me, is a tool, just like every other narrative I have at my disposal. Far from adopting it as an answer or set of answers, it provides a narrative toolkit for investigating certain questions and areas of human experience, which can be used alongside science, art, literature, philosophy etc., in order to arrive at the richest and deepest understanding possible, with the greatest possible benefit to my own life and that of those around me ...this is one of the problems I see with not admitting to and accepting that a great many people with an engagement with religion are not creationists, fundies or defined by and identified with their practices. Much like if i sit down with a Richard Feynmann book and puzzle through some aspects of physics I am not suddenly a physicist, or sit down and read Walt Whitman, I am not suddenly a poet. They are just things I do, you know? I, and many others lilke me, can laugh at some of the perceiveed absurdities inherent in religious discourse, while still finding great utililty in the narrative for understanding certain things...particularly within some of the more active spiritual practices (tibetan tantras, yogas, shamanic trance and dreaming (with or without entheogens) etc, etc,.) these narratives are essential and anyway seem to be hardwired into the brain as a way of relating to the shifted consciousness. They are all just stories, which is how we understand ourselves and our Universe. Some of these stories have a type of truth which can be demonstrated by reference to physical or perceived phenomena, others have a type of truth which cannot, and yet others have different layers or types of truth altogether. Some, I guess, are just horseshit.

As far as Dawkins goes, I think it's understandable that he is dismayed by the sort of religiosity he has encountered in his work (interesting, actually, that within the scientific professions, mathematicians and physicists by a long stretch have the largest population of professionals willing to profess a belief in some sort of deity or transcendental creator, while biologists - like Dawkins - are the smallest population.)

But I don't see the understanding of my ancestors as something that needs replacing or discarding, but rather something that is part of the foundations of the understanding of my era that can be built upon. The myths and narratives of our forefathers and foremothers served them well. They can very happily co-exist with modern understanding, contradictions and all, and I find them useful in different circumstances according to what I am trying to achieve or experience. I don't identify with or attach to any of these narratives, scientific, philosophic, spiritual, artistic, you name it. None of them is something I would identify with or like others to identify me with. None of them are entirely useful in all situations or able to provide satisfactory conclusions to all enquiries. They are just tools, and useful only in so far as they assist with the job at hand,

I accept completely that this hinges on the notion that religion is something people do not something that they are, which is not a view the popular media or indeed some religious mouthpieces may share. But so what?
 
 
sdv (non-human)
12:58 / 09.01.07
Death,

The question of whether the myths and narratives of our forefathers did serve them well - is perhaps one way that those such as yourself who wish to invest in religion, could perhaps produce some evidence...(?) None of the related work I'm familiar with makes any such claim as far as I remember. Normally they refer to the myths and narratives as discourses and refuse to make any such judgement... but I'd be glad to recieve some references making such a case.

The problem with the narrative proposition you are making is that I think there is really no reason to place religious discourses outside of the postmodern proposition of the 'end of the grand-narratives' (meta-narratives). As social constructions all narratives come to an end... This is well demonstrated by looking at just western histories.

In fact I find the idea that relgions are mere social-narratives, myths for study and use, quite acceptable. The problem is that most people appear to imagine that their faith is founded on something that really exists in our infinite universe, rather than being a social invention.

s
 
 
Lurid Archive
13:12 / 09.01.07
But I don't see the understanding of my ancestors as something that needs replacing or discarding, but rather something that is part of the foundations of the understanding of my era that can be built upon.

I think this is interesting because that is where I, and I suspect Dawkins, would disagree. I know that my relatives, who strongly support tradition and arguably the understanding of our ancestors, have a religion that emphasises conformity and obedience and which inevitably shades into intolerance. Personally, I *do* think it needs replacing and one of the obstacles to doing so is that a faith based perspective can be quite impervious to reason. This isn't to say that a faith based persepctive is entirely or always negative, but I don't think the presumption should be that it is worth preserving either.

Another point worth making - Dawkins discusses what he calls "Einsteinian Religion" in The God Delusion at some length - is that what people who don't follow organised religion refer to as "religion" can sometimes consist of practices and beliefs which no atheist would object to. I think that religious language can often be misleading when applied in non-traditional ways, and an identification with the great many people who are followers of one of the Abrahamic religions, say, is a fairly inevitable consequence of that. But that isn't to say that atheists reject everything that any religious person might claim as their own, despite accusations that atheists are nihilistic amoralists, for example.
 
 
gayscience
11:54 / 10.01.07
Whilst I agree with a lot of what Dawkins has to say, I find his personality very grating. He seems to have an almost religious zeal, and when he attacks people who disagree with him his objectivity seems to fall away as he becomes increasingly frustrated and impatient with them (see 'The Root of All Evil?' Ch4). This is largely an 'argument to the man' but I think its interesting to note nonetheless.

I also find his founding of what seems to amount to a church to his ego (in the Richard Dawkins Foundation) a bit scary.

The rebuff is surely that just because we might want answers to existential questions of life and death - does not mean that we should adopt false faith based answers.

sdv I would argue that there is no such thing as true or false, whether coming from subjective faith based ponderings or 'objective' science. Both science and religion can give the appearance of truth to their utterances, something which I find quite worrying.

Death, I agree with you in the main. But as Lurid has suggested traditional religious language (including the word 'religion' itself) is stretched to breaking point once it is employed outside of its prescripted areas. To me religion always implies a rigid system of thought, not something which can ever be used as a tool to do with as we please. We can never weild it, it weilds us.

However within religious thought there is something useful, a strand which says we as Human Beings cannot understand or control everything.

I feel parts of every area of thought (borrowing selectively from religion, science and faith) should be in our toolkit, but we must remain supercritical of of our uses of these tools (think Frankfurt School).
 
 
Scrambled Password Bogus Email
14:02 / 10.01.07
sdv - hmm. I guess I would point to the great civilisations of history - ancient Greece, Rome and Egypt (among many) - as evidence that the narratives and understanding of our ancestors served them well...They seemed to do all right by them. We are here, our distant ancestors became the dominant species on the planet in tandem with their growing understanding and narratives.

Lurid - I don't see how it can be 'replaced' though, any more than I view today as replacing yesterday, or you as replacing your parents. Now grows out of then, and thus it must be with narrative...I view the various narratives available for understanding much like a biologist such as Dawkins might describe the evolutionary layers of our brains - lizard, dog and human, or whatever stratification is currently in vogue.

We can no more replace the religious narrative with a more modern one than we can replace the lizard brain with a human one. They operate together, one built upon the other, or grown on top of it, whatever metaphor suits you best. As I mentioned, from my own experience, these narratives seem to be pretty much hardwired and busily underway somewhere within consciousness whether you find them silly, outdated, objectionable or not. You may not be conscious of them, but they are there, and not static, and can be brought into consciousness by various techniques which all fall within the domain of 'spirituality'.

Based on that, I have to completely disagree with gayscience's assertion that religion (not, as suggested in this thread, 'to return to bondage', which implies slavery, so much as 'to rejoin and bind fast', a verb, a doing, which implies willing reunion with something from which we have become separate) always implies a 'rigid system of thought'. On the contrary, I have found it to be a living, vibrant and open work...something which can be experienced first-hand, immersively, and not at all necessarily about endless scripture and liturgy.
 
 
gayscience
14:14 / 10.01.07
Based on that, I have to completely disagree with gayscience's assertion that religion (not, as suggested in this thread, 'to return to bondage', which implies slavery, so much as 'to rejoin and bind fast', a verb, a doing, which implies willing reunion with something from which we have become separate) always implies a 'rigid system of thought'. On the contrary, I have found it to be a living, vibrant and open work...something which can be experienced first-hand, immersively, and not at all necessarily about endless scripture and liturgy.

Sorry to get all semantic, but are you really talking about religion or in fact about faith/spirituality? Isn't what you are describing an individual use of some religious ideas, rather than an adherence to a whole religion i.e. Catholicism.
 
 
Lurid Archive
14:38 / 10.01.07
I don't see how it can be 'replaced' though, any more than I view today as replacing yesterday, or you as replacing your parents. Now grows out of then, and thus it must be with narrative..

Sure - the history of language and concepts are not something you can just wish away, but that doesn't mean you want to keep everything, as if it all has equal value - but you are really playing semantics here. First you say you don't see that something *needs* replacing, and then defend this by claiming it is *impossible* to replace any concept. I don't really want to get drawn into that kind of word game. Suffice to say that my points still stand, changing to replace by "discard and adopt another...", if you like.

As to whether religious attitudes are hard-wired....I´d be surprised if anything that complex were hard wired to that degree. I'd suspect that we may have a tendency to anthropomorphise, or perhaps attribute intent to any event, as well as a tendency to be credulous as infants, which lead to fertile ground for religiosity. Dawkins likes this sort of explanation, and discusses variant explanations for religion as a by-product in The God Delusion, none of which are very well evidenced, as far as I can see.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
16:06 / 10.01.07
death,

I guess I would point to the great civilisations of history - ancient Greece, Rome and Egypt (among many) - as evidence that the narratives and understanding of our ancestors served them well...They seemed to do all right by them. We are here, our distant ancestors became the dominant species on the planet in tandem with their growing understanding and narratives.

All of the religions you refer to exist as a direct consequence of the first industrial revolution and the invention of the city-state. Part of the underlying argument on this thread which has not been explored is that the relations between religions and the state, at least within the west, has changed dramatically as a consequence of the scientific and industrial revolution which began in the 17th/18th. centuries. Science has supplanted many of the functions of what were originally religious functions/practice.

Isn't the discussion precisely what is the point of religion when it can no longer be allowed to inform social and political practice - as evidence witness the appalling religious homophobia yesterday ?

You refer to something living, vibrant and open but there is no evidence of this in the actual behaviour of the religious within the spectacle, instead preciously the opposite what you see is an endless definign of the 'other'. Though you are obviously referring to individual and local group practices - which for me at least are irrelevant - but this cannot be used to justify supporting the actual social behaviour of the religions and the religious.

There is something that Kristeva said in support of religions/spirtuality that might be of interest but can't remeber it in the here and now... later perhaps
 
  

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