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A person's religious life is not necessarily what you or Richard Dawkins think it is. There might be more interesting processes going on within the context of a person's religious narrative than you are allowing for in your critique of it as some kind of universal monolithic structure.
and
To reiterate, for the third time now, I am attempting to make clear a distinction between the various destructive dogmas of organised religion that are being critiqued in this thread (such as contraception and creationism) and the values of the religious experience itself, as I understand it and have experienced it.
ok, got that. But I have a few questions for you, but let me make clear where I am coming from as well.
I think you are right, that Dawkins, etc. are principally critical of the way in which Religion functions within a society. Dawkins is quite specific with the examples he chooses (Radical Islamists, Zionists, and Conservative Evangelicals). Though, I will grant you that he does dismiss “supernaturalisms” as dangerous as well (though they aren’t the target of the “God Delusion” as I have read bits of it).
But I think that is what I see as un-critical in your presentation of your practice. That is, why describe the “religious experience” as a “religious experience” if you are not situating that practice within the general social-historical tradition of “Soul”, “God”, “Spiritual discipline.” It seems to me to be more of a poetic anachronistic description of psychic life than anything that is tied to the authoritative notion of institutional religion.
My question is why? Why do you think that there is a “soul”? What is it about the language of religion that applies to these experiences that is preferable to that of science?
For example, scientists often use the term “elegance”, an evaluative aesthetic description, to describe the Universe, but Sagan, etc. can demonstrate what they mean by this “elegance.”
And you write:
A person's religious life is not necessarily what you or Richard Dawkins think it is.
Again, when philosophers, historians, sociologists, talk about religion they are generally discussing social phenomena. That’s why the academic study of religion focuses on observation, be it textual criticism (religious texts) archeology (ceremonial relics), anthropological (observable rituals), social relationships, etc.
Though I do think the psychology and neurology of belief is a valid arena of criticism and inquiry. That is, when someone who is having a “religious experience” and describes it so (“out of body experience” for example), has particular areas of the brain particularly active; and someone who is put under the knife, or wears a helmet, that stimulates the same parts of the brain and describes the experience in mystical or religious language, there are grounds to say, with some evidence, that it may all be in the head. Furthermore, it’s not surprising that some personal disciplinary (as well as socially reinforced) practices may result in such experiences.
I am reminded of Rudoph Otto, who in the introduction to The Idea of the Holy, 1917 dis-invites readers who have not “experienced” the holy. Otto introduced the term the Numinous (“wholly other”) to describe this experience. The numinous is a combination of three experiences; the Mysterious, the Tremendous, and the Fascinating. Otto wanted to formulate a foundation for the phenomenological study of religion. If you like Jung, you may like Otto quite a bit.
I think Otto is read well with Feuerbach (one of the Young Hegelians), who’s basically calls god (in the Essence of Christianity, 1841), as the ultimate Other (in Hegel’s dialectical sense), a projection of all that is particular to humanity made universal. Feuerbach is one of the first students of Hegel to reverse the dialectic (making it “humanist” rather than “spiritual”), an acknowledged stage (though not without criticism) in Marx’s thought.
What I do find a bit interesting is that many of those who have expressed a dislike for Dawkins on this board do so out of an assessment of his personality as “arrogant” (etc.) and not his critique. I think in going through Dawkins' arguments (if anyone has them), and addressing the particular points of his thought, we may have a more fruitful discussion beyond “I think he’s a wanker or not”.
Furthermore, what I find more confusing is the offense taken by people who self describe themselves as religious with the caveat of “not like them” apart from orthodox faiths. That is, it is precisely those folks who describe themselves as religious, though in most of the world’s orthodoxies these positions are heretical. For example, it is highly unlikely that Crowley would be considered an approved theologian to most of the world’s major institutional faiths. It seems, at least in part, a strategy for casting one’s self as a twice victim. Not only do the major religious communities denounce these positions, so does Dawkins.
In closing I think the referent that Dawkins is describing as “religion” is what the vast majority of people accept as “religion”, including the majority of people who self describe themselves as “religious”. It’s also what people who study religion (critically or theologically) call religion. I find the position of the heretical but still religious somewhat analogous to that of being a Gay Conservative, at least to the degree that such folks tend to defend conservative ideals though in practice conservative institutions (as a whole) disavows them. (Conservatives dislike these folks because they are gay, Progressives because they are Conservative). Just trying to articulate a bit of my own confusion. |
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