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Lurid: If you wouldn't find watching people sleeping with their furniture uncomfortable, then... well, just replace it with something you would. Sleeping with their pets? Of course it's twisted to ignore everything except that emotional response, but the point is that if you're taking your own uncomfortableness with viewing certain images into account, your default position, before anything else is taken into account, must be "it is wrong", even though the images you might be uncomfortable with watching don't show any kind of hurt to the people actually involved. Perhaps the above example (of sleeping with pets or whatever) is included in your concession that on occasion, one can discount an emotional response, but if that's the case, what situation would you consider the default position (before other factors are taken into account) to be "wrong" just based on your own uncomfortableness with viewing the images? That is, not because they show people in pain or whatever, as that of course is a basis for a moral position because one can easily see the negative effect something has on someone, but just because the images are unpleasant to watch.
You're ignoring the initial premise of the analogy. It began with the statement that the DCVs/fetuses are NOT considered human, and therefore an abortion argument could be fairly applied to either of them. Likewise, if you begin with the premise that a DCV/fetus IS human, the statements sound absolutely insane and perhaps evil, don't they?
You've stated that the gory aspects just turn your stomach because they are gory, yes? Not because humans are being killed, but because the procedure isn't pleasant to watch.
No. No, I'm not. I'm saying that the matter of whether or not a foetus should be considered human is in contention, and that the only possible value I could see to abortion images helping to make a moral judgement would be to aid that decision (though I'd think that more pertinent would be information such as whether the foetus is able to think for itself, whether it's able to feel pain, etc., none of which can be discerned from the images).
And I still hold that the gore is just "grotesque glamourisation" with no informative value. If you start with the assumption that the foetus is human, then the procedure would by most people already be considered pretty horrific, before viewing the images. But viewing the images doesn't tell them any more than they already know, i.e. that a "human" is killed; it doesn't give any indication of how much, if any, pain an aborted foetus feels, or (as said before) the impact on any of the others' lives. Basically, all it says about how it affects those involved is:
The mother - if under general anaesthetic, absolutely nothing. If under local anaesthetic, possibly some emotional response, but I don't think someone who's going through with an abortion is likely to consider that any emotional pain she feels isn't worth it.
The foetus - that it's killed. Full stop.
The doctor - unless the doctor's obviously traumatised by performing the surgery, nada.
Anyone involved with the mother - Nope, nothing, again.
Saying that lies should be overcome doesn't seem to me to be a particularly good argument in favour of their being brought into existence. Surely it's better that one is only given the truth than be forced to invalidate lies...
Well, obviously that would be better, but it isn't feasible (unless you want to resort to censorship). Who gets to determine what is truthful as it regards to the foundation of an individual moral/philosophical value system? Beyond any empirical facts, we've got nothing but personal feelings on all sides.
I still don't see how that's an argument in favour of using such images to affect morality. Saying that lies are unavoidable doesn't exactly validate them. You can argue about whether or not the images do contain any useful information, but I've already given my reasons why I believe they don't, and thus why they should just be considered "show" and "propaganda" (and therefore no more useful than lies).
There seem to be two issues bound up in the conversation:
1) Images = uninformative
2) Emotions = irrelevant in ethical debate
Right. I really don't need that perception repeating over and over again:
I never said that images are inherently uninformative. I said that pretty much all will have some "spectacle" element, which I consider to be the uninformative part of an image (or, if you like, text). An picture can be worth a thousand words, yes, but that doesn't mean they're necessarily entirely constructed of useful information.
I also never said that emotions are irrelevant. However, I do believe that the emotions which are relevant are those of the people involved, and not those of someone who doesn't have anything to do with it. As said, if you experience an unpleasant feeling from seeing someone cut open, or two people (or a person and something else) having sex, then unless your unpleasant feeling is a reflection of the emotions of anyone who's actually involved, then it's irrelevant. I don't think it's justifiable to say that anyone has the right to argue that, say, someone's being gay is in any way wrong just because watching certain homosexual acts makes them feel uncomfortable, even though they no-one except the people involved actually have to be subjected to such acts.
I think Jefe's summed it up nicely...the fact that exposure to sensory details of the issues may or may not sway the argument (perhaps in ways you may not like) in no way invalidates that exposure as a means of 'padding out' the information one possesses regarding the issues, and thus incorporating the information in ones new model...
Images can be informative. Of course. They can also be merely unpleasant, or pleasant, in a way that might make people feel differently about something even if they contain no relevant information. An image of (to stick to the same subject) two men having sex may make some people uncomfortable in a way that makes them change their opinion on the morality of homosexuality, even though the image contains no moral information (except perhaps that the people involved are enjoying themselves, and pleasure, as the opposite of pain, is arguably a moral goal). |
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