BARBELITH underground
 

Subcultural engagement for the 21st Century...
Barbelith is a new kind of community (find out more)...
You can login or register.


Underground > Head Shop >

Images of Abortions - should they be allowed to influence ethics ?

  
  

Page: (1)234

 
 
sdv (non-human)
15:24 / 19.04.04
The question here is not about the morality or otherwise of Abortion. But rather whether the spectacle should be displayed and then viewed, and then used to influence an ethical and moral issue.

I should state that I believe nobody should watch the program - and that secondly that of course the choice is the woman's.

This is NOT what I am interested in. For the question that occured to me is whether a mediated image should be allowed to influence a persons moral/ethical response to an event...
 
 
Tom Coates
15:37 / 19.04.04
That's a fascinating question, and I would think the heart of the issue is probably to do with whether or not the philosopher has perfect knowledge of the wider issues. So - for example - a philosopher might argue one or other stances on abortion, but without having experienced it or having witnessed another person experiencing it, they might not have the information they need to be able to recognise which points needed arguing or what level the argument should be at. So the questions then become: (1) Do we hide information about {the thing the spectacle is about} from people in such a way that they would not be able to make an informed argument around it (2) Would revealing these things generally make it easier or more difficult to reach a position through philosophical methods and (3) Does the spectacle component play on other aspects of human thought, compassion and/or squeamishness that should not be allowed to influence our decision-making. I'm not sure I have an answer to any of those questions. Anyone else?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
16:15 / 19.04.04
To frame it another way, should images of bombing victims be used to influence people into opposing war efforts? Should images of gun shot victims bleeding to death in the ER be used to disuade people from supporting guns? Should images of the genocide be used to deter people from pondering another Holocaust? Should we use ANY images that show violent or distasteful outcomes in an attempt to influence morality?

If our answer is always NO, we're basically just supporting an ethical system and ignoring (or trying to ignore) the outcomes of that ethical system.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:32 / 19.04.04
Shanghai,

The problem of your attempt at a positive example in favour of the spectacle/image is that the image of a victim of war is always morally ambiguous. In that the image of a person who has been killed can always be regarded as either a good thing or a bad thing, depending on your social and political orientation. One cannot translate an image into aving an unambiguous meaning.

Does one really need an untrustworthy image of a mutilated dead child killed by US soldiers to argue against the current Iraq-colonial war ? Does one need an untrustworthy image of a blown up car to recognise that Israel is morally wrong when it assasinates a man ?

The answer to this is surely that whilst the political argument may make use of the image - this is not to engage ethically but to attempt to play the game of the spectacle. All images of 'war' and 'terror' may be redundant in moral and ethical terms.

In the case of the holcaust - none of the best texts on the events have EVER contained images. (With the possible exception of Alain Resnais movie...)
 
 
sdv (non-human)
20:16 / 19.04.04
Tom

Whilst a utilitarian philosopher (all of whom are descended after all from Hobbes) might agree about the wider issues – who would by default believe that moral intentions and acts could only be the results of social engineering. Bentham for example said '..human beings are deficient in altruism and therefore require the threat of coercion to encourage them to seek majority interests rather than their own...' Such ethical thinking is completely bound to the social. The other pole of modern ethical thinking is not – indeed such ethical thinking is more absolute, even in some cases pre-ontological in that ethics comes before being. Ethics and morality is a transcendence of being – one becomes moral by rising above the spectacle. The differing stances on abortion are irrelevant as the strength of the philosophical positions on both sides is to deny that an image/the spectacle is relevant to the argument. Only a non-philosophical position – that is someone who might want an 'image' to represent 'truth' could possibly think that an image of a bit of wet protoplasm is relevant to whether a woman can choose to bear a child to term or not.

1)Does the image, the spectacle constitute knowledge ? In the sense that the picture of a child being killed by a soldier never in fact constitutes knowledge. It remains a different thing when we are speaking about a 'just war' or an 'unjust one' for example a child being killed in the Algerian war for independence is surely justly killed by the freedom fighters and unjustly by the French foreign Legion. An image merely shows a dead child. 2) It's not clear to me that seeing an image under these circumstances helps to construct knowledge – in a sense it merely generates a form of pornographic spectacle. 3) By it's nature (argues Debord) the spectacle does infest all areas of human thought and existence. The reason to refuse the 'image' is surely that it is the exemplary untrustworthy object of the spectacle. The core of which is usually understood to be the 'media'....
 
 
grant
21:01 / 19.04.04
But isn't this spectacle (and spectacle in general) based on physical, anatomical reality? Isn't the visceral response based on, well, the viscera?
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
21:54 / 19.04.04
Grant - and? There is a passage in The Republic in which a man goes to gaze upon some corpses, to satisfy a desire to see them, while upbraiding himself for so doing. Point being, the response to the dead bodies is a sort of titillation, an emotional reaction, but essentially one which has no purpose *beyond* titillation.

So, does the display of a foetus being terminated have a purpose beyond titillation, mere revulsion being a form thereof? That is, is it necessary to see it in order to make an informed decision about one's feelings about abortion? Probably not, as far as I can see, any more than one needs to watch an unwanted child being abandoned on a doorstep or abused in a care home.

But is it, or can it be, useful to see it? Of course ultimately the visuals are just that - information - but the presentation is presumably the issue at that point, and I don't see much value beyond titillation in a one hour documentary. Of course, "should be allowed to be shown" is rather different from "should be allowed to influence ethical and moral distinctions". Which is where the question of what consitutes perfect knowledge might come in. Tom says:

I would think the heart of the issue is probably to do with whether or not the philosopher has perfect knowledge of the wider issues. So - for example - a philosopher might argue one or other stances on abortion, but without having experienced it or having witnessed another person experiencing it, they might not have the information they need to be able to recognise which points needed arguing or what level the argument should be at.

To turn that on its head, is somebody armed with the sight of an abortion being performed better qualified than somebody who has read extensively about abortion, or talked to people about abortion, or had an abortion? Do all of these things have to be combined to create perfect knowledge? I'm pretty sure that perfect knowledge is unobtainable, knowledge being by definition a process that is never perfected, at which point you are back to what constitutes valid data and what constitutes spectacle, and for that matter what constitutes a profitable emotional response and what an unprofitable emotional response. Can no decision with an emotional component be accepted as valid?
 
 
Linus Dunce
21:56 / 19.04.04
I think I'm with Grant on this. I'd go further -- I find the position that the context of images is mediated so therefore all images are lies to be anti-philosophical and even anti-intellectual. A picture of viscera is a picture of viscera is a picture of viscera.

Your position is also self-defeating. If all images and texts are lies, why the Sam Hell should I believe what you say either? If the newsreader is dead, how are you qualified to pronounce on "the truth"?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
05:59 / 20.04.04
sdv: One cannot translate an image into having an unambiguous meaning.

Can you ever apply 'pure' information to the formulation of philosophical or moral values? To go back to the war example, if we are pro-war, should we accept that only statistics from the ground are reliable, but if we add images to the equation then our thought becomes tainted? OR if we become anti-war upon seeing those images, we're somehow in a philosophically weaker position than those who were anti-war without having ever seen someone shot?

How far to the extreme can we go with this? If the pictures don't have any bearing on your morals, would being in the photographer of the pictures be any better? Is the suggestion that we cannot rely on the experiences of others to make moral choices? If so, are we more justified in shifting from pro-war to anti-war if we are on the ground?

Does the image, the spectacle constitute knowledge?

If we can discount images as being useful in our understanding of things, what else may we safely cast aside in our effort to retain philosophical purity? If our stomachs are turned by the sight and sound of an abortion, forcing us to re-evaluate our position, does that place our new anti-abortion stance on weaker philosophical ground for it?

So, right, the question would be, as Haus put it, can no decision with an emotional component be accepted as valid?
 
 
No star here laces
08:03 / 20.04.04
From a psychological perspective it's an acknowledged fact that vividly presented information is more likely to be retained and processed than pallidly presented information.

This is just one example of how actual human decision-making differs from decision-making we might characterise as "rational" i.e. based on logic.

Frankly, people will always be influenced more by information that is presented to them in an interesting, impactful way.

If you are going to talk about "argument" and "persuasion" then it is naive (and irrelevant) to bring logic into it. Emotive arguments simply are more convincing (that's why you need lots of ads to get elected president, not lots of policies).

And given that MORAL issues presumably present us with a moral IMPERATIVE, then they cannot be helpfully discussed in the abstract.

So surely the philosopher must of course say what he thinks is the right thing in the most CONVINCING way possible...

Further to this, we now know a lot about the human mind and how it makes decisions, and that this is not done in a rational manner. So shouldn't morals be debated in a non-rational, human manner in any case? Given that morals are ultimately about human decisions...
 
 
Pingle!Pop
09:08 / 20.04.04
The original example I personally find scary as hell; if the UK develops its own significant anti-abortion lobby, resulting in the murders of any number of abortion-performing doctors, then I'd think this program would certainly have its fair share of the blame.

But is it quite the same as showing images of war? Of course, the effects of war can be described, but do not images have a potential value in a way that they don't for the abortion example? As was pointed out in (I think) the thread in the Laboratory on "partial birth abortions", people being told about what "partial birth abortions" involve are extremely likely to agree with a ban just because it's "icky", but hey, surgery is icky, and no-one's asking anyone but doctors to face gory details. Showing images of abortions is bound to influence people's opinions, but I can't really see a case for them providing information which should be relevant to making moral decisions. The devastation of war, however, is relevant to making moral decisions, and though certain aspects of images portraying said devastation may appeal only to people's "ewww, icky!" side, it may be easier to explain using images than with words alone.

So surely the philosopher must of course say what he thinks is the right thing in the most CONVINCING way possible...

Can propaganda be morally positive, a case of the end justifying the means? I'd like to say that people should be given an entirely unbiased opinion, but I have to admit that if I owned a TV station I'd probably be happy to plaster people's screens with propaganda-stylee images of atrocities in Iraq.
 
 
Lurid Archive
10:03 / 20.04.04
The emotional, visceral reactions we have to images are part of who we are, part of what makes us human. I think that making a rational decision involves incorporating these kind of responses into our moral framework.

That is to say that it is a common moral failing to lack empathy with others and to fail to appreciate their situation. In the context of making difficult moral decisions, this separation can result in a double standard whereby we excuse and avoid the uncomfortable consequences of our choices. As such, I think that avoiding a certain hypocrisy requires us to be prepared to view uncomfortable images. The ick factor is an inescapable part of morality, in my view.

This is especially true in the conduct of modern warfare, where the separation between an electorate and the casualties, whatever one thinks of their moral status, facilitates dehumanisation. I think the same is true for abortion, to an extent, and a robust pro-choice position should be prepared to view abortions.

That said, the ick factor does not dictate morality. I get squeamish watching heart transplants, but that doesn't mean I am opposed to them. I put my squeamishness into a certain context in which it is outweighed by other factors, though I maintain that it is not entirely irrelevant and keeps to the forefront of my mind the seriousness of the procedure. And there is the danger of manipulating the ick factor when making a moral case, trying to subsume all context within certain visceral reactions.

But how is that different from any other arguments that are deployed?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
10:21 / 20.04.04
Showing images of abortions is bound to influence people's opinions, but I can't really see a case for them providing information which should be relevant to making moral decisions.

Well, if showing images of an abortion is going to influence opinions, how is it not relevant information? If a person is prediposed to supporting the idea of the fetus as a non-person, and the sight of an aborted fetus being removed from the womb changes their mind, how is that any different than a person being predisposed to supporting the idea of war only to change their mind when they see bullet-riddled corpses being pulled from the rubble of a building? Is it the perceived scale of destruction that makes one inappropriate and the other completely appropriate?

The information in both cases would seem to be "something that looks bad is caused when this happens" and, as such, seems like it is perfectly material and important to the moral decision-making process.

No one wants to be stuck with the last-ditch argument that "Oh, it's not so bad as it looks!" after viewing something, uhm, "icky." After all, how can you defend your intellectual principles against something that inspires an undeniably emotional reaction?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
11:06 / 20.04.04
Stepping back from all the war/abortion/violence examples, I suggest the real question is "When ethical and moral issues may be influenced by SPECTACLE, should SPECTACLE be ignored to maintain a philosophical position?"

A philosopher must, of course, say NO. If a philosophy cannot withstand scrutiny and challenge, it should be reevaluated.

As Lurid said, icky images may elicit an immediate negative, but if the position is strong then the philosophy can stand against them. If this negative can be outweighed by accepted positives, the position is not broken. If this negative cannot be outweighed by accepted positives, the philosophy requires deeper consideration.
 
 
No star here laces
11:08 / 20.04.04
Also it's not as if language like:

"The problematic muslim ethnic group will be transplanted from their current location in Bosnia to an area where they will be happy in the company of other muslims"

was more informative than images of refugee camps, is it?

Just because something is couched in colourless, precise-sounding prose does not necessarily make it accurate...
 
 
Pingle!Pop
11:32 / 20.04.04
Well, if showing images of an abortion is going to influence opinions, how is it not relevant information?

Basically, because it's not making anyone better informed as to the effects or implications of the abortion. If someone sat me in front of a TV showing images of abortion then I'd spend the entire time mostly avoiding looking at the screen in the same way that I would with any surgery being shown, but nothing shown would tell me anything about the effect on anyone involved, and so shouldn't, as far as I'm concerned, have any effect on moral decisions.

Likewise, I'd find images of sexual acts involving one or more men extremely unpleasant to watch and be rather squicked, but that certainly doesn't affect my moral opinion on the matter. An awful lot of men stand against male homosexuality just because they're squicked by the thought of what the sex invovles, but I don't think that their position, based on their gut reaction, is justifiable. Perhaps I take liberalism to the extreme - I don't, for example, care if people sleep with their pets if they have a method of ascertaining whether Rover is happy to participate - but I believe that morality should be based on the effect one's actions will have on others, and "ick" reactions are completely separate to that notion.

The war images, on the other hand, I do believe have potential for educating people regarding moral implications. Yes, playing to people's emotional reactions (showing a decapitated body, for example, will have an impact that goes way beyond that of simply saying "x person was killed") does factor into the equation (although arguably, it has more place, as the images of war will be traumatically imprinted on survivors' memories forever, whereas in the case of abortions, the doctor performing the operation isn't likely to be traumatised by what he sees). However, showing people's homes flattened and hundreds of people dead does undeniably say, "This is what happens if you bomb people."

That is to say that it is a common moral failing to lack empathy with others and to fail to appreciate their situation. In the context of making difficult moral decisions, this separation can result in a double standard whereby we excuse and avoid the uncomfortable consequences of our choices. As such, I think that avoiding a certain hypocrisy requires us to be prepared to view uncomfortable images. The ick factor is an inescapable part of morality, in my view.

But whose situation does a viewer understand from viewing "uncomfortable" images of abortions? Surely all that viewing abortion images tells us is what it looks like when a foetus is removed from its mother, and I can't see how that informs us any better of the effects on any of the involved parties. I really can't see how, "Eurgh, I don't find it aesthetically pleasing to look at that," plays a legitimate role in deciding morality. It seems to me very closely related to the ultra-conservative moral absolutist position of, "It's just wrong," given without any justification.

(Oo, and since writing that, a couple more posts

Stepping back from all the war/abortion/violence examples, I suggest the real question is "When ethical and moral issues may be influenced by SPECTACLE, should SPECTACLE be ignored to maintain a philosophical position?"

A philosopher must, of course, say NO. If a philosophy cannot withstand scrutiny and challenge, it should be reevaluated.

But pure spectacle images aren't "scrutiny and challenge", they're just for show, unsubstantiated propaganda to hide the real issues. If images tell the viewer something about how something affects other people, it's not spectacle but information. And again, I say that the abortion images, unless they, say, show the doctor involved in emotional pain, are entirely useless for providing information about how the procedure affects those involved.

Also it's not as if language like:

"The problematic muslim ethnic group will be transplanted from their current location in Bosnia to an area where they will be happy in the company of other muslims"

was more informative than images of refugee camps, is it?

Just because something is couched in colourless, precise-sounding prose does not necessarily make it accurate...

... Was that aimed at me? Because of course I agree with that, and never said anything which would suggest otherwise. While perhaps any information provided by the picture could be communicated in writing, of course that doesn't mean that the picture isn't a valid way of expressing that information. And the fact that it contains actual information means that it is certainly not just pure spectacle.

If your point is that writers can lie, though - well, pictures can lie. I'm sure all major newspapers have a few people working for them who would be capable of faking pretty much any photo they wanted if they felt like it. The matter at hand isn't about what information can be trusted, but what should play a part in influencing moral decisions.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
11:55 / 20.04.04
The spectacle is not based on anatomical reality – it is a mediated, manipulated image which has meanings within its context. A visceral immediate response to such an image may be acceptable in the horror genre but certainly not when deciding whether to oppress or liberate other human beings. The image of an aborted foetus tells you nothing about the circumstances of the foetus’s production – indeed I’d probably go as far as to say that an image in itself can never tell you anything. All the meaning of an image is in the social and historical context through which we interpret and understand the image. Arguably an imagee does not have a status that relates it to either lie or truth. I would go as far as to invert Linus Dunce’s statement and suggest that it is culturally safer and philosophically correct to regard all mediated images as a lie or better an untruth rather than to believe that they may be truth.

In the history of philosophy there has always been a tendency to delegitimize moral impulses and emotions. And to construct the structures of ethics and morality out of logical arguments with emotion carefully removed. In recent times this tendency has been challenged but in the specific cases it appears to change nothing for whilst a postmodern ethics may allow the Other back into the structure as a neighbour, both at-hand-and-mind, allowing them entrance into the moral and ethical self – this does not allow the corruption of the moral sphere by the spectacle. “…the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for the other, an extreme vulnerability….” (Levinas) But these positions do not allow one to oppress another being in the interests of yet another being (especially a not-yet-being). Nor of course can the ‘emotional turn’ change and allow the spectacle to influence what constitutes an ethical interpretation. Consequently an emotional component can be accepted as valid, and indeed must be valid. But if the image of an abortion broadcast over the media produces an anti-abortion stance it does place the response wholly in non-philosophical ground. Just as the images of the murder of children and other people in an occupied country/land does not change the actuality of the conflict. If the images emotionally sway someone to support or be against the conflict – it seems obvious that counter-images could change there mind again. A moral and ethical position must be based on something more than the mere brute facts of the event.

The other thing which gives me pause about allowing the emotional to much influence in the question is that it immediately prevents any possibility of universality – given that emotions are personally, socially and historically specific - this lack of universality does seem a loss.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
12:03 / 20.04.04
Shanghai - the question "When ethical and moral issues may be influenced by SPECTACLE, should SPECTACLE be ignored to maintain a philosophical position?" -

The answer to this depends on whether you are talking about a specific instance of the spectacle - an image or program within one of the media or the spectacle as a whole.

In either case the correct philosophcal position is interrogation, thought and the invention of a concept to address the spectacle.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
12:13 / 20.04.04
whoah ...I just read "And again, I say that the abortion images, unless they, say, show the doctor involved in emotional pain, are entirely useless for providing information about how the procedure affects those involved."

sorry that's nonsense - A woman does have the right to decide whether she bears a child to term.

Society has a duty to ensure that her decision either way safeguards either her or her+child.

An individual doctor has to make the decision whether to participate in the abortion consequently emotional pain must be irrelevant.
 
 
Lurid Archive
12:28 / 20.04.04
Basically, because it's not making anyone better informed as to the effects or implications of the abortion

...

The war images, on the other hand, I do believe have potential for educating people regarding moral implications

I think you are employing a double standard here that I don't understand. I hesitate to presume, but you give me the impression that your position on these issues is determining whether you consider emotive, visceral appeals to be justified. In a philosophical context that seems a touch circular.

Watching an abortion may have an impact on one's views about the status of the foetus. Personally, I think one should be sensitive to that. Now, clearly, this can be overplayed and be used as the only argument in order to distort the debate. Sure. Likewise, much as Jefe points out, one could use clinical language to obscure the procedure and to sanitise the moral question. Again, this could be distorting. But the possible abuse resulting from an exclusive, distorting focus does not constitute an argument against either emotional imagery or clinical description.

I think your other example is probably more conducive to your point

Likewise, I'd find images of sexual acts involving one or more men extremely unpleasant to watch and be rather squicked, but that certainly doesn't affect my moral opinion on the matter.

OK. Let me meet that head on. I disagree. (Actually, this is an academic disagreement, since I don't personally find gay sex disturbing, though I'll take for granted that yours is a common position.) I think it is relevant that people find gay sex icky, though only marginally so. To my mind, the mistake you are making is assuming that a relevant factor is overwhleming and without balance. Actually, people find all sorts of sex involving other people distasteful. But there are plenty of reasons, involving consent, privacy and harm, that act as strong counterbalances to the ick factor. I would say that this reaction could be used to justify decency laws of some description, though I see no reason why these should be exclusively about gays, when you factor in all the other considerations.

However, I would think that a tolerance of homosexuality which was unable to contemplate any form of gay sex is a very shaky tolerance indeed. Likewise, I think that moral positions need to be able to contemplate their possibly graphic effects in order to be more than abstract exercises.

What do you learn when you see something that causes some squeamishness? Well, you open yourself to viewing something at an emotional level and, as such, may be more able to empathise with the relevant actors. Is this open to abuse? Can this be used to manipulate? Are there situations in which such a reaction is irrelevant? Yes, yes and yes. But the fact that one can fetishise graphic images is insufficient to argue that they are irrelevant. Rather, a responsible morality should be prepared to face shocking consequences, as well as justifying them in the abstract.
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
12:29 / 20.04.04
Basically, because it's not making anyone better informed as to the effects or implications of the abortion.

Showing an abortion doesn't show anyone of the effects of an abortion? That's like suggesting that showing someone stuffing a live grenade down a throat and showing the resultant explosion and decapitation doesn't inform anyone of the effects of having a live grenade shoved down a throat.

I don't think that their position, based on their gut reaction, is justifiable.

These individuals aren't out to justify a philosophy to you, they're out to justify a philosophy to themselves. They may not care what you think or what you believe is a justified position. These individuals work by filtering information in their own way and come to different conclusions as a result. Same input, different output.

Showing people's homes flattened and hundreds of people dead does undeniably say, "This is what happens if you bomb people."

Showing an abortion doctor at work and the bloody fetus removed from the womb must therefore, undeniably, say "This is what happens when you abort a fetus."

Pure spectacle images aren't "scrutiny and challenge", they're just for show, unsubstantiated propaganda to hide the real issues.

If spectacle or propaganda, and the resultant emotional reaction, is not a challenge to a philosophy, would it not stand to reason that a philosophy would not not be challenged by viewing said spectacle or propaganda? And if a philosophy is unchallenged, why would anyone change their philosophy after observing a spectacle?

...abortion images, unless they, say, show the doctor involved in emotional pain, are entirely useless for providing information about how the procedure affects those involved.

So the fetus is not involved in the procedure? Isn't that the purpose to the spectacle? To show what happens when you abort a fetus?

To express the question in another way, if we don't show a slaughterhouse employee in emotional pain, must we therefore conclude that showing the process by which chickens are butchered is not informative as to how being butchered affects the chickens?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
12:45 / 20.04.04
In either case the correct philosophical position is interrogation, thought and the invention of a concept to address the spectacle.

Agreed. However, if we cannot address the spectacle adequately within our philosophical framework, it's fair to assume that our existing position requires reevaluation.

As a result, it stands to reason that spectacle is important and should be allowed to influence our positions IF they cannot be addressed within our existing philosophy.

Showing someone images of death camp victims may result in consideration as to whether someone's support of death camps is well advised. Showing someone images of aborted fetuses may result in consideration as to whether someone's support of abortion is well advised. If we cannot reconcile our reactions to these images with our morals, we must either abandon our former positions or change our morals.

Well, that or pretend we didn't see the images and repress, but that strikes me as a terribly bad idea.
 
 
Pingle!Pop
15:00 / 20.04.04
Watching an abortion may have an impact on one's views about the status of the foetus.

... Showing an abortion doctor at work and the bloody fetus removed from the womb must therefore, undeniably, say "This is what happens when you abort a fetus."


OK, guilty, then; perhaps abortion isn't quite a topic in which showing the images are entirely spectacle, as yes, one's opinion on, say, whether or not the foetus could be considered "human" or whatever could be influenced. I was previously working on the reckoning that basically, anyone arguing about abortion would already know what the result of the abortion would be (i.e. removal/death of a foetus), what a foetus is, and the implications for the mother, and therefore all that showing images would achieve would be to equate the procedure with an unpleasant feeling they feel because of the aesthetics of the situation, in the same way as showing the gory details of any surgery, which I consider to be rather arbitrary. I still consider this to be the main effect, but granted, there is that matter of the "status of the foetus" with regards to which actual images could be informative.

Actually, this is an academic disagreement, since I don't personally find gay sex disturbing, though I'll take for granted that yours is a common position... However, I would think that a tolerance of homosexuality which was unable to contemplate any form of gay sex is a very shaky tolerance indeed.

Christ, that's rather putting words in my mouth. Disturbing? Tolerance? Unable to contemplate? I merely said that "I'd find images of sexual acts involving one or more men [incidentally - "any form of gay sex?" I'm sure that last I looked, heterosex involved a man as well] extremely unpleasant to watch and be rather squicked"; likewise, I'd find images of people being cut open during surgery or even just receiving an injection to be extremely unpleasant, but I think you'd be hard-pressed to extend that discomfort to saying that I find such things "disturbing" and merely "tolerate" them.

Anyway:

I think it is relevant that people find gay sex icky, though only marginally so... I would say that this reaction could be used to justify decency laws of some description, though I see no reason why these should be exclusively about gays, when you factor in all the other considerations... Likewise, I think that moral positions need to be able to contemplate their possibly graphic effects in order to be more than abstract exercises.

So... why is it relevant? If you found something unpleasant to watch, then you think that the default position should be against it rather than neutral until any further arguments can be given either way, even if you'd never have to be subjected to watching it? You comment on decency laws, but surely that's only relevant if it's to actually protect people from having to be subjected to things they'd rather not see, not to prevent certain acts from happening at all. In the same vein, in what way is, say, gay sex a "graphic effect" of homosexuality? If one were to videotape and broadcast it, then yes, perhaps it could be argued that it might have a negative effect on some people by giving them slightly unpleasant feelings, but otherwise, I don't see how the fact that it involves things which people would rather not watch could be seen as any basis for morality.

[T]he fact that one can fetishise graphic images is insufficient to argue that they are irrelevant.

True. However, images which are purely fetishisation and contain no information are certainly irrelevant. For example, someone arguing against, say, heart surgery (whyever anyone might do that) could show graphic images of the procedure which are nothing but images of, well, lots of blood and guts; this would be the sort of thing likely to sway people's opinions just because of their gut reaction to the unpleasant images, but it doesn't mean that the images actually contain any information which should be considered relevant.

Basically, because it's not making anyone better informed as to the effects or implications of the abortion.

Showing an abortion doesn't show anyone of the effects of an abortion? That's like suggesting that showing someone stuffing a live grenade down a throat and showing the resultant explosion and decapitation doesn't inform anyone of the effects of having a live grenade shoved down a throat.

Well, apart from the point conceded above (that it could give an indication of the "status" of a foetus) all it shows is that a foetus is removed from its mother, and that all this gore is involved. The former I would assume that anyone arguing about abortion would already know, and the latter is pretty irrelevant, as the gore only really affects the doctor (I'm assuming it's all pretty well cleared up by the time the patient is conscious), who I'm assuming doesn't have much of a problem with it. It doesn't show anything about the effect it has on the mother's life or help explain any of the moral arguments behind abortion.

These individuals aren't out to justify a philosophy to you, they're out to justify a philosophy to themselves. They may not care what you think or what you believe is a justified position. These individuals work by filtering information in their own way and come to different conclusions as a result. Same input, different output.

As I said, I don't think that basing their morality on their gut reaction is justifiable. That they might think it is doesn't really affect my view of morality. And I can't say that I think, "Some people think that this is immoral," without arguments should affect my morality either. So what's your point?

If spectacle or propaganda, and the resultant emotional reaction, is not a challenge to a philosophy, would it not stand to reason that a philosophy would not not be challenged by viewing said spectacle or propaganda? And if a philosophy is unchallenged, why would anyone change their philosophy after observing a spectacle?

Well, by that argument it's justifiable for a person's moral position to be altered by outright lies. One could say, "All people who have abortions go on to become depraved baby-eaters," and if someone bought it, it'd probably influence their judgement, but to say that it's a legitimate challenge would seem a bit ridiculous.

As a result, it stands to reason that spectacle is important and should be allowed to influence our positions IF they cannot be addressed within our existing philosophy.

Again, surely that's saying that one's default position on anything which one might find at all unpleasant to watch (even if one never actually has to) must automatically be "against"? Doesn't seem a terribly convincing argument to me.

(Yes, you then follow it with the example of images of death camps, but I think it's fair to say that those're images of actual horror, actual bad things happening to other people, rather than just images one finds unpleasant to look at, and therefore certainly don't count as "pure spectacle".)

"And again, I say that the abortion images, unless they, say, show the doctor involved in emotional pain, are entirely useless for providing information about how the procedure affects those involved."

sorry that's nonsense - A woman does have the right to decide whether she bears a child to term.

Society has a duty to ensure that her decision either way safeguards either her or her+child.

An individual doctor has to make the decision whether to participate in the abortion consequently emotional pain must be irrelevant.

Sorry? I don't quite understand your argument. Are you saying that one shouldn't take the effect performing a procedure might have on a doctor into account, because they agreed to do it and therefore must suffer the consequences if they turn out to be pained by their decision later? And why is a woman's right to decide whether or not to keep a child relevant to my statement? To clarify, all I meant was that the people involved (apart from the foetus if you wish to consider it a "person") are just the doctor (and nurses) and the mother. If the mother's under general anaesthetic, then I doubt one could tell much about what effect the abortion is having on her. So the only conscious people a video would show would be the doctor, so unless ze is crying or something, the images aren't particularly informative re: the effects on those involved.
 
 
zee
15:09 / 20.04.04
Showing an abortion doesn't show anyone of the effects of an abortion? That's like suggesting that showing someone stuffing a live grenade down a throat and showing the resultant explosion and decapitation doesn't inform anyone of the effects of having a live grenade shoved down a throat.

Immediate effects versus long term effects, both of which, presumably, should be accounted for in any kind of moral debate. Seeing the foetus being removed during the abortion tells you nothing of the situation of the mother, or the after-effects of such a procedure.

Spectacles like the first example will inevitably involve little to no consideration of important factors that should be considered when making moral and ethical decisions as to whether something is 'good' or 'bad'. Questions of personhood, notions surrounding the point at which the foetus becomes conscious and thus (in some views) a member of our moral community, whether being a potential life or an actual life is what counts - none of these things really get brought into a gory and grotesquely glamourised image of a foetus being aborted.

I think viewing the image does nothing but give you a literal picture of How Abortion Works, but should not in any way affect any moral discussions surrounding the issue.

Similarly for images of war, and people killed in war. I'm drawn towards saying that yes, seeing dead bodies dismembered by bomb blasts goes a long way for evoking a human response to death, in a probably more effective way than hearing that 'x numbers of civilians died today'. So too for seeing pictures of the mourning families to remind oneself that the cadaver in question is more than just a deceased lump of flesh. But should these images, these spectacles, influence our moral considerations of the actions involved to create these images?

Also, what of the image itself? What differentiates non-biased visual representation from a media-influenced, probably biased representation? Is the former even possible? Would it be possible to have a sympathetic portrayal of abortion on television, using the footage of the abortion itself, or would all televised portrayals of the event inevitably be ammunition for the pro-life organisations?

I'm thinking here of the footage that was plastered over our TV screens during the first few months of the 'War on Terror'. Bad-taste jokes were made at the time along the lines of it being a military version of big brother, made to get votes, ratings, and support. Why install a camera crew with most of the battalions serving in Iraq? So people could witness the events of war unfolding as they did? So people could see their loved ones as they lived out there, even if that involved there existing footage of their demise also?

Yet another temptation arises to say that perhaps what these spectacles do is highlight questions that we should be asking about the situations covered by such spectacles. Images of unnatural death should perhaps lead us to question the ethics of that death, whether it was justified, unjustified, and if either, then why so? But then at what point do we separate the image from playing a part in our thoughts, and allow to function merely as a prompt, rather than an affecting consideration?

Hmm.
 
 
Lurid Archive
15:34 / 20.04.04
Christ, that's rather putting words in my mouth.

Yeah, sorry. I got a bit carried away there. But I'm not sure I have much to add. The fact that some emotional response may in some cases be outweighed by other factors says nothing about whether emotional responses should generally influence morality. I think they should, to an extent, as part of a broader picture. But they are far from the totality of morality.
 
 
grant
16:17 / 20.04.04
There seems to be a few conflations going on here I'm not sure I entirely get:
image = spectacle :: word = philosophy
Is that what people are basically doing here?

If I'm getting that sense correctly, that relationship seems to be acting as a kind of stand-in for the old
body/viscera :: mind/thought
dichotomy.


And in the terms of that dichotomy, I'm not sure that it's not "philosophy" (or will, or predetermined ideas) that's the force mediating the image that becomes spectacle -- that the spectacle isn't just philosophy using image to pass through the body to the mind, rather than using words for some kind of mind-to-mind contact.

So, along those same lines, I'm also not sure that the body-mind split is really all that honest or useful when assembling what Tann's calling "perfect knowledge" -- especially when dealing with "ethical and moral issues," or issues where philosophy directly acts on the body, right?

I mean, isn't objection to war based on the fact that people die? That bodies are maimed? That there's a squickfest going on there just beyond our vision?
 
 
Shanghai Quasar
16:38 / 20.04.04
Pingles: If I may...

"Let's suppose that our initial premise is that the 'death camp victim/fetus' is not a human. It is a burden on the 'social/female' body so long as it lives within it, and as such we cannot possibly be expected provide it the same rights as a real human. These 'victims/fetuses' are completely dependent on 'society/the mother' and, as a 'society/the mother,' 'we/they' should have the right to deal with them as we see fit.

Now, obviously, showing photographs of the previously mentioned 'victims/fetuses' fails to show the effect it has on the 'society's/the mother's' well-being, nor does it help to explain any of the moral arguments behind 'ethnic cleansing/abortion'. It shows only the final condition of the 'victims/fetuses' following the completion of our 'cleansing program/abortion procedure'.

I agree that showing images of the 'victim/fetus' after the fact may lead to people questioning whether these 'victims/fetuses' are human. However, I would generally feel that this is unnecessary, assuming that everyone understood what happens during the process, and may equate the unpleasant feeling they feel because of the aesthetics of the situation to the process itself. Indeed, I feel that the unpleasant feeling itself is just an attempt to undermine an entire rational philosophy and a right that should be protected.

I mean, is the gore really relevant? The only person affected is the doctor, and they were willing to do the procedure. No harm, no foul."

Absolutely ridiculous?

Well, by that argument it's justifiable for a person's moral position to be altered by outright lies...

A lie in itself cannot alter a moral position, only an individual who believes that lie can. If a person can convince themselves that an outright lie is the truth, they have an issue. If a person can gather evidence that invalidates that lie, they will retain their original position.

...but to say that it's a legitimate challenge would seem a bit ridiculous.

Lies are a challenge to any philosophy. They must be defeated and overcome using the truth. That's the point, isn't it?

zee: Yet another temptation arises to say that perhaps what these spectacles do is highlight questions that we should be asking about the situations covered by such spectacles.... ...at what point do we separate the image from playing a part in our thoughts, and allow to function merely as a prompt, rather than an affecting consideration?

You put it very well, zee. As it was said earlier, the lack of universality means that we can really only answer that question on a personal level. Still, it is the question that ties this whole thread together, isn't it?
 
 
zee
17:01 / 20.04.04
Grant, I think the dichotomy you're talking about is possibly more along the lines of emotion vs reason, or emotive response vs reasoned and rational response. That's not to say that I'm advocating one as holding more merit or being more worthwhile, or even more correct than the other. Part of being human is recognising that both play a part in our response to the world.

The role philosophy tends to play, in the analytic tradition anyway, is the advocate of reason, analysis, and rational argumentative thought for and against whatever. Reacting emotively to stimuli, although covered in places, doesn't constitute the general method. If we're responding philosophically to the notion of spectacle, siding on the part of our emotional gut responses to provocative images is, I think, going to highlight what we shouldn't be doing, more than contribute to any arguments we might have.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:06 / 20.04.04
Shanghai "As a result, it stands to reason that spectacle is important and should be allowed to influence our positions IF they cannot be addressed within our existing philosophy."

That makes the assumption that there is something about the spectacle (even a given image) that is somehow external to the available philosophical thought. This is not the case.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
18:17 / 20.04.04
The other thing which gives me pause about allowing the emotional to much influence in the question is that it immediately prevents any possibility of universality – given that emotions are personally, socially and historically specific - this lack of universality does seem a loss.

I'm not sure I agree with this - the principium individuationis would suggest that the idea that emotions were specific in that sense is an illusion - but more importantly I don't see how exactly it differs from "reason" or "philosophy". These are surely highly socially and historically specific conceptions, with radically different meanings at any given geographical or historical point. Otherwise, surely if one were sufficiently devoid of spectacle-induced emotion, then all people of good reason in all places and at all times would logically come to the same conclusions, no?

So, I think the reason/emotion/spectacle/information division here is not quite calibrated. Honestly, I'm confused by the way the term "spectacle" is being used in this discussion - Debord is being cited, but it doesn't seem to be a Debordian spectacle exactly... could somebody clarify?
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:22 / 20.04.04
Grant "...isn't objection to war based on the fact that people die..."

No the objection to war is not that people die. In the iraq case the objection is founded on the imperialist/colonial intent of the main invaders, and the attempt to impose a specific set of 'western' values upon the geographical region (iraq).

One of the things I was most interested when I posed the initial question was whether anyone would raise directly or indirectly the notion of the 'importance or sanctity of human life' - indirectly it is appearing, but it is only fair to state that a human life cannot in itself be regarded as 'sacred' or even perhaps particularly important. Certainly as Singer points out most of us prefer going out for a meal than saving the life of a person in the third world.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:51 / 20.04.04
My original use of the term spectacle was a deliberate reference to Debord - however I was not attempting to use the term to condemm the entirity of western mass consumptive society (which is what Debord meant). Instead I was initially using the term in the sense that 'spectacle = (mass) media' which for Debord is of course equally something to condemn, but understand. Though the images in question all seem to exist within the realm of TV I would myself extend the question to any medium. In the case of Debord I'd certainly put myself well outside of the 50 people in the world who Debord thought would understand his work - maybe somewhere in the next 1000 or so. (he is after the least read of the great marxist philophers and thinkers and the numbers of people who've read him must only be in the 1000s)...

The initial question was whether the spectacle of the images of abortions should be allowed to influence ethical and moral positions. I am more convinced after this that A philosopher is correct to say NO, much more than I was before. Which is a surprise to me as I assumed that I would be thinking that an image could be said to be a relevant way of transmitting truth. Perhaps it is that given that the images are so deeply embedded in this society I can no more think of them as a means of transmitting knowledge, than I can contemplate the mass media as a whole as a means of communicating truth.

Perhaps someone can convince that an image, within a spectacle can 'punch a hole through our knowledges and produce truth...' but I doubt it.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
19:00 / 20.04.04
Tantamont, the reference to 'emotions' is an indirect reference to Levinas and especially to Bauman - the latter especally seems happy to discrad all universlaisms and replace with a moral core that is non-rational. I'm not convinced that the loss of the universal really helps. I think that the retreat from the universal is a sign of intellectual fear...
 
 
Scrambled Password Bogus Email
19:36 / 20.04.04
So the definition of SPECTACLE here is 'graphic images', yes? 'Something which is seen or viewd'.

Something cannot be considered without having a description with which to work in the first place, even if the description is just an arbitrary label like 'foetus' or 'abortion' with a consensual meaning...A film of a (real) event is a vastly more detailed description of that event.

So is the question here whether or not the level of detail, and engagement of the five senses, informing the description can be an acceptable basis of influence on an opinion?

So, for example, whether the description extends to 'bloody foetus', or 'wriggling, bloody foetus', or 'screaming, wriggling, bloody foetus with an awful stench' or a film of the entire procedure with no sound, or with sound, or visual, audio and some olfactory information thrown in, or actual presence 'at the scene' and some sort of hierarchy of validity of opinion based on ones personal engagement with any one of these?

I find the question very hard to make sense of, as an opinion on ethical and moral issues will surely stem from the entire descriptive resource and rational resource available to the individual forming the opinion...The notion of whether it 'should be allowed' seems strange - allowed by whom? The individual forming the opinion, or the wider society considering the basis of the opinion? Censorship from exposure to the issues being considered the only means by which to arrive ata valid conclusion? How can you 'not allow' your description of the event to be a part of your decision making process?

Is the suggestion that the position 'I disagree with abortion, because I worked in an abortion clinic and saw, heard, felt and smelled what an abortion is really like first hand' is irrational/not philosphical and therefore invalid?

Recalling the images of Leah Betts post mortem used to attempt to dissuade people from using and abusing Ecstasy in the 90's, the image in an of itself served no purpose other than to actualise in a concrete form the notion of 'a dead body', perhaps with the addition of 'due to an overdose resulting from recreational drug use'.

Whether or not this 'should be allowed' to influence the ethical / moral debate as regards drug use is surely a moot point, since those who have viewed the image will have the description to work with, and those who haven't...er...won't. The ethics and morals of drug use are an open debate, and the addition of an image of a victim of drug overdose to that debate merely adds to the descriptive lexicon of those discussing the issues, it carries no ethical or moral weight in and of itself, only emotive weight if you happen to react to still images of corpses in an emotive and visceral way...It relies entirely on the context in which it is used as a description; clearly the argument 'Drug use is wrong because - look what can happen' *point to* [img src - Leah Betts etc.] is in essence no different to the argument 'Drug use is wrong because it killed Leah Betts' - only one argument uses a visually descriptive prop while the other uses an arbitrary label...Ones level of revulsion at the words 'Killed Leah Betts' compared to ones level of revulsion at an image is completely rooted in ones tolerance of the notion of death generally, and fairly arbitrary...

Sorry, I sense myself rambling horribly...must shoot off and swap my brain for a better one.
 
 
Pingle!Pop
20:12 / 20.04.04
There seems to be a few conflations going on here I'm not sure I entirely get:
image = spectacle :: word = philosophy
Is that what people are basically doing here?

...So, I think the reason/emotion/spectacle/information division here is not quite calibrated. Honestly, I'm confused by the way the term "spectacle" is being used in this discussion.

Well, in my case I have been using the word "spectacle" to mean the sensationalist or, more precisely, uninformative aspect of a visual image. I'm happy to extend this to include words with the same function - after all, it's perfectly possible to write a piece of emotive rhetoric which actually means absolutely nothing (see Dubya et al - I know that the word "freedom" has always been used as a rousing meaningless word to justify dodgy actions, but the US admin manages to take it to new extremes) - but I think the major distinction is that spectacle appeals to people's gut reactions, rather than actually providing them with information. Most images, of course, will contain a certain amount of both spectacle and information.

Shanghai Q: To be honest, I don't think the analogy fits at all. I've already conceded that the images shown could potentially have some validity in their influencing of decisions as to a foetus' "status", and thus whether it should have certain rights.

You start by effectively saying that the reason the foetus/victim could be considered not-human is because it is a burden: no - the reason it may not warrant the label "human" is because generally, the term refers to any member of the race homo sapiens from the time of birth to death. This certainly covers death camp victims, but whether or not it should be extended to include foetuses, egg cells or even sperm is a rather contested point.

As zee says, viewing the image [of abortion] does nothing but give you a literal picture of How Abortion Works; anyone holding a moral position on the matter would, I'd assume, already know that the effect of an abortion is the death/removal of the foetus, and apart from showing us the amount of gore involved, which doesn't really say anything about the effect on the mother, foetus or doctor, images of abortions inform a viewer of very little.

Images of death camps, however, if filmed in action (which they'd have to be to be equivalent to the filming of an abortion), show exactly what physical and emotional effects such camps have on large numbers of people. There may be a small element of spectacle, perhaps - for example someone being stabbed repeatedly may suffer no less than someone decapitated, but the latter would probably have more emotional impact - but such images certainly contain large amounts of information.

So, I still stand by my assertion that the gore (agin in zee's words, a gory and grotesquely glamourised image of a foetus being aborted), given that it doesn't affect anyone (except, as said, possibly the doctor, if ze happens to be squeamish - methinks, though, that'd suggest ze might be in the wrong job), is irrelevant. However, the gore at death camps is seen first-hand by hundreds, thousands, and will certainly have a huge emotional impact on those present, and may also indicate the torturous way in which some victims were killed (I don't think that lots of blood is a particularly accurate indication of whether a foetus feels pain, or how much).

A lie in itself cannot alter a moral position, only an individual who believes that lie can. If a person can convince themselves that an outright lie is the truth, they have an issue. If a person can gather evidence that invalidates that lie, they will retain their original position.

Well, in that case only an individual that believes the "propaganda" of pure spectacle can alter a moral position. But whether direct or not, the lie/propaganda certainly has an effect, and stating that it relies on human beings being malleable to be effective doesn't make it valid. Saying that lies should be overcome doesn't seem to me to be a particularly good argument in favour of their being brought into existence. Surely it's better that one is only given the truth than be forced to invalidate lies (and besides, how can you prove that all women having abortions don't go on to become rabid baby-eaters?)...

Lurid: I'm intrigued as to how you justify your position that any emotional response should necessarily be included in one's moral judgement of a matter. If one were to discount all factors other than your own "squick" response, for example, how would you argue that people sleeping with their furniture is wrong?

sdv: Don't suppose you could, as requested before, clarify your critique of my statement that abortion images, unless they, say, show the doctor involved in emotional pain, are entirely useless for providing information about how the procedure affects those involved. I'd like to respond properly, but can't really until I know exactly what you meant.

Quickly, as the post appeared after writing all the above, and I've written quite a lot already for one day:

Is the suggestion that the position 'I disagree with abortion, because I worked in an abortion clinic and saw, heard, felt and smelled what an abortion is really like first hand' is irrational/not philosphical and therefore invalid?

Well, it depends what you saw/heard/felt/smelled (though I can't think of why the latter should be a consideration unless it caused such an unholy stench as to be a danger). If you saw an expression of pain on a baby's face or mutilation where none should have happened, you probably have some reasonable grounds. If you just saw blood, and your reasoning is based on the fact that you personally don't like the sight of blood, I can't say I find your moral stance particularly convincing. If you heard screams, yeah, it's probably relevant; if you heard "icky" squelches, it's probably not.
 
  

Page: (1)234

 
  
Add Your Reply