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Where do we get our values from now?

  
  

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Closed for Business Time
13:17 / 22.11.06
First topic from me - so bear with me if this is slightly clunky. The reasons I have for bringing this admittedly huge question to the table are several, many of which have been touched on in other threads around Barbelith. My main reason is this - if one disavows religion, and theistic-spiritual paradigms of magic, scientific materialism and/or postmodern social and human sciences seems to give us little if any leverage on the question of morality. Is there a third way between (scientific) materialism and postmodernism on the one hand and transcendental idealism on the other? If so, I'd be very interested to hear your views and ideas.

---please forgive the over-use of parentheses in the abstract---
 
 
jentacular dreams
13:29 / 22.11.06
Good topic. I've been struggling with this one myself for quite a while (mostly prompted by flaws in the logic of Christian writers such as C.S. Lewis), and don't as yet have an answer.

I would like to believe that morality is more than the golden laws society drills into us, and that it's not just another aspect of natural selection at work, but haven't thus far managed to fully assemble a working argument as to why.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
14:04 / 22.11.06
kingofthebees - thank you mucho for your kind words.

I quote -
I would like to believe that morality is more than the golden laws society drills into us, and that it's not just another aspect of natural selection at work, but haven't thus far managed to fully assemble a working argument as to why.

Agreed. As I see it, the problem with a sociological theory of morality is that it doesn't explain its emergence and origin. What it does do, and quite brilliantly so, is explain how morality is transmitted both over time and through social spaces.
The evolutionary account of morality, as per R. Trivers, W. Hamilton et.al., does give morality an origin as a product of natural selection. The problem I see with this approach is that it basically says that morality, as it is expressed here and now (for me that's London), is in some fundamental sense random and pointless, since that is how evolution proceeds - randomly and without a goal. For me, evolutionary psychology explains the origin of morality only to conclude that its contents are in themselves not moral - they are merely functional aids to further our reproductive success, arrived at by a random process of selection and mutation, and subject to unpredictable change - for better or worse (whatever that means).

I'm not 100% sure that my views on the evolutionary theory of morality is correct... A slightly different view from evolutionary science, by Stuart Kaufmann, can be found here.
 
 
nighthawk
15:32 / 22.11.06
Hmm, good thread. I'll come back later, but for now:

The evolutionary account of morality, as per R. Trivers, W. Hamilton et.al., does give morality an origin as a product of natural selection.

Its worth being clear about what you're looking for here: a genetic account of morality, or a justification of morality.

As an analogy: I know that 2 + 2 = 4. A genetic account of this knowledge would describe its origin - maths class with Mrs Ali in my primary school. But this account of its genesis doesn't justify it. I shouldn't believe '2 + 2 = 4' because Mrs Ali told me it does; I should believe it because it is true.

So if we look to evolutionary psychology, are we expecting a genetic account of morality, i.e. an account of the pressures and processes which led to behaviour that we would describe as 'moral'? It might be able to provide that much.

Or are we looking for a justification of morality? Because if we are, all evolutionary psychology will be able to tell us is why (it thinks) particular patterns of behaviour emerged, not why they are justified, i.e. why we as individuals ought to be 'moral' here and now.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
15:47 / 22.11.06
Glad to hear that (some) 'lithers find this interesting.
As to your comments, nighthawk - Its worth being clear about what you're looking for here: a genetic account of morality, or a justification of morality.

I'm looking for a justification of morality, based on something other than the descriptions of either sociology or evolutionary theory. As you say, evolutionary psychology can give us a reasonable explanation of the origin of morality - the evolutionary processes that led to us behaving what we term as "acting morally". On a trivial level, one can say (as do most evolutionary scientists - indicate if you want refs anyone) that one can't go from the is, the description of the origin and functions of morality in evolutionary theory, to the ought, the justification of this or that moral precept. This, I believe, is the standard reply to charges against sociobiology ala EO Wilson etc as being a recipe for "social darwinism", eugenics and other perceived-to-be unsavoury implications of ev. psych. However, that is a digression.

But, while on the subject of evolution - would anyone care to give a justification of any moral precept based on evolutionary theory?

Cheers!
 
 
Lurid Archive
22:02 / 22.11.06
But, while on the subject of evolution - would anyone care to give a justification of any moral precept based on evolutionary theory?

I don't think it quite works like that. The idea is that a social species with intricate relations between its members benefits if there is a predisposition in individuals to sacrifice a certain amount of individual, and perhaps short term, gain for the benefit of the group and to internalise the desirability of cooperative interactions. That is, if everyone is a sociopath, barns never get built.

Treating others as you wish to be treated isn't some fundamental truth, from this point of view, but rather an expression that Tit-for-tat is a remarkably good gaming strategy. So good, in fact, that it should be in some sense hard wired.

All this is extremely speculative though, since I don't think the mechanisms are really well understood enough to make reliable statements. It also tells you little about how to justify morality. Personally, I've never seen the ultimate foundation of morality as a big problem - one can appeal to concern for the suffering of others or somesuch, but this probably just begs the question. But it doesn't really worry me because in some sense it isn't a fundamentally more difficult problem than justifying my favourite flavour of ice cream.
 
 
jentacular dreams
08:20 / 23.11.06
I agree with Lurid, in that 'moral' behaviour will definitely have a selective impact on any social species. However, I dislike the idea that morality (outside of evol-psych) is based upon nothing more than preferences or even 'taste'. If this is true would this not naturally lead to speculation that, like so many other things, what is moral is ultimately what the majority decides to be moral (something also suggested rather uncomfortably by history)? However, once an individual believes this, does the term morality have any meaning any longer? Would people believing the above who continue to choose to act in accordance with moral values society upholds be considered some sort of antithesis to a sociopath or psychopath?
 
 
Closed for Business Time
08:38 / 23.11.06
Monsieur Archive - thanks for joining the exchange. I agree with you on some points, on others not.

Just so we can have a foundation for further debate, I've pasted the introduction from the Wikipedia article on morality underneath. That too is, of course, up for debate.

Morality refers to the concept of human ethics which pertains to matters of good and evil —also referred to as "right or wrong", used within three contexts: individual conscience; systems of principles and judgments — sometimes called moral values —shared within a cultural, religious, secular, Humanist, or philosophical community; and codes of behavior or conduct.

Personal morality defines and distinguishes among right and wrong intentions, motivations or actions, as these have been learned, engendered, or otherwise developed within each individual.

Okee... where I agree with LA is where ze says that having to justify hir morals doesn't bother hir more than justyfying hir choice of icecream. That wasn't entirely my point in starting this thread, however much I feel the same. I guess it is more of an intellectual exercise than anything else - wank thy head!

I disagree with a number of statements of yours describing the state of the evolutionary theory of morality, such as "The idea is that a social species with intricate relations between its members benefits if there is a predisposition in individuals to sacrifice a certain amount of individual, and perhaps short term, gain for the benefit of the group and to internalise the desirability of cooperative interactions." This can be correct if group selection is found to hold in H. Sapiens. I don't think that's the case, but I might be wrong. My point is that the evolution of morality, and indeed the strength of moral behaviours seen as an expression of selection pressures relies to some extent on the unit of selection. So evolutionary theory potentially gives different answers if the unit of selection is taken to be the gene, the cell, the organism, our kin, our group or our species. As you say, dear LA, it's all a bit speculative.

One thing I do believe holds true, no matter what the unit of selection is, is that "evolutionary morals" usually, but not always, makes utilitarian and descriptive statements and shies away from justifications.

So just to clarify - what I'm trying to engender is a meta-ethical debate, getting tentative answers to questions such as
What does it mean to say something is "good"?
How, if at all, do we know what is right and wrong?

I'm not trying to debate any ethical theory per se, nor ethics applied to any particular situation. That said, I'd be happy to do so in another thread.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
08:56 / 23.11.06
Ah! The apian royalty is back! Great stuff!

To sum up what we all agree on so far - moral behaviour is likely to be shaped to some degree by evolutionary pressures. The hows and wherefores belongs, I think, in another thread. But, as I said in an earlier post, this position makes morality essentially random, and that seems... weird.

Back to your last post, kotb. I quote

However, I dislike the idea that morality (outside of evol-psych) is based upon nothing more than preferences or even 'taste'. If this is true would this not naturally lead to speculation that, like so many other things, what is moral is ultimately what the majority decides to be moral (something also suggested rather uncomfortably by history)?

Indeed it would. Morals, in a relativistic perspective, is nought but another tall tale told by the powers that be. Nothing is "simply" or "obviously" right/wrong, but always so in relation to the the moral code of a given era or culture, in which case it's natural to start looking for power differentials within that culture/era to explain their moral code.

Further on
However, once an individual believes this, does the term morality have any meaning any longer?

I believe that is a fine summary of my quandary.

Maybe if I restate things, yet again, we will gain some traction. The question, is there a third way between idealism and relativism, can be restated thusly - is there "something between" moral universals and moral particulars?
 
 
Lurid Archive
09:00 / 23.11.06
So evolutionary theory potentially gives different answers if the unit of selection is taken to be the gene, the cell, the organism, our kin, our group or our species

I don't see that, myself. Natural selection should be thought of as operating at the genetic level, sure. But that doesn't exclude the importance of different structures. That is, if a particular individual does well reproductively, that is good for their genes. So the expression of these genes in the individual is important. Similarly, the success of a cooperative group may well benefit the reproductive success of individuals within that group compared to other groups. So even starting with just the genetic level, you can't avoid thinking about larger structures. These structures aren't inevitable, of course, and there is no fundamental reason why humans are social and cooperative (to the extent that we are). The argument doesn't say that you should expect social behaviour because of morality, but rather that you should expect morality given social behaviour. You might try to argue that reproductive success is more likely given cooperation between individuals, but I'm not sure how strong that argument is.
 
 
sleazenation
10:44 / 24.11.06
This week's edition of In Our Time (Melvyn Bragg's eclectic history of ideas, available as both streaming audio and, for the next week, as a downloadable MP3) covers this whole area.

Ostensibly this week's edition is on altruism, but this is something that is inextricably linked to concepts of 'morality'.

On the panel are
Miranda Fricker, Senior Lecturer in the School of Philosophy at Birkbeck, University of London.

Richard Dawkins, evolutionary biologist and the Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University.

John Dupré, Professor of Philosophy of Science at Exeter University and director of Egenis, the ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
11:15 / 24.11.06
Hey, thanks for the tip. Although the thought of listening to that bag of gratuitous phlegmy arrogance that is Doc "Squawking" Dawkins puts the shivers up my spine. Professor of Public Understanding my ass!
 
 
Spaniel
11:54 / 24.11.06
And this discussion about relativism may be of interest too.

Good ol' Bragg. Always there when you need him.
 
 
Tom Coates
13:01 / 24.11.06
I'm an enormous fan of both In Our Time and Richard Dawkins (although I'll accept that he comes across like a twat) so I'll be listening eagerly to that one.

It's worth looking at this in blocks. Firstly, different species operate in different ways. Many are highly individualistic. Many are highly or even savagely communal. Some species have no problem eating their own young or members of their own species. Others do. To the extent that a sense of what is appropriate or inappropriate in any species that has any kind of social order, it's pretty clear that the way they govern their relationships between one another, the ways in which they determine what is okay and what is not okay are radically different. You only have to look at the mating behaviour, courtship and competition rituals of some animals to get a sense that the 'normal' way of behaving for these animals is radically different than for us. It seems plausible to argue as a result of that alone that there are inbuilt differences in how different species socialise and inter-relate. This seems to have a pretty strong relationship to our conception of morality, paticularly in social contexts.

On the other hand, you only have to look at the differences in understandings of morality between cultures on the planet today and between people today and the past to know that morality at the point that you're talking about is not commensurate with biology - that is to say, there are other aspects to the way in which we decide whether something is appropriate or not both in terms of the culture we have been interpolated into, and in terms of our respective senses of what are right and wrong which may dramatically from our parents.

It is conceiveable that we could be arguing about the tiniest fragment of culture on top of a huge burden of evolution, and that we only conceive it as important because we find the stuff we have in common so obvious. It's difficult to determine that. It's also conceivable that everyone is born with a pure and solid sense of what is right and wrong built into their genes and then are forced to come into accomodations with the genetic material of people around them. I actually don't believe this, since we have to have positions in morality for things that could never have occurred to our forebears - on the correct treatment of intellectual property for example, or genetic engineering.

However, what some of the people in this thread seem to be protesting is the idea of something external to the argument or debate that can sanctify the moral choices we make. This is - of course - normally seen as a deity of some kind - some being whose agency is transcendent and who can say, bluntly, that X is right and Y is wrong and if you do X you will be rewarded and Y you will be punished. Logically, of course this helps not one jot. It doesn't tell you that your actions are good or bad, and it doesn't give you effective criteria to work these things out for yourself, it just pushes the question back one step to the question that should never be asked, "How did God determine that these were right or good things to do?"

If you can't have god, then you need logic or argument, and logic and argument require axiomatic bases. So if you're prepared to state up front that 'the good' represents continued happy and productive, free human life, then you can work out how to operate. But of course, now you're right back trying to work out who decided they were good things.

The truth is that biology is concerned with the survival of the genome, and people are concerned with their survival, propogating their genes, and their comfort, status and happiness. These things are biological. They are derived from genes and probably genes alone. How we turn those things into mechanisms and rules of how to behave is probably a combination of patterns that worked and allowed our civilisations to continue and the gradual ossification of those patterns into our very biology.

At an individual level, I say look towards what people actually want and now look towards the mechanisms that people consider the most effective way to make sure that they have the best chance of getting it. It's not okay to kill people not because people don't occasionally want to kill people, but because we don't want to be killed, and we've decided collectively or through a variation of the anthropic principle have been the only ones that survived as a result, that the best way not to be killed is to agree collectively that killing is bad. People who thrive in that environment become the next stage of human evolution.

In this way, I actually think you can find a good accomodation - the human being is not static and it's not purely 'at the mercy' of evolution, it's a species that's gradually starting to write itself, to take over from and to exert control over its own evolution by trying to find consciously patterns that work most effectively that will allow the long-term preservation of ourselves and our world. Does that help at all?
 
 
Closed for Business Time
13:31 / 24.11.06
Tom, thank you very much for your lucid comments. I'll have a think about this and come back in more detail, but before getting on the bus home, I'll just make one general comment whose main idea comes from a paper I read bits of yesterday (PW Taylor: Four types of ethical relativism - The Philosophical Review, 1954). Be warned, this is merely a restatement of the original question.. bleh..

Is there some acceptable procedure for rationally justifying moral statements, whereby such statements will be found to be true or false independently of the moral beliefs of those who utter the statements? If yes, what method of verification is to be used and on what grounds is this method chosen?

Or, slightly differently, is the attempt to justify rationally a set of moral values itself rationally justifiable?
 
 
SMS
20:35 / 24.11.06
I think the work of Emmanuel Levinas is particularly interesting, but it isn't exactly atheistic if that's important to you. Morality stems from intersubjectivity. Here is his most famous work, Totality and Infinity. I'm afraid I cannot contribute much to explaining him, but it might be worth your while to investigate.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:34 / 26.11.06
Richard Dawkins, does not come across as a twat, rather I'm afraid you do in your desire for transcendence... The crucial point which should be perfectly obvious even without accepting the non-existance of any god, is that morality and ethics do not have any necessary relationship to transcendence...

a twat, give me strength just to many idiots out there.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
23:06 / 26.11.06
Why not demonstrate that you aren't one of those idiots by adding something to the discussion, sdv?
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
00:44 / 27.11.06
For example: the description of Dawkins as a "twat" came from Tom Coates, who said of transcendence:

However, what some of the people in this thread seem to be protesting is the idea of something external to the argument or debate that can sanctify the moral choices we make. This is - of course - normally seen as a deity of some kind - some being whose agency is transcendent and who can say, bluntly, that X is right and Y is wrong and if you do X you will be rewarded and Y you will be punished. Logically, of course this helps not one jot. It doesn't tell you that your actions are good or bad, and it doesn't give you effective criteria to work these things out for yourself, it just pushes the question back one step to the question that should never be asked, "How did God determine that these were right or good things to do?"

As such, could you explain how his need for transcendence makes him appear to be a twat?
 
 
Closed for Business Time
08:33 / 27.11.06
sdv, if you could be bothered to read the thread, and perhaps the summary as well, you'd see that I'm/we're not saying that transcendentalism is a non-requirement for morality.. quite the opposite really.

As for the Dawkins/twat comments, that was initiated by yours truly on the basis of both reading Mr. D and hearing the man lecture. I simply reserve my right to state that the man appears to be speaking, at times, ex cathedra and with uncalled-for vehemence, on a great many topics that are more complex than he would usually grant. And yes, that goes for both his biological and his public-understanding-of-science activities.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
08:35 / 27.11.06
err... that first sentence to be read "we are saying that transcendence is a non-requirement for morality." a tad too many negatives f#cking with my brain at this time of the day.
 
 
jentacular dreams
08:47 / 27.11.06
Borderline temple here, but I feel Tom might have missed an important point with regard to God-based morality. As far as I understand it, western ethics and morality go hand in hand with the christian concept of sin which shaped much of our laws and values. However, immorality and sinfullness aren't neccessarily identical. (An absolute) God could never commit a sin, simply because the definition of sin is that which gores against the will/nature of (an absolute) God*. There is no action which god could perform which could be described as sinful. There are plenty (e.g. old testament) which we could describe as unethical.

A second distinction between the two is that sin is an absolute. In moral terms there is no pure good. All actions have consequences, and somewhere down the line of causality, some of those consequences will be less than ideal. The ethical choice is one in which we weigh up, to the best of our abilities what the consequences will be, and choose according to what we believe will yield the most 'good' and least 'evil'. Morality is a compromise, an attempt to make the best of a bad lot. Sin however is a much more inflexible concept. If faced with two options, either of which will result in some evil, no matter which the individual chooses, they are tainted with sin (and again, from the christian worldview, all sins are equal barriers between man and the sinlessness of god, there are no 'levels of sinfulness').

So, if sinfulness and immorality aren't completely analogous, I suppose then that even from a christian theological point of view (and therefore maybe to an extent from a jewish and islamic one) the idea of morality is still a human one, grounded as it is in the idea of 'this imperfect world.'

*to correct a misconception, from the Christian perspective god does not reward good behaviour, they believe it's all about faith.
 
 
Spaniel
12:41 / 27.11.06
the ethical choice is one in which we weigh up, to the best of our abilities what the consequences will be, and choose according to what we believe will yield the most 'good' and least 'evil'. Morality is a compromise, an attempt to make the best of a bad lot.

Where are you getting this stuff?
 
 
jentacular dreams
14:26 / 27.11.06
Mostly my poor addled mind. I've done quite a bit of thinking on the subject. Maybe too much.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
14:33 / 27.11.06
Just a short note to your previous post, apian royalty - surely there are levels of sin in Western Xtianity? What about cardinal/mortal sins in Catholicism?

Another thing I believe is a too narrow characterisation of Xtian ethics/theology/ is where you state [..]from the Christian perspective god does not reward good behaviour, they believe it's all about faith." Not all Xtian doctrines subscribe to that particular dogma, do they? Sources can be had if ya wanna. Tho I don't have time right now.

But - should anyone wish to pursue this angle - I suggest this goes to the Temple...
 
 
jentacular dreams
17:56 / 27.11.06
Sorry, the majority of my understanding of christianity comes from conversations with those friends who are (all but one are protestants of varying sorts), the bits of the bible I've read, and occasional trups to churches. Catholicism (along with some of the other smaller sects) aren't therefore something I'm very familiar with, but as I understand it, both the mortal and venial sins both result in damnation if not resolved through confession (the priest being an intercessory for god). Like civil and criminal law, both result in jail time if broken.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
18:55 / 27.11.06
A mortal sin leads to death - that is, separation from God and the loss of one's state of grace. According to Roman Catholic doctrine, someone who dies in a state of mortal sin goes to Hell. A venial sin does not lead to separation from God, except in special cases. You remain in a state of grace. The third category of sin identified in the new testament is blasphemy against God. This is worse than a mortal sin, predictably.

So, no, the legal analogy doesn't work, really, or rather doesnt work without the idea of a reversible sentence of death. I think you appear to be basing your conclusions about Christianity on, essentially, Lutheranism and post-Lutheran protestantism, KOTB, and to be honest that basis seems a bit shaky. New thread on sin, maybe?
 
 
multitude.tv
22:02 / 27.11.06
if one disavows religion, and theistic-spiritual paradigms of magic, scientific materialism and/or postmodern social and human sciences seems to give us little if any leverage on the question of morality. Is there a third way between (scientific) materialism and postmodernism on the one hand and transcendental idealism on the other? If so, I'd be very interested to hear your views and ideas.

I am trying to understand why the question is posited in the first place. As it seems to me that "the question of morality" pretty much disappears with the "theistic-spiritual" paradigms that are shed with scientific materialism and "post-modernism". Just like the "Question of God" Virgin Births, Original Sin, and other myths to scare children. Why bother with "Transcendental Idealism"? It seems to me that "questions about morality" go more or less the way of Buridan's Ass, angels dancing on pins, etc.

What is it about the "question of morality" that calls to ask? What is meant by morality?

Also, I am curious as to the Dawkins is a "twat" comment. He seems to offer up an interesting story to account for just this question (if one demands an answer to this sort of question), what about it is lacking?

What of Nietzsche's arguments of against morality are lacking?
 
 
jentacular dreams
07:57 / 28.11.06
It wasn't an absolute metaphor, though perhaps it could be qualified by saying that the punishable crime isn't the sin itself, but rather the failure to bring it before god. As I said earlier, my understanding of most of christianity is largely based upon conversations with friends who are from a protestant (i.e. inherrantly lutheran/post lutheran) worldview (most have evangelical leanings).
 
 
Closed for Business Time
10:09 / 28.11.06
Mr. multitude.tv - you're trying to understand why I asked this question. Fair game. I take that to mean that the upthread posts by yours truly and the others didn't help you get that.

My understanding of morality, whenever I stoop to observe it (it's small and not too cuddly), that is - how I justify my moral beliefs as right and good, seems to be a muddle of religious (transcendental, or at least idealist) and humanitarian (some sort of inherent dignity, human rights, utilitarian/nihilist mash-up) "concerns". However, I find myself at a loss to truly come up with something/arguments that would satisfy, well, me.

Relijun... I'll quote Tom on that

However, what some of the people in this thread seem to be protesting is the idea of something external to the argument or debate that can sanctify the moral choices we make. This is - of course - normally seen as a deity of some kind - some being whose agency is transcendent and who can say, bluntly, that X is right and Y is wrong and if you do X you will be rewarded and Y you will be punished. Logically, of course this helps not one jot. It doesn't tell you that your actions are good or bad, and it doesn't give you effective criteria to work these things out for yourself, it just pushes the question back one step to the question that should never be asked, "How did God determine that these were right or good things to do?"

OK?

The problem, as I see it, with arguments based on either natural sciences, materialist or postmodern philosophy, is that they are either mute on the question of what justifies our morals (natural sciences), or they end up in nihilism (materialism and postmodernism) or simply appeals to some moral/powerful authority (Gandhi, Dr. King, JFK, Der Fuhrer or wtf).

Now, that's all ok... I'm not incapable of making seemingly rational and justified moral statements and performing moral actions in lieu of fool-proof justificatory principles. In short, I get on with life fine without having those.
I am however concerned how people can legally and politically justify their principled opposition to a range of attitudes, actions and beliefs, as for example racism, murder, rape, theft, abortion etcetera ad nauseam without committing major logical fallacies. Or vice versa for more salutatory causes.

Now, to make myself perfectly clear. I am not saying that people have no right to protest/endorse any and all of these horrific/beautiful actions without a sound and firm philosophical base. What I am saying is that the principles that underlie the moral arguments diverse groups of people make will have repercussions beyond those groups, and as such, I think it's helpful to have a notion of where people argue from, in order to both understand my own and their positions, and if possible, come to an understanding based on (AND HERE IS WHAT I'M AFTER) rational arguments that appeal not to a god(dess), not to a moral human authority per se, and emphatically not to history and tradition.

As I've mulled over these concerns since before posting them here, I'm slowly starting to realise that I'm painting myself into a corner. My train of thought goes something like this.

1. I accept no religious authority.
2. I don't see science answering any of my concerns (i.e. you can't go from is/was to ought, or see the naturalistic fallacy)
3. I don't believe in appeals to tradition, politics or history.

So what am I left with?

As for why Dawkins is a twat... That statement had nothing to do with the arguments against religion in his latest book, The God Delusion (haven't read it, doubt if I will), but it had a lot to do with the fact that I think the man is arrogant, supercilious, superficial and disrespectful. In short, a highly educated and well-paid twat.

Regarding Nietzche's arguments against morality, I would be most grateful if you could post a short version of'em. I read some N way back in the days, but I cannot for the life of me remember what it was all about.

Phew... Cig break coming up I can sense... BBL
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
11:58 / 28.11.06
Damn - just lost a post. Notes for hopeful later completion:

Borderline temple here, but I feel Tom might have missed an important point with regard to God-based morality. As far as I understand it, western ethics and morality go hand in hand with the christian concept of sin which shaped much of our laws and values.

Note importance of Roman law in modern western legal practice. Note conflation of "laws" and "values". Use e.g homosexuality - untangling of religious and social law.

However, immorality and sinfullness aren't neccessarily identical. (An absolute) God could never commit a sin, simply because the definition of sin is that which gores against the will/nature of (an absolute) God*. There is no action which god could perform which could be described as sinful. There are plenty (e.g. old testament) which we could describe as unethical.

Note - this is untrue. If God exists, and is absolutely good, his actions cannot be described as unethical. If He does not exist, then his actions cannot be described as unethical, because no such actions exist. Note switch from immoral to unethical in para. Cite Book of Job. Make particular note of Leviathan - apparent mistake of God, source of undeserved evil, ultimate purpose in Messianic feast.

A second distinction between the two is that sin is an absolute. In moral terms there is no pure good. All actions have consequences, and somewhere down the line of causality, some of those consequences will be less than ideal. The ethical choice is one in which we weigh up, to the best of our abilities what the consequences will be, and choose according to what we believe will yield the most 'good' and least 'evil'. Morality is a compromise, an attempt to make the best of a bad lot. Sin however is a much more inflexible concept.

Note that this describes only one form of morality - consequentialist morality. Thus, incorrect. Ref. Kantian morality, Nietzschean morality, which hopefully Multiverse will be back to talk more about shortly.

If faced with two options, either of which will result in some evil, no matter which the individual chooses, they are tainted with sin (and again, from the christian worldview, all sins are equal barriers between man and the sinlessness of god, there are no 'levels of sinfulness').

Not true - explain sin as state and sin as action, explain difference identified in New Testament between three different levels of sin.

So, if sinfulness and immorality aren't completely analogous, I suppose then that even from a christian theological point of view (and therefore maybe to an extent from a jewish and islamic one) the idea of morality is still a human one, grounded as it is in the idea of 'this imperfect world.'

Note significant differences between various Christian and Jewish concepts of sin, request clarification on Islamic concepts of sin. Suggest talking to a priest - or, for preference, several - about the nature of sin to firm up understanding of Christian concept before going further into other religions.

Sorry for the notes - wanted to get it in while it was still fresh in my head post-crash.

*to correct a misconception, from the Christian perspective god does not reward good behaviour, they believe it's all about faith.
 
 
Scrambled Password Bogus Email
13:51 / 28.11.06
Fairly comprehensive analysis of Judaic, Christian and Islamic takes on Sin courtesy of Wikipedia. Also other faith's equivalences / correspondences and differences.
 
 
multitude.tv
14:47 / 28.11.06
LosMontes, thanks for your clear representation of your question. I think the center of my inquiry was, in part anticipated by you:

how I justify my moral beliefs as right and good, seems to be a muddle of religious (transcendental, or at least idealist) and humanitarian (some sort of inherent dignity, human rights, utilitarian/nihilist mash-up) "concerns". However, I find myself at a loss to truly come up with something/arguments that would satisfy, well, me.

I think my question is, whence does the desire to justify a set of beliefs. The kind of beliefs that are of concern are designated as “moral” and “moral” beliefs have to do with claims to “right and good”.

As for N’s various critiques of Morality, an interesting summary can be found here. What I find compelling, or interesting, is his assessment of the origin of the Moral impetus (his targets are principally Christianity and Kant, though there are, I think, lashings out at Hegel. N claims that these forms of morality are rooted in a fundamental kind of resentment (or in Hegelian terms, Negation). Morality is seen as contrary to action, creation, movement, etc. This is why N is compelled to look to physics, life, and art for models of “ethical” action. N’s critique, I think, misses the naturalistic fallacy, as I can’t recall where he evokes an “ought.”

““our thoughts, values, every ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ ‘if’ and ‘but’ grow from us with the same inevitability as fruits borne on the tree — all related and each with an affinity to each, and evidence of one will, one health, one earth, one sun” Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals

I think, and so does Nietzsche, that his critique of morality is the opposite of Nihilism. It is a materialism that is fundamentally grounded in an affirmation of life.

I think that his view is compatible with contemporary Atheist (Dawkins) articulations of the origin of morality, (though D would, I think, cringe at N’s critique of “truth”). Foucault and Deleuze certainly draw a great deal from N’s critique.

But I think you have a further concern, that is

I am however concerned how people can legally and politically justify their principled opposition to a range of attitudes, actions and beliefs, as for example racism, murder, rape, theft, abortion etcetera ad nauseam without committing major logical fallacies. Or vice versa for more salutatory causes.

This reminds me of something Deleuze said in an interview,

“All societies are rational and irrational at the same time. They are perforce rational in their mechanisms, their cogs and wheels, their connecting systems, and even by the place they assign to the irrational. Yet all this presupposes codes or axioms which are not the products of chance, but which are not intrinsically rational either. It's like theology: everything about it is rational if you accept sin, immaculate conception, incarnation.” –Deleuze, “Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium”

I think that to look for an analytic coherence to moral belief between peoples, will, more than likely, come up empty handed. It isn’t that there is no rationality, or justification in the moral lessons of various religions or peoples; it is that the systems of reasoning emerge from different rationalities. This is where I think Haus’s post is well thought. If one doesn’t accept the axiom of original sin, what is there really in Christian morality that makes consistent sense. The reasoning of Christian morality works perfectly well if you accept a particular given sex of codes, and I would guess that most transcendental moralities are similarly grounded on various particular cultural codes (myths, assumptions, habits, etc.).

Returning to N, there is most certainly a “value” attached to life in his work (which he posits in opposition to the value of death in “The Anti-Christ”). I suppose in the attribution of value to life, N’s thought could be seen to follow; this is why bio-power/politics/ad nauseum becomes central in post Nietzsche French thought (Foucault).

So, I think that you may have painted yourself into a corner. Personally I don’t bother with moral questions per se, I think there are particular ethical styles that one can find in N, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, etc; but these have little obvious tie to the “ought” discourse of analytic moral philosophy. In short, (and rather sloppy), I think my personal moral concerns (I generally stay away from the “m” word in favor of the term, drawing from Spinoza, ethics) are tied more to questions about “how to live creatively in the world with others” (creatively being the evaluative, and problematic qualifying term) than to concerns about what ought to be done to maximize the good in a given situation.
 
 
symbiosis
15:59 / 07.12.06
'1. I accept no religious authority.
2. I don't see science answering any of my concerns (i.e. you can't go from is/was to ought, or see the naturalistic fallacy)
3. I don't believe in appeals to tradition, politics or history.

So what am I left with?'

I know this is humanistic, but you are always left with yourself. And you want to be consistent if you want to have a moral. A moral that changes with context is the problem we are trying to overcome. Insomuch as any situation can be similar enough to another one, than a moral could possibly apply to both.

And here I defer to Chomsky somewhat, who is always saying this.

The most elementary moral principle is that we must abide by the rules which we apply to others, if not more stringent ones.

Do unto others...of course.

I think that you can get bogged down in morality if you start looking at too many situations to which you have no tangency. You shouldn't be spending your tiime contemplating the morals of x-ray vision if you don't have x-ray vision or know anyone who has x-ray vision.

But we do know people who are fighting in Iraq, we do, Americans of course, have the opportunity to vote on these things. One thing Ill say about the contemporary view of Iraq, as an example case, is that you can't find anywhere on American television the viewpoint of a common Iraqi or anyone wondering what it would be like to be a citizen over there right now. And this tells me that the national interest is probably running off of one of the deprecated forms of morality, some abstract strictures or fruity aphorisms like 'spreading freedom and democracy.'

It would be nice to be a nihilist and say that language and life is meaningless and time spent considering them is wasted, but one day someone might pull out your fingernails and you might have to admit that things matter, that pain is real, that you want to change the world, fight back, keep score, be remembered, or whatever.

And when you do these things, your reputation matters. There is a commons.

If you put your money where your mouth is, and follow the rules you apply to others even when it's costly, you run excellent chances of being considered a moral person by most other humans, across nations, religions, planets, galaxies etc.

And if God or a god were to disagree, then we can say that these other entites (surprise) have a different morality than us. And if they want to impose some grand universal set on us, then we can tell them to kiss our ass or come down here and make us.

And if they send us to hell because this whole universe is rigged in their favor, that's where we'll start the next revolution.
 
 
diz
20:57 / 07.12.06
For me, it's enlightened long-term self-interest. My personal experience has confirmed to my satisfaction that you do indeed tend to get back the same kind of treatment you dole out. People generally respond to kindness and generosity with reciprocity, and selfishness and general bastardry with distrust and hostility, so why be an asshole?

What's good for the overall benefit of the community is ultimately good for the individual, and definitions of "community" can scale up or down as appropriate for the situation, from "family and friends" for individual scale decisions to "humanity as a whole" for large-scale political issues.

It's not dependent some kind of mystical woo-woo explanation. You can talk about things in terms of reputation systems or whatever.
 
  

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