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Deleuze & Guattari

 
  

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Tryphena Absent
10:25 / 07.04.05
(And by the way I do find D & G a lot easier to read than Charles Dickens)
 
 
Spaniel
12:17 / 07.04.05
I appreciate that guides are just another interpretation of the original text, and that they suffer from all the problems of any interpretation, plus maybe a few more as they tend to over simplify, but I still think they can be very helpful.

An intelligent reader should be aware of the aforementioned problems and will almost certainly approach any beginner's guide with caution.
Perhaps the best analogy is an old map. Sure, it's not the territory and some stuff will be wrong, but it'll help you get your bearings if used mindfully.
 
 
Foust is SO authentic
17:23 / 07.04.05
Ordinarily I'd agree about source vs. secondary, for the reasons others have argued here.

Certain authors are exceptions, however. The writers that insist on obscure jargon, and then refuse to provide descriptions of that jargon - ie, D&G.

I can work with Nietzsche and Foucault on my own; they at least attemp to explain their terminology.

I'd say that Heidegger and Derrida are somewhere in between; I can work through their technical language with some effort, though I'd still prefer to have basic explanations of "sorge" or "the trace" in place before I tackle these guys, and the only place I'll find these explantions is from secondary sources.

D&G, however, are totally indecipherable without some kind of specialized D&G glossary, at least.
 
 
Spaniel
10:20 / 08.04.05
Hmm, I've come across as far too prescriptive in this thread.

I started with Xyu in mind and ended up defending a position.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
15:35 / 09.04.05
I wouldn't say don't read secodary texts, or that glossaries aren't useful and even perhaps at times entertaining. But it doesn't actually help to often they are full of illusions that only the source texts can protect you from - Nina C brought up Walter Benjamin - a more over interpreted writer is almost impossible to imagine and yet all that's needed is to open the text and 'read'. D&G are the same - read them through de Landa for example and you end up thinking they are something entirely different than if you read them through Iain MacKenzie or Badiou or Hardt --- Perhaps to read D&G is to have to accept that they may be an 'introduction to a non-fascist life' but that doesn't mean it will be easy...

After all if you look at the British Tory party, or the US republican party - isn't it obvious that we still have a long way to go...
 
 
alterity
16:47 / 14.04.05
The secondary texts concern is a real and important one. There is a difference, IMHO, though between texts like Claire Colebrook's explanations of D+G and DeLanda's use of D+G (or Hardt and Negri's, or Liz Grosz'). One thing to remember is that D+G (and Deleuze by himself before they were joined at the hip) insisted that they were not trying to get everyone to understand everything they were saying, not in the sense that they were trying to be difficult, but in the sense that not everyone will get it in the same way. That's why A Thousand Plateaus is written the way that it is. It's a toolkit for thought, and many of the tools are very similar but are useful in different modalities. That's why DeLanda favors the stuff that is more directly related to science, Hardt and Negri take the political stuff, and Grosz takes the stuff about becoming. But whether you're talking about smooth space, rhizomes, or deterritorialization, you're really just talking about different modalities of the same concept.

It's also important to note that much of the problematic language found in D+G is discussed by the two separately in earlier work. For example, Deleuze first makes use of the Body Without Organs concept in The Logic of Sense. Of course he stole the idea from Artaud. The point is that reading the earlier texts helps with reading the later ones. Of course the early ones are also very difficult, and often require understanding the philosophical tradition out of which D+G (but especially D by himself) are working. Lacan is important, as is much of structuralism. Gilbert Simondon is also key, especially for Difference and Repetition. Freud cannot be avoided. Hume, Kant. Plato and Hegel, but only in contradistinction (Deleuze hated Hegel so much he almost never mentions him).

To me one of the best places to start with Deleuze is with the short Spinoza book, Practical Philosophy: Spinoza. After all, D+G call Spinoza (in ATP) "the Prince of Philosophers." Some very clear examples in there, and a very, very, very interesting reading of the Genesis story. From there I would say that reading Nietzsche and Philosophy, Bergsonism, and the Foucault book will give anyone interested a handle on some of the "basic" ideas. From there one can move into the more difficult texts. Avoid Anti-Oedipus like the plague. Terrible and, to my mind, pointless. Do read the Kafka book. Also try Coldness and Cruelty, which includes the text of Venus in Furs by Sacher-Masoch, the so called inventor of masochism.

Sorry for the overly long post, but I've been following this thread since it began and I just got my invitation to the board this morning.
 
 
Spaniel
09:59 / 15.04.05
Welcome to the board, Alterity. You've certainly piqued my interest.

Care to expand on the D+G's reading of Genesis?
 
 
alterity
17:28 / 15.04.05
Okay, here goes. . .

In 1664 a nut job named William de Blyenburgh wrote a letter to Spinoza asking the latter about some of his points made in The Ethics (the relevant letters are included in the edition I linked to). De Blyenburgh was concerned that Spinoza was claiming in some way that God was/imperfect. Spinoza's argued this interpretation, claiming that God was in fact perfect, and that he had never said anything other than that. (It is important to understand here that Spinoza's concept of God was spiritual, but hardly Judeo-Christian in the traditional sense. God was more or less equated with Nature, or the entirety of existence. As an atheist, I have no problem with Spinoza's notion of God or his expression of God's perfection. Perfection does not equal "better than everything," but merely "adequate to the task for which it exists.") Anyway, in terms of Genesis, Spinoza argued that if God had forbade Adam to eat the forbidden fruit then Adam could not have eaten it, as nothing can contradict God's decree. (Spinoza would, in a similar vein, claim that while juridical law can constrain a human, can make a human go to jail for example, no law can force one to fly. In other words, there are natural laws that cannot be bent or broken. If it were truly unnatural, against nature/God, to eat the fruit it would simply not be possible.) Instead of forbidding Adam/Eve the fruit, God merely expressed to them what would happen if they were to eat it. It is at this point that Deleuze comes in.

Before I get to that, I just want to make a a point about the distinction between the two interpretations of Genesis I mentioned here. In the first case, wherein God forbids Adam/Eve, we have a morality at work. Moralities (and I am here working from a Spinozan cum Deleuzean definition, so no one should try this at home or, say, in the presence of a Badiouian or an acolyte of Levinas) place limits on bodies and are (in the best cases) static. The 10 Commandments are a morality, or a series of moral doctrines. The US Constitution is a morality. In many cases morality is bad, in that, again, it limits affect, or what the body can do (more on this notion below). Sometimes, however, it is necessary. No matter what we think of the mandate to keep holy the Sabbath, "Thou shalt not kill" sounds like pretty sound advice to me. This morality is necessary, despite the fact that it limits bodies to not kill because it allows other bodies to be and become without being killed. Moralities work best when the are applied at a societal level in the service of society, rather than say being applied at a societal level in the service of a segment of society (gay marraige amendment anyone?). Moralities must be enforced universally and without exception (eg free speech). Of course this begs the question of interpretation and who exactly gets to decide on what morality is, but that's is perhaps a question for another time.

The second reading of Genesis, Spinoza's, leads away from morality and twoards ethics. Ethics is not a universal, but is ultra specific. Ethics deals with the body's abilities and capacities. So when God told Adam/Eve not to eat the fruit he warned them that it would be bad for their bodies, that it would alter their bodies' relationships to themselves and to the world. Thus they were cast out of Eden because their bodies changed in the way they were able to deal with Nature. The best way to understand this idea is in the concept of poison, and not just arsenic. Virtually anything can be poisonous in the right quantity. Eat enough food and you will get sick. This action is unethical because it is bad for the body. It alters the bodies capacities in a negative manner. Eating the correct foods in eth correct amounts will increase the bodies ability to affect the world and be affected by it (this sum of these two movements is called "affect" with a short "a" sound). So the fruit of the Genesis myth had a negative and therefore unethical impact on Adam and Eve's body.

Okay, so as my father would say, "What does that have to do with the price of tea in China?" Well Deleuze reads this argument in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy and runs with it. (Much of the running is done in later texts like A Thousand Plateuas, although one has to read between the lines to see it.) One of the most difficult tasks for anyone trying to find a moral/ethical stance on an issue is the specter of relativism. The Ten Commandments only works (seemingly) if you believe in an all powerful God who wrote them. God in this instance cannot simply be nature, but must be an actual being with agency who, by the very fact that its words is law, can never, ever be wrong. If this sort of God is removed from the equation, who's to say who's right? Well in steps Spinozan ethics. The shorthand for the idea (and this is me readin deleuze reading Spinoza, so I don't expect that it is ever just stated clearly in any of the texts I am citing) goes like this: the body is never wrong. If a body reacts badly to poison, it is reacting correctly. Better put, the body will interpret the poison correctly, as something harmful to itself. It should interpret food correctly as well, as something beneficial to itself.

The issue hinges on what we understand interpretation to be. Current debates over judicial activism in the US are caught up in a fight over the status of interpretation. The Dems and lefties in general claim that a judge must be free to interpret the COnstitution as s/he sees fit. The right claims (implicitly) that there is no interpretation of the Constitution (or the Bible), but that there is one inherent meaning, to which they seem to hold the key. (Note that early Puritans were all convinced that there was one abslutely, intrisically, and incontrovertably correct interpretation of the Bible. They just couldn't agree on what it was.)

THe probelm with interpreting what we understand to be texts is that what you say is true may be different than what I say is true, and there is no possibility of proving who is right without recourse to some higher authority (eg God). But in the case of the body, the way it interprets the world is always right. (and when I say interpretation I mean that a basketball player interprets space during a game with he/r body. A dancer does much the same thing. There is very little cognition in the moment of the act in either of these two cases.) Thus interpretation becomes possible without recourse to GOd or to an anthing-goes style relativism where what's true is a matter of either sophistry or of power. No amount of argumentation or coersion can make a human flap he/r arms and fly.

Of course there are several problems here, not with the theory, but rather with where it leaves us. One: we have to get rid of the idea of the normal altogether. Otherwise, we would have to say that there is a normal interpretation of sugar. Diabetics would be considered abnormal in such an understanding because they don't read sugar like other people. There are many other, far more sinister variations on this theme. People have been fighting normative powers for years, and many do a much better job than do D+G, but this is a radical destruction of normalcy, under which it becomes difficult to create any but the most provisional and shaky taxonomies. (What happens to the nation, or to religious groups, or to families when there can be no "normal" standard against which to judge their membership to the group?) Two: we can't really know the correct interpretation of anything without experimentation. In other words, if you want to interpret that tasty looking but potentially deadly mushroom growing on that tree over there you're gonna have to eat it. Maybe it'll increase your affect. Maybe you'll die. This dilemma is, I think, what Deleuze has in mind when he claims that Nietzsche is a Spinozan at heart. Finally, there is the problem of how to take ethics--which is a local and specific to individuals (or to parts of individuals, as D+G would claim that the individual is largely a myth, an attempt to "organize" [vis-a-vis the Body without Organs) that which is actually but an aggregate of loosely associated parts coming together in a temporary alliance, much like a wasp and an orchid in the midst of pollination)--and turn it into morality. I have some thoughts on the subject, but I will leave off for now not having meant to go on so long.

Oh, and just let me mention one of the best books you can read in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari is Brain Massumi's Parables for the Virtual. Who else could write so intelligently (if difficultly) about Ronald Reagan's voice, Frank Sinatra's eyes, and soccer as philosophy?
 
 
Chiropteran
18:50 / 15.04.05
[I like alterity. Can we keep hir?]
 
 
alterity
19:08 / 15.04.05
[I like alterity. Can we keep hir?]

*smiling and staring at the floor, feeling welcomed by some very nice sentiments*

You can keep me. I hope to continue this and many other discussions.
 
 
Spaniel
15:14 / 16.04.05
I'm convinced. I'm gonna get me some D+G.

Pretty contraversial interpretation of "perfect", Alty. Should you be going for something more along the lines of 100% appropriate for a given purpose, context, etc...
"Adequate" seems a little weak to me.
 
 
alterity
16:44 / 16.04.05
Pretty contraversial interpretation of "perfect", Alty. Should you be going for something more along the lines of 100% appropriate for a given purpose, context, etc...
"Adequate" seems a little weak to me.


I should add that "adequate" also needs to be understood in this context not as simply "okay" or good enough", but more what you've said. Thanks for pointing that out. The idea is that the concept of "perfection" is not transcendent or abstract, but is tied to specifics and pragmatics, ie materail instantiations of the object in question. "Perfection" is not that of a Platonic Idea/Form, but exists in a thing being "100% appropriate for a given purpose, context." Good show.
 
 
Foust is SO authentic
20:15 / 16.04.05
Holy shit. Just... holy shit. I'm always impressed when someone is able to produce a lucid interpretation of certain continental philosophers, but to make an aspect of D&G that crystal clear leaves me in awe. I am not worthy.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
10:01 / 18.04.05
Alterity, I have enjoyed reading your posts. Two things which I think would be useful for me at least - firstly could clarify what you dislike about Anti-Oedipus ? - secondly what you specifically like about Massumi's understanding of D&G's work....?

sorry realised I type Alias rather rather than Alterity - sigh short term memory loss...

sdv
 
 
alterity
13:17 / 18.04.05
Thank you. I said it before and I'll say it again: I love being here. The board is so intelligent, and I am glad for the opportunity to think out loud and then engage with people who are willing to question what I say and teach me when I go awry.

Anyway, that said, I wish I had a really good, smart answer about my problems with Anti-Oedipus, but the following will have to suffice. It's Deleuze's first collaboration with Guattari, and I more or less prefer Deleuze by himself than with a partner. The problem is especially acute in AO, because it is there the Guattari seems to have the most influence. I , for the most part, avoid psychoanalysis like the plague. The questions it raises, the concerns it has, and the answers it provides are not useful to me. They have no bearing on the questions I want to raise. I took a class on the subject and found that it colored my thought in a manner that is inimical to the way I need to think. (BTW, if they work for you I am not questioning your right to use them, nor am I criticizing that use.)

That said, even though I understand that AO is against psychoanalysis, I find the engagement with the subject a bit mush. It seems to me that Deleuze did far more interesting work on the subject in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. (And, BTW, if you are looking for rigor, check out the former book. If you are looking for wacko rigor, check out the latter. If you're looking for just wacko, check out AO.) The engagement with psychoanalysis directly relates, in my mind, to Guattari's own (albeit strange) relationship to the discourse. The end result is a somewhat murky questioning of the unconscious, economy, and our own desire for being oppressed. For my money, Lyotard's Libidinal Economy does a better job with the subject. Bataille's Accursed Share is a more interesting read. (And yes, I can't stand the way AO reads. It's terribly written I think.)

One last thing: the book seems so dated. It was, after all, written as a response to the May 68 student revolts. As a result, it seems such a product of that moment in a way that most of D's other work, and even his other work with Guattari, does not. To sum up: I don't like the subject, I don't like the way it's written, and I don't like what to me seems its (out-of-)datedness. I wish I could give you something about its argument and how it's just wrong, but I can't. I should also say that I did not understand a lot of it. Another reason I don't like it, even if this last is largely irrational and petty.

As far as Massumi goes, I can't really say what about his reading of D+G I like because he never ever seems to read them. What I mean is that he makes use of them to answer questions he has, to think in his own right. He doesn't bother to explain them, or to critique them, but simply to think with them and see where his own experiment goes. It is worth noting that the lack of critique is very Deleuzian. D never bothered to say very much about philosophers with whom he disagreed. He just took what he wanted from them and moved on. He never bothers to tear down Hegel, even though he loathed the dialectic and most forms of phenomenology. So while Massumi is often criticized for being to accepting of D+G, he is just being true to one of the central parts of their thought: take what you need for your own thought. Philosophy is a toolkit and you don't always need all of the tools.

I will say that I love his readings of Reagan in Parables for the Virtual, but those readings are too complex for me to explain (in the sense that I am incapable of providing an intelligent and concise explanation; there's too much for me to handle). What I can attempt to summarize is Massumi's notion of the "part-subject."

M is talking about sports (although he does not name the sport it seems clear that he is discussing soccer/football). He claims that the field is the condition of play and the the goals polarize play across that field. Play is pulled towards these poles and becomes more intense as it approaches one or the other. He writes: "If goalposts, ground, and presence of human bodies on the field induce play, the ball catalyzes it." What this means ultimately is that the "ball is the subject of play" and the human bodies are the "objects of the ball." After all, everyone is chasing the ball and is tied to its movements. (This argument is akin to the joke about aliens watching humans pick up dog shit. Who would you assume is in charge? The one doing the shitting or the one who follows that one around and cleans it up?) Anyway, what emerges from the relationship of player to ball is a "part-subject" where each of the two loses some of itself in the other. Neither can be said to be the creator of action per se, and neither can be said to inert matter that is acted upon. This argument is related to D+G's arguments in the Rhizome section of A Thousand Plateaus, where they discuss how the wasp deterritorializes itself on the orchid during pollination. It's an important argument because it destroys the notion that humans (or any thing [sic]) is discrete. We are all tied to the world in infinite ways. (Note this is also Bergson's argument in Matter and Memory, another important Deleuzian influence, and an important one for Massumi in Parables for the Virtual). Anyway, I will end this post here. I have quite a bit of formal writing on this subject that I would be happy to share with people if they would like, but I don't want to inundate the board with a big, steaming pile of me (to appropriate Richard Jeni).
 
 
sdv (non-human)
22:01 / 18.04.05
I feel as if I should defend anti-oedipus, it's a book that has been heavily attacked in recent years. Especially by those who are uncomfortable with the philosophical change that took place when Deleuze began working with Guattari. But this is not a sustainable position in my view as there is no evidence to support the argument that the work became inferior in his joint work with Guattari. If anything it seems to have enabled a more directly political focus to emerge - the missing work on Marx is sadly missed. Arguably the nearest we can get to this is the recent work of Toni Negri which manages to bypass the Nietzschean trap through a deft use of Spinoza and Marx.

However I still do not feel inclined to argue the case for the AO that is anti-psychoanalytical, let me instead point towards the work on universal history and most of all suggest that the main body of Anti-Oedipus is structured as a detailed analyses of the collective syntheses that constitute a society and how new typological cultural formations are invented and structured. These are the contributions that AO continues to make within the project of which it's merely one part. It is not surprising that it is the productivism that is discarded and lost, perhaps in part reemerging in the most constructivist and probably the most Kantian text of all 'What is Philosophy'.

later
sdv
 
 
alterity
01:31 / 19.04.05
Fair enough on all accounts, especially in regards to the politics (although I've never had trouble reading politics into the early Deleuze b/c of the later Deleuze and work by Negri and others). I don't understand the text well enough to critique it in any rigorous fashion, so I won't bother. However, I will stand by the claim that the best work Deleuze ever did, with or without Guattari, is in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense. Everything after that seems a refinement/elaboration of concepts he lays out there, with anything new being provided more by advances in science (which becomes grist for the mill) than in advances in the thought itself. Even one of the main conceits in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia texts, the Body without Organs, is initially developed in LoS.
 
 
Jackie Susann
02:21 / 19.04.05
Hey Alterity - have you read the book Massumi co-wrote with Ken Dean, First and Last Emperors? It develops some of the stuff about Reagan at greater length by way of something like a comparison with ancient Chinese politics. Its more wacko (in a good way, if you think there is a good way to be wacko) than any of his other stuff.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
10:58 / 19.04.05
Whilst I agree that D&R and LOS are critical and important works, and are understandable as important philosophical works written on the cusp of the socio-cultural change from modernity into postmodernity. I don't myself regard them as philosophically more important than What is Philosophy or A Thousand (ATP)... to name two. Nor do I accept that all the important concepts arrived in the later texts from the earlier ones such as D&R and LOS though I of course recognize that this argument is frequently made.

It seems to me that given how this thread started - how to start reading them - then it's best to start at the point most likely to have a direct connection with who you/the reader are - which is more likely to be ATP than D&R.

Reading, that is 'becoming philosophical' is a process much like listenning to music. In that everyone starts by listenning to whatever is popular on an everyday basis - and sometimes in the process people begin moving outwards from that point. How far people get depends on the depth of the engagement with becoming....

But whilst speaking personally I also think D&R is perhaps Deleuze's equivilant to Heidegger's Being and Time or Sartre's Being and Nothingness. It's just that in addition to this I recognize that ATP is the greatest philosophical hypertext ever constructed, written...
 
 
alterity
14:28 / 19.04.05
I have the Dean/Massumi text, but I've not read it. Can't get past all the stuff about ticks, although I am intrigued, which is why I keep trying.

It seems to me that given how this thread started - how to start reading them - then it's best to start at the point most likely to have a direct connection with who you/the reader are - which is more likely to be ATP than D&R.

I hope I have not lead this thread astray. I would never want anyone to start with D&R or LoS. I would also not have anyone start with ATP. I agree that people should relate to what they read. Since there is more to ATP broadly than there is to D&R--which to me is a more focused and systematic text--people are more likely to relate to it. However, I am hesitant about this idea in relation to Deleuze, mostly because it sounds too much like the "poets" on the D+G list who keep saying that anyone who actually wants to read their texts rigorously is just territorialized and striated. Rigor is a tool of "the man" and stifles everyone else's becoming. Nonetheless, to grasp these more difficult texts (D&R, LoS, ATP, WIP, perhaps the cinema books), I would tell someone interested in starting out that s/he should read the earlier texts and a few key texts by Deleuze's primary references (Bergson, Spinoza, Nietzsche). This reading will give the necessary foundation to read the rest. If anyone wants to jump in without the benefit of this reading, feel free. Deleuze himself would likely advocate such an approach (he argues that we should just start in the middle, rhizomatically as it were, and start making connections). However, very little of his work alone or with Guattari stands on its own (except, maybe, the Kafka book). Therefore, my advice as a student and a teacher is to start with the basics.

(BTW I don't wish to claim that Gilles became worse when he teamed up with Felix, but that he became different. I simply prefer D by himself, b/c it is in that work that he is most applicable to what I do, i.e. the stuff on the image of thought, the sustained readings of Spinoza, the stuff on the event.)
 
 
Logos
16:30 / 19.04.05
Can someone point me at a concise compilation and explanation of the structures discussed by D+G (the rhizome, the fold, etc.)?

How do these structures fit in within the larger body of their work?
 
 
sdv (non-human)
14:57 / 20.04.05
Alterity - understood, it's one of the things that is perhaps developing out of the recent readings of Deleuze, especially those of Zizek and Badiou. Personally I prefer Badiou's reading rather than Zizek's - hence I've become especially attentive to any expressed tendency to prefer Deleuze's solo work the joint work... Generally I don't have a preference either way.

I would cast a warning note against the suggestion that D&R is easier to read than ATP - in my experience it isn't correct. On a list I moderate there was a reasonably detailed analysis and discussion of D&R as a consequence of the Zizek book sometime back - what became obvious is that that the scope for misreading was enormous and it seemed as if the ability to recover from the misreading was harder - than with similar problems that happen with the capitalism and schzophrenia books.

Logos - there are some quite good glossaries -- but i'm in the wrong office to supply details at the moment, i'll post some references later.

--- i also like middle out approaches --
steve
 
 
sdv (non-human)
17:38 / 20.04.05
Logos

There are quite a few - but recently I've considered this as useful:

Deleuze and Geophilosophy - a guide and glossary: Mark Bonta and John Protevi. (Edinburgh)
[There are a number of relevant texts from Edinburgh - including some on Deleuze and Music, and feminism. James Williams book on D&R is exceptionally good]

and perhaps:
A user's guide to capitalism and schizophrenia - Brian Massumi (MIT), Eugene's Holland Delueze & Guattari's (Routledge) AntiOedipus may still be available

There have been a number of other glossary stytle texts but they are no longer available...

sorry my fetishism is showing...

sdv
 
 
Morpheus
20:31 / 26.04.05
I've read the Accursed Share and Anti-Oedipus, and found that both gave me the feeling that it is better to not know what it is they are refering to..alas they are French. The Accursed Share was much easier on the brain box...but Anti-Oedipus more sensual for it's lack of
auspiciousness. They are tools of strange application, and most of the time, if you don't know what the tool is, you'll end up toying with what is at hand.
So...dive in, the water is fine.

I would start by reading an eastern text called Lao-Tzu: "My words are very easy to understand." Lectures on the Tao Teh Ching by Man-jan Cheng

He is my grand teacher in Tai-Chi Chuan and the tool is less meta and more physical and so.. of use.
 
 
multitude.tv
08:11 / 09.06.05
I am going to venture a post, I have been reading and rereading a ton of DG lately, and I find that when one really gives this stuff a detailed reading for a week or so, then one can pick up the pace. There is a certain rhythm going on and a particular method(s) at play that come to light. I am currently getting into ATP again, perhaps one of my favourite books ever, and I am also giving Massumi’s Users Guide a shot, and it isn’t bad at all. It is actually very close to DG in style and grammar, but not so much in speed and complexity, his reiteration of specific points is probably its greatest strength. Furthermore, I find drawing parallels with DG and current geo-political affairs to be quite helpful, for two reasons (that are really four), first it helps elucidate and the situation and the text to relate it back to something, and secondly you can always find a line of flight then from the situation, or from the theory. So yea, give it a go. In august I will be reading Ds book on Spinoza along with Spinozas Ethics, if anyone would want to give that a go then.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
10:20 / 13.06.05
Ammonius,
I missed your post hence the delay in replying. I normally encourage people to read source texts rather than introductory texts (witness earlier in the thread) but might I suggest that whilst I would normally always suggest reading the source rather than the secondary texts (and as someone with a huge investment in Deleuze's work I think it's critical)... that in the case of the Deleuze/Spinoza or indeed the equally interesting Negri/Spinoza constructs it's bettter to approach Spinoza/Deleuze indirectly - that is to say to read Spinoza with a more normal companion text - say Stuart Hampshire's book on Spinoza (mentioned elsewhere recently) which is an excellent primer. And only then read the Deleuze or Negri books...

The reason for this is that both Negri and Deleuze are following the infamous Deleuzian statement about books on philosophers 'taking from behind' a radical materialist rereading in these cases - Hampshire is not doing this and is attempting to present Spinoza in his/it's own terms. Whilst Deleuze and Negri are more interesting radical philosophers than Hampshire - Hampshire will help protect you from their deliberate misreadings...

hope this is clear...

s
 
 
multitude.tv
08:56 / 14.06.05
sdv,

Yea, that’s clear, I think my post was more for folks who are already familiar with Spinoza and Deleuze (but not together), not with those seeking an introduction to Spinoza via Deleuze or vice versa. I have not read the entire Ethics since my undergad in philosophy, and my interest is not primarily in Spinoza’s work but rather in Deleuze’s appropriation of it. That is, the manner of the buggering (deliberate misreadings), not the validity/accuracy of the offspring, as it were. Though the suggestion for a text that is closer to an expository reading of Spinoza (in addition to a philosophical tease) may be suitable, one needs ones ``cake and sodomy`` I guess. Basically I am inviting folks to join me in a reading which I will be performing for a few weeks beginning in August regardless: Spinoza/Deleuze/Hampshire. Negri never really struck me all that cloase, though I will be reading him in a seminar this Autumn as well.

Any chance on moving this thread away from inquiries concerning an introduction to Deleuze and towards a discussion of particular/multiple concepts in Deleuze (and/or Guattari), and the appropriations and applications there of?
 
 
sdv (non-human)
15:43 / 14.06.05
Understood (that I misunderstood)- nice idea... where would you think of starting ?
 
 
multitude.tv
06:43 / 22.06.05
Right now I am reading ``Nomadology`` which doesn't seem to offer up that much difficulty. I am wondering though what folks make of DGs usage of Proposition, Problem, and Axiom in this selection (as well as the following chapter in ATP). The question is rooted in the discussion of Science in WiP. ``The object of science is not concepts but rather functions that are presented as propositons in discursive systems.`` Now, in the Nomadology DG draw a great deal from Social philosophy as well as structuralist ``historical sociaology,`` I am thinking here of the sections dealing with Dumezil at the outset. However they have been criticisized (in a non-productive, negative sense) for their usage of such information in working out their concepts (though many of these sciences are functions of the State apparatus).

So what do we make of this selection, could we say that DG are attempting a Nomadological sociology? Why use these examples from social science (or science at all through the text)? Are they maping a line of intercetion between Philosophy and Science here, and-or perhaps one that shows a nomadological line of flight not in the subject of the social sciences (the nomads as groups of people) but rather in the sense of the science itself. (That is, of the three diciplines presented in WiP, Science seems to me at least, the most entrenched in the operations of the State Apparatus).? Thoughts?
 
 
Mmothra
22:16 / 22.06.05
A User's Guide To Capitalism And Schizophrenia by Massumi is a wonderful suggestion... And despite the general air of anti-Guattari sentiment I have seen here and elsewhere, his book Molecular Revolution is terrific.
 
 
sdv (non-human)
18:35 / 06.08.05
A rare secondary text that is worth getting hold of is Adrian Parr's (2005) - The Deleuze Dictionary - it contains some excellent entries and I would recommend the dictionary both for those who've already begun the trajectory through Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari's work but also for those about to start could be very helpful. A great many of the key terms and references are given reasonable and understandable definitions.

It is not without faults firstly it appears to be a little under-edited, it doesn't have proper table of contents, and finally there is no index. (There are four pages of bios on the entries authors which really shouldn't be there...) Hopefully if they ever construct a second edition they will correct these errors.

Otherwise it's got some fine and interesting entries, which are much more useful than some of the other glossaries that have been produced... Now if such a thing had been available when when i first read AO and ATP life might have been easier.

sigh
s
 
 
The Prince of All Lies
22:35 / 06.08.05
Some of Deleuze's lessons have been edited in France (I found out because one of those courses just came out in Spanish), and from what I've heard, Deleuze explains his concepts and uses in a more straightforward way, as it should be when teaching a class.
I'm thinking about grabbing a copy, though it's an expensive little book.
Anyone heard about these?
 
 
sdv (non-human)
09:37 / 07.08.05
spinal

you can see some of this material in french and english at

http://www.webdeleuze.com/

The texts you refer to are useful - I am not sure about them being 'easier' to understand though...
 
 
The Prince of All Lies
15:55 / 07.08.05
thanks, I'll check it out.
 
 
nighthawk
22:04 / 12.09.05
Is anyone reading D&G at the moment? If so we could use this thread, or a new one, for discussion. I'm making my way through A Thousand Plateaus. Its taken me a long time to realise just how useful the record analogy is. When I first started to read it at the beginning of the summer I tried to plough through it like I would a normal philosophy book, reading it quickly from cover to cover so that I could get a rough idea of their themes and come back to it in more detail after I'd done a bit of background reading. Needless to say I got stuck very quickly, failed to take in even a quarter of what I'd read and generally lost interest.

But coming back to it a few months later (admittedly with a better background through other reading) I'm finding it much more rewarding, largely because I've just been picking out plateaus at random and reading them for as long as they interest me, without forcing myself to continue once I lose track of what's going on. And I've quickly latched on to favourites too, just like I would with a new cd, and I know these are going to change as I become better acquainted with it. Realising that there's a whole new way to approach a philosophy text has been a revelation in itself - the idea didn't really register when I first tried it ('so you just read it like a normal book, only you mix up the order of the chapters?').

Anyway I've just reread Year Zero: Faciality, which is where I gave up last time. I'm not completely clear what they're alluding to with the black hole/white wall stuff. Can anyone suggest further reading to clarify what's going on in this one?
 
  

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