Barbelith Underground > Head Shop > When is assassination an acceptable means of political change?

Frances:

it seems to me that your proposed example problematises not my objection to assassination asa moral bad, but the question of what constitutes assassination in the first place. You've created a 'commando raid against logistical target' scenario; what pushes this into the realm of assassination is the legal status of the targets, whom you have defined on the one hand as civilian and on the other as engaged in wilful depradation through the military structure on the ground. If we reshape the example for a moment as a planned mission against the same targets in uniform, does it meet the criteria of assassination? Not sure.

Taking your example at face value - it's still wrong. It appears less wrong, and it may be less wrong, than what the targets themselves are doing. That doesn't (forgive me if I sound like a primary school teacher) make it right, either in absolute terms, or - unless it can be demonstrated that the results will be positive - in Consequentialist ones. There's a fascinating question of duty here; an argument often deployed by black ops people - "this needed to be done, and we can't afford the moral games - that's what we buy for you by being prepared to sacrifice our own personal moral standing". That's not an argument I buy.

By drawing the comparison and considering the scenario to be a "smaller" version of al Qaeda's international terrorism, you have handily dismissed the fact that the actor is rightfully defending lives and/or livelihoods on hir own soil

It is the assertion of extreme Islamic groups that this is exactly what the Twin Towers horror was; an attack on the core of the U.S. economic infrastructure which allows domination of the world, including (at the time) the holy cities of Islam. Bin Laden actually stated US withdrawal as one of his objectives (link), and this was quietly done in 2003. Bin Laden, in his own eyes, may well be 'rightfully defending his own soil": according to him, the United States has been "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the [Arabian] peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples."

I'm not about to suggest that the Bali bombing has any relevance here - I'm not saying that Al Qaeda is anything other than a terror outfit. I'm saying that their justification for the Twin Towers and your posited example follow a similar track. I can look at that track and say it's attractive from the side of the actor, but still wrong; but I don't see where you can do that if you stick to your logic.

So were it useful to the actor in the sense that it weakened the invading forces plundering the actor's lands, would it then be an acceptable tactic?

From a Consequentialist point of view, it might be. That's the problem with Utilitarianism and its fellows: these things are very hard to measure, and some of them are incommensurable. How do you factor the possible strategic benefits against the possible damage to the societal code of ethics? What will the response be from the occupying forces? Will the action be dismissed (likely in this age) as a terror strike, and handicap your political representatives?

From a Consequentialist point of view, my mathematics would lead me to believe that assassinations are counterproductive - but that's an opinion based on analysis, rather than a belief in the wrongness of assassination at root.

It would seem to me that the establishment of the rule of law would come after the invading force had been expelled or subdued.

Why are the rules suspended during a conflict? Because it's not a fair fight and one side therefore needs to use special measures? The invading force - as we know from recent experience - says much the same thing in reply. The result is Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. Moral imperatives function all the time, not in privileged patches when we want them to. The end does not justify the means; the end is the product of the means - every last bit of what is done to achieve a goal feeds into the nature of the composite result.

If you want to be the 'good guys' you have to obey the rules when it's hard to do so, not just when it's convenient. That's pretty much what defines being the good guys.

Haus:

First up, yes, I'm taking this discussion seriously. I'm sorry if my response to your last post seemed cursory or inflammatory. This is an emotive issue for me; I've spent a certain amount of time talking to people who advance the argument you put as a hypothetical as a justification for their own real world actions in the service of - to take one example - the former USSR. It's hard, after that, to talk about your theoretical enquiry without seeing it as an extension of that context.

I do believe that the position you put forward is the narrative of self which high-ranking intelligence officials and their non-governmental counterparts use to justify actions which would otherwise seem unpalatable.

It's paternalistic in that it asserts that these people have the right to keep secret from their constituents the unethical actions which are being taken in their name, and to make decisions on behalf of those constituents - who might not approve of either the actions or the status quo they are intended to perpetuate - in line with what they see as what those constituents should want or would want if they truly understood or were capable of understanding that situation. In other words 'be quiet and leave it to us professionals'.

'Meta moral high ground' refers to that position, which goes roughly "I do this bad thing, that you shall be excused morally difficult decisions, and be innocent of wrongdoing which is done so that you may prosper - this is my higher moral calling". That is, in my view, a repellant fudge - all it does is produce a situation where people are unknowingly taken to have assented to crimes done in their name.

1) Has an assassination ever had beneficial consequences?

[shrug] If you mean 'has any assassination ever had any consequences, however incidental, which were positive as far as we can judge?' then the answer is probably 'yes'. If you mean 'has any assassination ever resulted in sustained positive change?' then I can't think of any. It's notoriously hard to tell what triggers historical events. That's not a problem for me, though, but for anyone wanting to advance the notion of assassination as a possible positive.

Obviously, a short term strategic goal may be served by an assassination, so here's a possibly useful priority tree, which I believe is a fairly common command tool: Tactics from Strategy From Political From Ethical.

Tactics from Strategy: the battlefield tactics, where forces actually fight, are defined with reference to a strategic objective. So this emplacement is bombed because we need that ridge.

Strategy from Political Objective: we need that ridge because we need the town below it, because we need to establish control of the area for free elections.

Political Objectives from Ethical Code: free elections because that's what we believe is good.

A tactic which nullifies the political gain is valueless - hence the old joke: "we'll free these people if we have to kill every one of them to do it". It seems to me that political assassination will always nullify its own gains as long as you're a putative do-gooder (read 'believer in individual rights') because - apart from anything else - it either breeches the target's 'right to life' or it asserts that it's possible to abdicate your rights through your actions if those are strongly disapproved of by an armed force. As I've said before, it also seems to me to assert that violence is a legitimate tool of political action, and once that line is crossed, it cannot be redrawn in convenient places later.

2) Can assassination ever be morally justified?

I don't think so. I think there are situations where it becomes immensely appealing. I think there are countless justifications. And I think they don't stick. Aside from my objection to violence, there's my argument about consequences.

3) If assassination cannot be morally justified (or notwithstanding whether assassination can be morally justified), is it ever therefore justifiable in any other terms to assassinate?

Same considerations apply for me. I think there's an issue of immediacy with the Pearl Harbour example; a genuine - as opposed to a notional - back-against-the-wall situation, which makes it difficult to criticise soldiers in that situation. I think pre-emptive or excursive self-defense - where you go looking for a target against which to defend yourself - is a little different. I agree, however, that it gets very difficult to assert simple morality around the terminator line (no pun intended) between military action and assassination. "Hard cases make bad law" etc.

The question was "when is assassination an acceptable means of political change", which is rather different.

Yep. And in that case, I think the 'no' is far clearer.

"it seems to me that your proposed example problematises not my objection to assassination asa moral bad, but the question of what constitutes assassination in the first place. You've created a 'commando raid against logistical target' scenario; what pushes this into the realm of assassination is the legal status of the targets, whom you have defined on the one hand as civilian and on the other as engaged in wilful depradation through the military structure on the ground. If we reshape the example for a moment as a planned mission against the same targets in uniform, does it meet the criteria of assassination? Not sure."

I would say my first question does both by highlighting the lack of clear demarcation in the real world in compare to the very black and white moral scenario you've outlined. It seems your argument hinges on the theory that there is no in between -- that there are good guys, and bad guys, but no ordinary folks just doing their best to stay alive, defend their families and their livelihoods. You further this impression by ignoring that part of the context in the hypothetical narrative I've offered.

My scenario differs from the typical assassination scenario precisely because the actor didn't plan to encounter the civilian authority. It was happenstance. So it's partly a question of whether or not the actor is permitted to exploit a target of opportunity in consideration of the actor's circumstances. The problem as I see it with your reasoning as presented is that he who has the biggest guns will always win and be considered morally superior, to boot. A sufficiently-abled aggressor can occupy a city and fill it with civilian occupiers, thusly immunizing itself to any potential consequences.

"Taking your example at face value - it's still wrong. It appears less wrong, and it may be less wrong, than what the targets themselves are doing. That doesn't (forgive me if I sound like a primary school teacher) make it right, either in absolute terms, or - unless it can be demonstrated that the results will be positive - in Consequentialist ones. There's a fascinating question of duty here; an argument often deployed by black ops people - "this needed to be done, and we can't afford the moral games - that's what we buy for you by being prepared to sacrifice our own personal moral standing". That's not an argument I buy."

Then there is also the question of why it is wrong. Why do occupiers who are not wielding firearms enjoy a right to relative safety? Why are they not equally valid targets? Why is it that the folks with a colonialist agenda enjoy the booty and moral superiority?

"It is the assertion of extreme Islamic groups that this is exactly what the Twin Towers horror was; an attack on the core of the U.S. economic infrastructure which allows domination of the world, including (at the time) the holy cities of Islam. Bin Laden actually stated US withdrawal as one of his objectives (link), and this was quietly done in 2003. Bin Laden, in his own eyes, may well be 'rightfully defending his own soil": according to him, the United States has been "occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors, and using its bases in the [Arabian] peninsula as a spearhead to fight against the neighboring Islamic peoples."

Osama bin Laden is not legally speaking a representative of Saudi Arabia's nation state or armed forces, so there are still significant differences. Thusly, I still don't see how the equivocation is fair. I know quite well bin Laden's stated goals, but I'm not talking about Syrians in Iraq fighting U.S. forces (for example), I'm talking about Iraqis who've lost their families to U.S. forces presented with an opportunity to, more or less, punish the U.S. financially, logistically, and politically for it's occupation. Osama bin Laden's primary stance is religious and ideological -- his boundaries of 'defense' are defined more or less by the history of the Ottoman empire. I think our actor's situation and motivations are a bit more tangible then Osama bin Laden's stated goals.

"I'm not about to suggest that the Bali bombing has any relevance here - I'm not saying that Al Qaeda is anything other than a terror outfit. I'm saying that their justification for the Twin Towers and your posited example follow a similar track. I can look at that track and say it's attractive from the side of the actor, but still wrong; but I don't see where you can do that if you stick to your logic."

I'm not sure what you mean, here. Do what, exactly, if I stick to my logic? As regards your comparison ; there are similarities, perhaps, in certain respects, but not so much so as to validate your moral equivocation in my mind.

"From a Consequentialist point of view, it might be. That's the problem with Utilitarianism and its fellows: these things are very hard to measure, and some of them are incommensurable. How do you factor the possible strategic benefits against the possible damage to the societal code of ethics? What will the response be from the occupying forces? Will the action be dismissed (likely in this age) as a terror strike, and handicap your political representatives?"

How do you calculate the societal damage to ethics you discuss here? I don't think I agree with you -- I don't see how it is that the hypothetical actor would be doing any substantial damage to "societal ethics" (which have already been scrapped by the occupying force) by making the personal decision to exploit the target(s) of opportunity described.

To answer your last two questions: a.) it would be difficult for the response from the occupying forces to evoke more suffering than is already guaranteed by their willingness to rape, murder, plunder, and relegate natives to second-citizen status, and b.) the nation state being invaded has likely already had hir political representatives invalidated on the world stage and likely killed or imprisoned.

"From a Consequentialist point of view, my mathematics would lead me to believe that assassinations are counterproductive - but that's an opinion based on analysis, rather than a belief in the wrongness of assassination at root.

What calculations are those, precisely? Are you working on particular examples? Did the individual(s) who murdered John F. Kennedy, for example, suffer a slight to their agenda, or was U.S. domestic and foreign policy changed in their/hir favour as a consequence of the action?

"Why are the rules suspended during a conflict? Because it's not a fair fight and one side therefore needs to use special measures? The invading force - as we know from recent experience - says much the same thing in reply. The result is Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. Moral imperatives function all the time, not in privileged patches when we want them to. The end does not justify the means; the end is the product of the means - every last bit of what is done to achieve a goal feeds into the nature of the composite result."

I agree, but I think your worldview is quite romantic and ignores a great deal of context and subtlety. To give an example, when the U.S. carried out it's 'Shock and Awe' stage of the Iraqi campaign, it attacked civilian targets openly. I'm sure we both agree that this action was unacceptable, but not only is the U.S. not penalized for this activity, the U.S. is allowed to pursue it's further goals in a brazen fashion. Meanwhile, the U.S. has unarmed contractors delivering goods and weapons to armed forces. So the Iraqis aren't allowed to attack the lines of support because the U.S. is willing to sacrifice the lives of the contractors to retain a public image of moral superiority?

Why exactly should someone engaged in resistance, in this case, honour what is essentially lip service to the morals you lay forth? What's wrong with them doing the practical thing, in the case of the Iraq example? Why exactly can the playing field not be levelled by the victims, if no one else will do it?

"If you want to be the 'good guys' you have to obey the rules when it's hard to do so, not just when it's convenient. That's pretty much what defines being the good guys."

And I think this is our primary difference -- I don't see it all as a matter of "good guys" or "bad guys". It's just people and some arbitrary systems providing a heavily weighted "balance" that allows for the extraordinary exploitation of one group of people on the part of another. I see it as a natural correcting mechanism when certain tactics are adopted to offset the balance, and frankly, expect it. When addressing how "ethics" will be brought into the equation, I usually consider it a matter of pragmatism to redress the balance before I deal with the undesirable actions of the disadvantaged parties.

I could offer a more comprehensive hypothetical dealing with real-world figures for discussion, if that would be helpful.