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“The principle of induction is a working hypothesis which is known to fail. However, to make any assertions or even to interact with the world requires some working hypothesis. To cross the road, I need to assume things about my experiences of cars, roads, walking etc. Induction is a hypothesis that you use all the time. Life would be impossible without it.”

And isn’t this exactly the point? Yes, we certainly need “working hypotheses” in order to live, but such hypotheses are accepted on faith; that is, like you say, the principle of induction can fail, but, with respect to any conclusion that is accepted based on the inductive method, we accept that the conclusion will hold until we are proven wrong. How is this not a form of faith? Like you go on to say, “[i]nduction, for instance, is not something that one is completely certain of.” Again, the uncertainty, while still present, is generally ignored qua our faith in both the inductive method and the particular conclusion of an inductive argument.

“The problem is that this will not be an aid to communication. People will still see a difference. Moreover, it doesn't really help one to understand these different areas of human activity.”

Hmm, I don’t see how this is not an aid to communication. How about some argument as to why you feel this is the case instead of a seemingly unsupported assertion? Yes, people will still see a difference; however, this difference can be predicated on a difference in the degree of faith required (like I’ve been saying) and not on some fundamental and irreconcilable difference. Moreover, I don’t think that framing the definition of ‘faith’ as I have been is intended to help understand these “different areas of human activity.” Rather, it is intended to highlight or point to similarities. On this definition of ‘faith’ differences could been established on the degree of faith towards a given belief or by pursuing other avenues of description.

Now Nick, perhaps it’s merely me, but I feel you are beginning to sound a little testy—maybe you are simply having a bit of a difficult day or something (and that’s OK), but I wanted to let you know that this is how I feel that you are sounding in your most recent post. Anyway…

I think that we are being a little naïve when it comes to examining the various relationships between science and religion. Ian Barbour has done much work in this area. In his relatively established and accepted (within religious studies circles) book When Science Meets Religion, he marks out a four-fold general typology of the approach that writers and thinkers have taken to presenting the relationship between science and religion. First there is the relationship of Conflict. This arises, in general, as a function of those who are either Biblical Literalists or Scientific Materialists. This paradigm requires that its supporters accept an excluded middle between the two discourses: an acceptance of one rejects the other. Each is seen as discourse about the same domain, but one discourse is taken to be false while the other is taken to be true. A good example of a supporter of Scientific Materialism is Richard Dawkins. As for Biblical Literalism, well, I can’t think of a decent example off hand, but we could look to those who, say, argue for Creationism over Evolution. Second, there are those who argue from a position of Independence. Here the two discourses are kept in water tight compartments; that is, the two discourses are seen to each have their own respective domains. Typically science is seen as working with the “how” of our existence and religion is taken as attempting to cope with the “why.” Here we can note a quote that Galileo repeats reflecting a developing current of thought in his own time: “The intention of the Holy Ghost is to teach us how one goes to heaven, not how heaven goes.” In other words, people supporting this relation between science and religion see each as functioning with respect to their differing domains of inquiry. Third, there is the position of Dialogue. Writers and thinkers of this approach attempt to better understand the “other” position. Here there is emphasis on similarities in presuppositions, methods, and concepts. Finally, Barbour marks out the last sort of conceptual relation, which is Integration. This category includes those who work towards bringing together theological claims and scientific claims. Fritjof Capra, Gary Zuckav, and Paul Davies spring to mind as examples of people who fall under the category of Integration. This approach can be roughly divided into those who develop a “theology of Nature” and those seeking a “systematic synthesis.” I think that this four-fold typology adequately accounts for the possible positions that a given thinker might take towards his or her view of the relation between science and religion and I think it is helpful in its guiding our interpretation of the work of a given thinker.

So, as to whether or not there is a “magic moment” in history when what I’ve said is “right,” I think what you’ve said about “[t]he word 'Faith' [having] its roots firmly in the Christian position…” echoes what I’ve said; that is, I am saying that aspects of science have their roots in the Christian position also. Put differently, we can see that in history many of the people that are labeled as “scientists” were also deeply religious. Take Newton, for example. Scientist, alchemist—a religious man whose scientific ideas are premised on the thought that God has constructed an ordered clockwork universe that we, as human beings of His creation, can come to understand by developing Absolute Laws based on an Ideal clock ticking away universal moments at some central focus point of space. We can see in this example alone that faith in God and faith in scientific principles are intimately entwined—there are plenty more examples if we’d only take some time to research them ourselves.

“What makes you imagine [science and religion] need [a common ground]? Is there some new schism between Church and Religion that I was unaware of?”

Well, science and religion need common ground if we are dealing with people who are coming from either a position of Independence or Conflict. As well, in situations were the approach falls under the category of Dialogue, common ground gives more to dialogue about, i.e., it provides something in common which the two position can build dialogue around. It’s kinda’ like how it’s handy to have common ground when courting a potential mate—it gives you something to build a relationship around. And no, I’m sure there’s not “some new schism” between science and religion that you are not aware of, but perhaps there are (relatively) established divisions that you are not taking into account?

I think that there is likely interesting material to work with and examine if only you’d unpack your statement that “[t]he problem is not that they do not understand each other, but that they are totally and irretrievably interwoven.” Could you please say more about this? In what ways do you see science and religion as understanding each other? What are some examples of how they are totally and irretrievably interwoven? Moreover, if you feel this way, then I don’t particularly understand why you appear to be so vehement about keeping faith in a religious domain of discourse, which is excluded from an apparently separate domain of scientific discourse?

“…the Church and Science both attract some extremely powerful minds - do you imagine this profoundly sophomoric notion has escaped them? Hardly. This discussion is old news.”

Hmm, “old news”? Yes in the sense that people have been thinking about these issues for many years; however, I would hardly say that much has been resolved (except relative to specific “schools of thought”), and so, it seems that there is room for developing methods and techniques for coping with the positions that some people will take up regarding the relationship between science and religion.

Now, I feel that the phrase “profoundly sophomoric notion” is a little unfair and also a bit of a quick and perhaps dogmatic judgement. I don’t think that we’ve come to any agreed upon conclusions as to whether or not faith is ubiquitous in human belief—this discussion is based on making progress to such a conclusion, isn’t it? Simply because I am arguing that it is and you are arguing it isn’t doesn’t mean that my position is any more or less “sophomoric” than your own. Again, this feels a tad bit reflective of your presuppositions and not so much reflective of your argument to date. So when you assert that I cannot make a connection between faith as manifest in active belief and faith as manifest in passive belief, I say that I can and I think I have made reasonable arguments to support such a position. Perhaps I have not convinced you or others, but I’d hardly say that your argument so far has convinced me otherwise. Hence, we are engaged in dialogue. Let’s try our best to keep this dialogue reasonable and not merely resort to asserting our conclusions as if they were a priori, OK?

So you say that I am “…tak[ing] a common experience and…term[ing] it Faith because it is convenient to [my] agenda, yet it does not meet the criteria. Bad science, bad theology.” Well yes, it is convenient to my agenda, if it wasn’t then why would I bother supporting my position? I’m not exactly clear on what criteria you are referring to: could you say more about this please? As to your second statement, well again, I don’t really know if this counts towards argument or counts towards asserting a conclusion based on presuppositions. Perhaps you could clear this up?

“When? And when did they sever it?”

I think I’ve addressed this in the above. As you yourself recognize (or so it seems to me), the Enlightenment seems to capture the apex of the severing of ties between religion and science. And, as you note, science itself was invested with the faith that it, as you say, “…could and would provide control over the Universe, answers to all aspects of the human condition, and perfect society.” In other words, this line of thought seems to displace faith from its occurrence in the domain of religious discourse and place it within the domain of scientific discourse. Either that or it serves to illustrate that there are not separate domains but a singular domain; however, the paradigm of Enlightenment thinking serves to minimize the relevance of religious discourse regarding this domain and place the emphasis on scientific discourse while realigning faith from its role in the failing religious discourse to a new role in the developing scientific discourse.

So Nick, you seem to feel that the conclusion of an inductive hypothesis is not accepted on faith. Yes, I really do hear you asserting this and I understand what you are saying. Moreover, I am sorry that you are feeling frustrated because you feel that I am not listening to you. I feel that I am listening to you, but I that I don’t agree with you; thus, we are having this discussion. Perhaps we are “going around the same loop,” but I think that I am at least making progress towards clarifying my position—I’m not merely being redundant in the argument, but only with respect to my conclusion. Anyway, yes, I am “asserting my conclusion” with the line you quote, I think it is clear that, in the context of the paragraph you quote this statement from, I give argument to support it, namely:

“…the principle of induction can fail, but, with respect to any conclusion that is accepted based on the inductive method, we accept that the conclusion will hold until we are proven wrong. How is this not a form of faith? Like you go on to say, “[i]nduction, for instance, is not something that one is completely certain of.” Again, the uncertainty, while still present, is generally ignored qua our faith in both the inductive method and the particular conclusion of an inductive argument.”

So you can see that I give reasons and ask a questioned yet to be answered that appear to support my conclusion.

“The dictionary definition of the word you want to co-opt specifically contradicts the use what you're saying.”

I don’t see this. Could you please explain how the definition contradicts what I’m saying; that is, could you sketch this out a little more fully, please?

“You're looking to re-define a word. The word is in use and means something other than what you want it to.”

In a sense, yes, I am looking to redefine a word. But I am also looking to re-appropriate it in a way that reflects its original role with respect to our beliefs about our experiences, i.e., that there is some manifestation of faith that occurs as the ground of our beliefs. I don’t think it matters that this word “…means something other than I want it to.” Within the context of this examination, I feel that the common meaning of faith doesn’t quite capture what faith is; thus, I seek to find a more appropriate definition—there is nothing wrong with such a pursuit. It is similar, perhaps, to the way that the word ‘nigger’ used to mean a certain thing in its use and meant something other than what a certain group of people would want it to mean. Thus, the word’s meaning was challenged and re-appropriated by that group of people. I don’t feel that what I am undertaking is somehow a “fault” that undermines my conclusion.

“My quarrel with you is on two levels. The first is simple: you're abusing the language in an attempt to support your opinion. You muddy communication rather than clarifying.”

I’ve been accused of being a so-called “language abuser” before. It has been my experience that such an accusation isn’t much of a defense of one’s argument as it is representative of a misunderstanding or failure to follow the argument that I have laid out. Again, that’s been my experience, but you are entitled to your opinion that this usage of the word ‘faith’ does muddy communication qua your interpretation. Also, I don’t think that this alleged “abuse of language” is supporting a mere “opinion.” It is supporting an approach to take to certain formulations of attitudes towards the relationship between science and religion; moreover, I have tried to illustrate why I think this approach is beneficial. It seems to me that there has not been much argument to support how it doesn’t work in anyway other than there assertion that it doesn’t. If I am mistaken about this, then please point me to places in the thread where such argumentation has been given.

“The second [reason I am quarreling with you] is more complex and belongs in another thread - that your reason for wanting 'faith' to mean something rather pale that everyone experiences is an attempt to find a 'common ground' between Science and Religion; this I find baffling, because they are closely interlinked entities whose quarrels derive, as far as I can see, far more from their similarities and mutual comprehension than from their differences.”

Two things, both repetitious of what I’ve already said. First, I have stated quite clearly, or so it seems to me, that the definition of ‘faith’ that I desire to work with is neither “paler than…” nor “weaker than…” your preferred definition. Again, “[i]f the definition I am using encompasses the definition that you are using, i.e., it is as “strong” as your preferred definition, then it seem to me that adding a greater depth to the definition doesn’t weaken it but makes it at least as strong as the original definition.” So, to use your current metaphor, I feel that my working definition of ‘faith’ is at least as “dark” or “rich” as yours. Second, it would be helpful if you spoke more to this “interlinking,” “similarities,” and “mutual comprehension” that you see and said more about how this allows the quarrels to arise. Perhaps some specific thinkers or examples?

So I said, “[a]s you yourself recognize (or so it seems to me), the Enlightenment seems to capture the apex of the severing of ties between religion and science.” You respond to this by saying, “I think that's a gross oversimplification.” To which I say, yes, perhaps it is an over-simplification; however, I don’t think we can deny that the Enlightenment was a time when the current of thought turned away from placing our faith in the benevolent function of religion towards a better life and instead turned to a faith in science to provide this.

“Control of knowledge moved out of the exclusive province of the Churches during this period, but in no sense are Religion and Science severed - indeed, their mutual evolution is responsible for many of the defining characteristics of the world we now inhabit - to take a colourful example, Muslim Fundamentalism is the result of the joining of Russian Anarchism and Marxian Historical Materialism (themselves products of analyses which drew on Christian Eschatology) with Koranic thought.”

OK. So here you are giving us some more information as to why you feel that religion and science are intertwined, thank you. Now maybe it’s simply my lack of knowledge, but it seems to me that your example of Muslim Fundamentalism doesn’t have much of a trace of strictly scientific discourse—social sciences yes, but I don’t see any hard sciences represented in Russian Anarchism, Marxist Historical Materialism, Christian Eschatology, or Koranic thought—except perhaps if we include in Koranic thought the ideas and arguments of (ancient) Islamic thinkers and theologians whose faith in religion is intimately linked with their faith in science. If we are admitting that, then we are admitting the conclusion that faith is present in belief towards scientific discourse and religious discourse. Or so it seems to me.

“This was the placing of Science in the realm of Religion. Empirically unjustifiable notions used to formulate dreams of an Apocalyptic moment which would yield a stasis of perfection - an idea drawn from Christianity. Faith remains solidly the domain of the Church - it's just that at that moment, Science became a Church for a while.”

I feel that we are quibbling here over something that we basically agree upon; namely, we appear to bickering over in what way we agree that the Enlightenment paradigm included a faith in science. I’m saying that scientific discourse was emphasized over traditional religious discourse, which appears to be in some way true, and I read you as saying that scientific discourse usurped religious discourse to become, as you say, “…a Church for awhile,” which appears to be in some way true—and it really appears to me as if we are saying the exact same thing.

So I said, “…the paradigm of Enlightenment thinking serves to minimize the relevance of religious discourse regarding this domain and place the emphasis on scientific discourse while realigning faith from its role in the failing religious discourse to a new role in the developing scientific discourse,” and then you asked, “[i]n what possible way does it do this?” Well, I think I answered this in the above. And I think we more or less agree.

What is Faith?