“…human dignity is a feeling just like pride is a feeling, but still only internally validated, its subjective.”
Oh, I’m prone to somewhat agree. But “human dignity,” I think, isn’t merely “internally validated,” but at least inter-subjectively validated, which, it seems to me, points to some sort of “objectivity.” The point being more in line with what you are saying about feelings. Our feelings, so it would appear, go a long way in contributing to our actions. To feel a sense of human dignity seems to me to go hand in hand with feeling a sense of freedom in our existence. Again, whether these sorts of things are “real” or not is secondary to me: what is important is that they appear to make up an integral component of the human experience.
“But what is choosing, and how far does that what go in making a choice?”
Well, this is probably a really good question—what is choosing? It appears to be at least the ability to select from amongst various options, and the options themselves appear to have an affect on our choice. But all this sorta’ begs the question of whether or not there actually is choice or merely the appearance of choice. Like I said, it doesn’t matter much to me: I am content so long as I have at least the appearance of choice.
“And how far has that sense of everyone being able to choose affected our history in a negative/positive way?”
Well, since history appears (to me) to be an idealized story told from a specific point of view that highlights certain events and people at the expense of other events and people, I really don’t think it matters. Our sense of choice has likely affected history in both positive and negative ways, and how are we to determine which is which?
“.. and for convenience of discussion, traditionally we frame the free will problem by saying ‘Could I have done otherwise?’ If I could have then I'm free, if I couldn't then I'm not free.”
Ah, the ole “counter-factual” sleight of hand! I don’t know how far we can take this to support free will. It seems that, at least in some sense, the counter-factual claim is not something that can ever be seen as “true.” What I mean is that if we look at the antecedent clause of the conditional, then it is empty—there is nothing that it corresponds to! For example, let’s say that I put my change into a vending machine, push a specific button, and get product x. The counter-factual claim might be “If I had pushed the button for product y, then I would have gotten product y and not product x.” Now, while the consequent can be evaluated as “true,” there doesn’t seem any way to evaluate the antecedent clause, ‘if I had pushed the button for product y’. Is it taken to be true? No, because I didn’t push that button. Is it taken to be false? No, because I didn’t push that button. So saying, “if I could have done otherwise, then…” doesn’t seem a very promising way to establish free will.
We might try to remedy this by adding a modal operator to the statement: “It is possible that if I could have done otherwise, then…” but this obviously begs the question: was it really possible?
[An aside about a pet peeve: in philosophic and other forms of dialogue it sometimes occurs that an individual will assert that such and such is “question begging.” Now, unless it is stated which question is being begged, the phrase “begs the question” is an empty bit of rhetoric!]
“How could something distinct from me make my decisions?”
It’s not about something “distinct” from you making your decisions, but that there is no actual decision to be made. The specific action is seen as a required consequent of some antecedent formed by a conjunctive chain.
“I would think that how a person has been raised and what type of environment he or she has been raised in would also be a huge factor when talking about choice.”
Ah, cue the good ole Nature/Nurture debates. I agree though, certainly the environment and the patterns of an individual’s thought processes are going to play a key factor in determining the possibilities of (actual/illusory) choice. |