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1. If freedom is an emergent property, it has to emerge from something. I was assuming you intended to suggest (and I notice we've switched from 'suppose' to 'I think') that it emerged from human interaction and thought - hermeneutic reinsertion; the world influenced by thought which in turn is influenced by the world and so on.
That being the case, freedom isn't a natural state from which we depart by introducing rules, but a product, albeit a natural rather than an artificial one - although exactly what the distinction between natural and artificial, emergent and made, would be in this context is something I find deeply problematic.
And even if freedom is emergent, it does not follow from that that it has no rules. It may emerge from rules and unverbalised self-restraints. I think the ideas can fit around one another quite readily.
2. Sorry - you're catching the back end of an earlier phase of the debate in the 'prisons' thread, where Gozer (or possibly aussieintn) asserted that freedom is a natural state from which we are alienated by the system, and that real freedom is in the absence of rules.
At which point, I suspect, we may need to clarify how we're all using the word 'rules'.
3. I'm not entirely happy that I understand your use of 'statistcal tendencies' and 'behavioural norms'. Perhaps you could clarify how these make a picture of human action? Humans, as a group, may act in ways which can be analysed along those lines, but the individual functions in a context, and will often refer to laws, rules, desires, rights or morals - attempts, as I see it, to make a more predictable environment by setting ground rules for contact between individuals and between the individual and society. This system may be more or less reflexive, and may base itself precedent or 'theory'.
I'm going to stop. I suspect we're about to bump up against a divergence of opinion about how to think about human action - if I'm wrong, we're in the clear. If I'm right, we'll need a new thread... |
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