| |
|
So many ingredients go into the vast, convoluted conceptual-jumble of literature surrounding the topic that i hardly know where to begin . . .
Let's see, a few innocuous queries:
Do we have desires, beliefs, and values, and then "reasons" for such; or do we merely have desires, beliefs and values which subsequently provide us with reasons?
If the former, then how do we avoid an infinite regression of conditionals whereby we require reasons for our reasons and then reasons for those, and so on, ad infinitum? And if instead the latter, which of these can we then declare (without being overly reductive) to be the most fundamental source of normative influence upon our actions: our desires, our beliefs, our values, or some amalgamized force comprised of the three? And, in the first place, is it at all possible to avoid arbitrariness in making any such declarations?
Along the lines of the last question just posed, is it a mistake even to think of "desire", "emotion", etc as being fundamentally distinct and seperable from "rationality" (as per Hume, or on the other end of the spectrum, Parfit)?
Then, if we DO insist on an ontological sort of distinction between rationality and desire, is rationality an end in itself, or simply a tool by which we facilitate the realization of our desires? Or perhaps is desire something that works in service of a greater rationality, like the Hegelian *Idea* or something? Can rationality ever be an end in itself even if we don't "desire" it to be? Why, after all, be rational if we don't WANT to?
Furthermore, what role do "facts" play in any or all of this? On the surface, beliefs and values seem to have a different sort of relation to factuality than desire - the former pair aiming at interpreting facts while the latter aims at engaging them - so how does this affect each of their respective roles as played with regard to rationality?
What role does temporality play in our determinations of what is or isn't rational?
Why can't desire itself serve as both reason AND end in explaining behavior, whether that behavior be rational, ethical, ignoble or otherwise? Why are we so intent, in our search for the guiding and motivating principles of our actions, on finding discernible, fundamentally rational elements?
And, how come no one in the ethics field ever seems to take it upon themselves to deconstruct the various linguistic dichotomies and distinctions which underlie all this confusion and talking-past of one another? I alluded to a few before, but terms like "desire" "belief" "value" "decision" "end" "all things considered" "rational" and, most especially "reason", all seem to mean different things coming from the mouths of different thinkers, yet the majority of these thinkers proceed with their investigations as though there were one set, definable context and meaning for each. Why aren't the ambiguities which blur the lines between such words ever more fully explored by the leaders in the field (i mean, we can perhaps forgive Hume or Hobbes, but people like Parfit, Broome, et al. should certainly know better by now, right? . . . Or is it a postmodern conceit even to make such a suggestion?)
Sometimes, it seems like one of the great ironies of so much contemporary ethical philosophy, and so many of the attempts at pseudo-algebraic constructions of rationality, obligation, etc, is the sheer and vast number of words squandered in the pursuit of what must always be both a fundamentally and ultimately ELUSIVE form of semantic precision . . .
Finally, is there a sense in which the search for "normativity" often devolves, as it were, into the quest for a sort external, metaphysical force which exists apart from, and independently of, human behavior (particularly in the hands of thinkers like Korsgaard)? And, if so, how do we redeem its conceptual usefulness in helping us to answer the question of "What should i do?"
. . . just curious. |
|
|
