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No need to jump from this particular case of name dropping to a general condemnation of autodidactic Deleuze readers.
Me, I think humanism sits on top of a false dilemma, but a difficult one to deal with. The implication of humanism is that no other intellectual movement treats people well - humanism, in my reading, being the belief and the movement around the belief that we should treat people well by virtue of nothing more than them being people, to value the humanity of ourselves and others. This is a false dilemma because damn-near every movement has valued some quality of humanity, (excepting the truly ascetic ones, but I can twist them this way as well) and utlimately does so in a way that is substantively no different to the way humanism does, though the form of this belief differs.
I think you could pretty fairly characterise humanism in one way that sets it apart from other value systems, in that according to humanism every person alive is a member of your moral community. Compare this to, to use a hackneyed example, a tribal mentality where you only have obligations to those in your extended family. I think this oversimplified comparison works because humanist arguments always narrows the discussion of where the boundaries of our moral communities must lay between tribalism (nationalism, communitarianism, etc) is always characterised as tribalistic in that it draws such boundaries, whereas the more 'enlightened' humanism does not.
I don't however believe that keeping such an undiscriminate moral community is tenable, and I'm uncertain about how desirable it is anyway. But I have some strong anti-humanistic sympathies. I particularly detest the implication that only by being a humanist can you care about other people - this makes light of the very real value of narrower conceptions of community. |
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