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The Consolations of Philosophy

 
  

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Good Intentions
03:46 / 20.04.07
Modernite: "Those people aren't possessed by demons."
Modernite: People in set D are not possessed by demons

Medieval: "What people?"
Medieval: Which set?

Modernite: "The people you say are possessed by demons."
Modernite: Set D

Medieval:"The possessed people aren't possessed?"
Medieval: People in set D are not possessed by demons?

Modernite: "That's right. Allow me to explain..."

There is a difference between the identifier 'people who are possessed' and the statement 'those people are possessed', which is what I see the example as showing. That language isn't as simple a matter as we might think. But logically it's very clear what is happening.
 
 
Good Intentions
03:47 / 20.04.07
SMS, I don't see what you're getting at.

Also, I could do without being told the pitfalls of being a modern philosopher.
 
 
SMS
20:13 / 20.04.07
What I’m trying to call into question is the translation, or the project of translation, like the one that you have undertaken with the post above. I'm not denying its utility; I'm suggesting the possibility of its limitations. In other words, I want to question whether it the two sentences are really identical in all essential respects. Is it really the case that

"Those people aren't possessed by demons." == "People in set D are not possessed by demons."

I'll try to be clearer. Suppose that the concept of mental illness always carries with it the trace of the older concept of demon possession, so that what we are thinking of when we think of mental illness as we do in today's world is really only possible because of the theories of demon possession that preceded us. In other words, that the history of medicine has a memory. Then the sentence, "the people possessed by demons aren't possessed?" is not just a confused way of saying "the people in set D are not possessed by demons." Instead, it expresses a memory of a past iteration of concept development that is absolutely essential to a complete understanding of the concept of mental illness.

Another example:
Say, I draw a line segment on a piece of paper ————————————————————
Now, I tell you, "this is not a line segment." It isn’t, afer all. It isn’t perfectly straight and it has width. When I think of a line segment, I think of something perfectly straight and without width, but I cannot do that without thinking of something less than perfectly straight and having some width. In the game of mathematics, we pretend that the originating concept is a kind of shadow of the actual line segment. That’s what makes mathematicians mathematicians. But in the game of life, we never actually abandon the drawing on the page. And hence, "a line segment is not a line segment" says more than, "this thing on the page is not a line segment."
 
 
Good Intentions
03:08 / 21.04.07
Once again, you are referring to two different things, and there is no contradiction.

When you are saying 'a line segment is not a line segment' - to unpack that statement, 'an instantiated line segment is not a theoretical line segment' and, well, that's uncontroversial both in being true and in not violating any laws of thought.

Instructive examples, yes, indications of the complexity of language, yes, examples of the extent to which meaning depends on structure, certainly. Paradox? No. It's only an apparent paradox. You've gone to some lengths to (succesfully) show that the thing in the first case and the thing in the second case are different, but then you discard the distinction and insist that they are actually the same. No, you had it right the first time, they are two different things, and to see a paradox is to be confused.
 
 
Good Intentions
03:22 / 21.04.07
Also, you are guilty of special pleading when you go "you say more" by expressing it as a paradox. What you are expressing clearly by stating it as a paradox is that there is a gap in meaning between the two things you are referring to - the instantiated line segment and the one in theory - but nothing more. You have not described the substance of the difference between them. When you go 'this isn't a line segemnt', you are giving a similar but different set of information - some of the particulars of the difference make themselves seen, but you've lost the generality. And if I go 'this is a line segment', I have given another set of information. The fact that this is meaningful without contradiction is an indication that you are overstating your case when you say that translation is impossible. What I am giving you when I say 'this is a line segment' is the logical complement of what you are giving me when you say 'this isn't a line segment' - the ways in which they are similar, the ways that the qualities of interest of ________ are the qualities of a line segment. When you go "you say more" you are unduly privileging one type of information without giving justification. While it might certainly do me a lot of good in a lot of circumstances to think of a person as a collection of various minerals in some arrangement, it does not follow that I should always respond to 'this is a human being' with 'no, this is a collection of atoms'.
 
 
Quantum
15:22 / 22.04.07
Im not sure what it really tells you apart from the fact that a model of truth that allows no exception, change or amendment isnt actually very useful. Lurid

It doesn't really tell you anything at all- it's a philosophical party trick to make saying P=notP meaningful. If you can construct a better example that's fine, the time travel one is just the one my professor used. You said "if you are going to flag up a contradiction" but that isn't what's happening, the contradiction is not real but only apparent, as you say. It's like making more toast than your breakfast colleagues just so you can say "I boast the most toast" or something, a contrived situation to allow a particular statement.
To me it's like arcane math, but philosophy, p=notp being the equivalent of the square root of minus one. You have to renormalise it to get any real-world result, but it can be handy.


To attempt to cut away the complexities of that meaning and bring out a pure meaning, which could then be expressed with all the dryness of chalk on a board, with a professor lecturing his students — is this not a vain attempt?

SMS, you do realise that I heard this example from my philosophy professor while I was a student, standing at a blackboard? I'm not sure what you're getting at to be honest, it sounds more like a rant about arrogant academics than philosophy particularly.

And that’s one of the major pitfalls of the modern philosopher. His title can get to his head. He might begin to think that he has discovered and needs to relay his discovery to an unsuspecting and underdeveloped civilization.

What on earth are you talking about?


Good Intentions- I see what you're saying, but set D is defined by only one quality, the quality that is being denied.
The identifier that determines whether or not someone is in set D is demonic possession, so to deny that seems to be nonsense- until it's explained that the descriptor 'possession' is more accurately something else, 'mental illness'. (If that's the case of course, if it turns out demons are real then they would be right and the time traveller wrong)
So, you say set D, those-people-over-there-acting-strangely , demonically-possessed-people, mentally-ill-folk or whatever. That means there is no contradiction, you separate the set from the descriptor, sorted. You're right.

But, if you *choose* to use the descriptor 'possessed-people' rather than 'set D' or just pointing at the people, you *can* meaningfully say 'all X are not-X'. That's the whole point of it all, not to force a paradox or anything, just to allow the possibility of the statement.

What SMS is (I THINK) talking about is the map/territory or language/reality relation better expressed by Magritte;



Ceci n'est pas une line segment.
 
 
SMS
21:39 / 22.04.07
I'm not sure what you're getting at to be honest, it sounds more like a rant about arrogant academics than philosophy particularly.

It wasn’t meant to be quite that. I realized from Good Intentions response that it reads that way.

What on earth are you talking about?

I was talking about a kernel-shell theory of meaning, I think. I was trying to suggest that it may not be possible to grab the essential meaning in one form and put it into another. It all made perfect sense to me at the time.
 
 
Good Intentions
04:38 / 23.04.07
So, you say set D, those-people-over-there-acting-strangely , demonically-possessed-people, mentally-ill-folk or whatever. That means there is no contradiction, you separate the set from the descriptor, sorted. You're right.

But, if you *choose* to use the descriptor 'possessed-people' rather than 'set D' or just pointing at the people, you *can* meaningfully say 'all X are not-X'. That's the whole point of it all, not to force a paradox or anything, just to allow the possibility of the statement.


Yes, I agree. I also agree with the way you protrayed it to SMS. I'm just stressing that there is a difference between the grammatical form of the statement and its logical content, something which is quite commonly passed over.
 
 
Quantum
11:35 / 24.04.07
Groovy. SMS, I think I see what you're getting at kinda.

Let's move on to other things, like favourite phrases from philosophy and interesting conceptual moves. When GI wrote there is a difference between the grammatical form of the statement and its logical content, something which is quite commonly passed over that reminded me (for some reason) of the ever-handy Existence is not a predicate. When people say 'X exists' they usually mean 'X is factual, not fictional'. Existing is not something you *do*, it is a synonym for being, to be=to exist. The word 'is' does the job of telling us something exists, 'X is' is sufficient. Because of the shape of English though and the many uses of the word 'is', when someone says 'X is existing' it looks like it makes sense, even though it doesn't.
I also like Epiphenomenal qualia, mostly for the sound of the words (although the concept is nifty too).

My favourite move is recursion. I discovered after studying for a while that the first thing to do to any theory is apply it to itself and see what happens- sometimes it collapses spectacularly. It turns out to be useful when reading posts on the internet sometimes too, for spotting hypocrisy and double standards. Example- if someone says everyone who is intolerant should be rounded up into camps, it pays to point out they would have to be the last one in and shut the door behind them.

What's your favourite bit of philosophy? Do you prefer beauty or utility from a concept?
 
 
Good Intentions
13:58 / 24.04.07
I have a mental hard on for Zeno's paradoxes. Paradoxes in general, actually. The one I use the most is the sorites paradox, but that would be because I'm a mereological nihilist.
 
 
Good Intentions
14:02 / 24.04.07
I take a real pleasure out of seeing clear and insightful thinking - take reading Kant for instance: I disagree with the stodgy old fart on many things, but his philosophy is so rounded and cogent and simply well done that I honestly enjoy reading him.
 
 
SMS
02:45 / 25.04.07
GI, I am curious. About what basically do you disagree with the old fart? If it’s something simple, like that you are a utilitarian or something, that would be sufficient.
 
 
Quantum
17:07 / 25.04.07
Ooh yes, paradoxes tickle my brain. What's a mereological nihilist? *web-fu interlude*
Ah, "the world we see and experience full of objects with parts is a product of human misperception"- I'd agree with that.
 
 
Good Intentions
01:38 / 26.04.07
SMS, I'm a determinist. I think that Kant's talk about phenomenon is, well, fantastic, but that his theories on noumenon are neither well-established or necessary (but, seeing what he's wrking from, is a really impressive edifice nonetheless). I'm sure that there are various things in his account of phenomenon I disagree with, but I'm buggered if I can understand him clearly enough to see all the minutae of his theory.

In his moral philosophy, while I disagree with him placing free will at the center of his ethics (since I don't believe it exits), I still have to admire how well his ethics hang together, and while I deny that what he preposes is a catogorical imperative, it still makes a really persuasive hypothetical one.
 
 
Good Intentions
01:53 / 26.04.07
Here's a doozy of a paradox for your perusal:

Carroll's Paradox.

I'd say that this takes pretty accurately portrays what it's like to debate on internet message boards.
 
 
Quantum
13:51 / 27.04.07
Hah. I assume you've read Godel, Escher, Bach?
 
 
Good Intentions
11:40 / 28.04.07
I actually haven't. I just know a Japanese logician who's quite keen on logical paradoxes, normally in deflating their mystery.
 
 
Quantum
14:25 / 28.04.07
Oh man, you should definitely have a look. It's about recursion, AI and paradoxes and reductionism and holism. And he has Achilles and the Tortoise as recurring characters after Carroll, I can't recommend it enough.
 
  

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