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What would a (complete?) metaphysical system look like?

  
 
SMS
22:16 / 02.02.07
I've seen the claim from time to time that the world has seen the collapse of metaphysics. This has led to some interesting work in attempting to philosophize with the notion that the activity of philosophy is always a reaching-for-the-beyond or, at least, a reaching into what cannot be grasped. Philosophy might then begin again with the interruption of systems, carried out by deconstruction, the face of the other, the inbreaking of God (through scripture or eucharist), the historical process, or something else. For this to make sense, however, we need to have some degree of confidence that (all) metaphysical systems do collapse, or at least that any metaphysical system which begins will find itself on a trajectory for collapse.

Where can we find this confidence? How could we go about deciding whether such confidence is justified? Do we look at the history of ideas and see that they are constantly undermined, or do we have a concept of a metaphysical system that is both totalizing and sufficient — a concept against which we can compare what might possibly actualize? If the latter (and as far as I can tell, this latter must play a part) — if the latter, what is this concept? Is it a concept born entirely of language or do we have pre-linguistic concepts of which language is only an approximation?

By the title of this thread, I am presuming that this question — what is the concept of a (complete) metaphysical system — is the first and central question to these collection of questions. This may be argued if you think this would be helpful.

Please feel free to correct any misunderstandings I have demonstrated in this post. As a matter of fact, these questions are important to me personally, and how they are resolved could effect choices I make in life, so I thank you in advance for any insight and assistance you may offer in answering them.
 
 
David Roel
13:27 / 03.03.07
Have you looked into Ken Wilber?
 
 
SMS
01:22 / 04.03.07
I have not. Would you kindly elaborate?
 
 
Aertho
23:34 / 07.03.07
A Brief History of Everything
 
 
SMS
02:59 / 08.03.07
Thank you for the link, but I still don’t understand the response. It doesn’t look like Wilbur is specifically addressing my question about what such system would look like, so are you suggesting that Wilbur has, in fact, produced one? Or are you suggesting that he has failed and that the failure of such a brave and monumental attempt would be indicative of the tasks inherent impossibility? To be perfectly honest, the man’s ideas don’t look to me terribly compelling.
 
 
HeartShadow
20:14 / 08.03.07
I think it runs into problems of things like the individual's lack of knowledge. For any one person to create a complete system encompassing *everything* would imply that there's nothing outside that *everything* left. Or there needs to be space for that which is unknown.

In physics, there's the quest for the Big TOE: the Theory of Everything. The attempt to reconcile gravity with electromagnetism and nuclear forces. And as far as I know, they're not getting anywhere with that either.

There's the problem that we can either see from a wide perspective and miss details, or we can see from a narrow perspective and get the details but miss the big picture. A complete system of metaphysics demands that we do BOTH. I sincerely doubt that's possible for any one individual to encompass.

That doesn't mean it could never ever be possible, but it makes it vanishingly unlikely. It requires an overcoming of limitation that I'm not sure we can do. (and it presumes there's nothing *out there* which contradicts what we think we know, as well. any system based solely on humanity presupposes no aliens, f'ex).
 
 
SMS
23:34 / 08.03.07
In physics, there's the quest for the Big TOE: the Theory of Everything. The attempt to reconcile gravity with electromagnetism and nuclear forces. And as far as I know, they're not getting anywhere with that either.

Although finding a Theory of Everything would not be finding a complete metaphysical system, but only, in some sense, a complete physical system, it is an illuminating example for two reasons. One is that physicists have a very good idea of what it would look like; namely, it would be a theory from which both the standard model could be derived and from which general relativity could be derived. It would also, of course, be falsifiable (in accordance with principles proper to the empirical sciences). The other illuminating fact about the TOE is that it would not give humanity omni/science. Even if it were capable of grounding everything from chemistry to modern psychology, we would not thereby be able to treat modern psychology as another branch of TOE. We could conceive of it as such, and, in fact, most already suppose that the same physical laws that govern the stars govern our brains, but we could not treat it as such even after firmly establishing the theory. The other thing to note about a TOE is that it would tell us absolutely nothing either about morality (what I ought to do) or about the qualitative experiences of life (what it’s like to experience love or red, say). That would not make it any less of a complete, physical system.

Thus, my question on metaphysical systems is not: Why can we not have a complete metaphysical system? but What would be the character of a complete metaphysical system such that we could either recognize it if found or, if that is not possible, have confidence in the impossibility of such a system?

I think this is an interesting answer:

There's the problem that we can either see from a wide perspective and miss details, or we can see from a narrow perspective and get the details but miss the big picture. A complete system of metaphysics demands that we do BOTH.

but it seems to be a description of omniscience and that seems to be much more than ought to be required of metaphysics. We have had swings in the history of philosophy back and forth from universalism to particularism, but both of these philosophies view a relationship between the universal and the particular, and they have specific reasons for focusing more on the one than the other. If one were to establish an adequate procedure for their dialectic, then this would seem to be all that should be demanded of him with respect to resolving the incompleteness brought upon by our inability to focus on both at the same time.
 
 
HeartShadow
11:20 / 09.03.07
I think I might be misunderstanding either what you mean by complete or by metaphysics.

If it's complete, it has to have everything, right? Or is there some kind of complete that is an overview? Or perhaps a view that it's actually a lot simpler than you think?

At least the way I view the Universe, no, there's no way to encompass entire metaphysics. We're too limited and there's too much out there. That doesn't mean it's even necessarily complex. It might be incredibly simple. But it's so vast, even in that simplicity, that it dwarfs our mind.
 
 
David Roel
13:52 / 09.03.07
A complete metaphysical system must include levels, lines, states and types.

Levels are developmental levels or stages of growth. All organisms develop through biological/physiological stages of growth, there are stages of psychological growth, stages of moral development, stages of cultural/social development, and close to all metaphysical systems agree that there are stages of spiritual growth. Examples of developmental systems that include stages are the Chakras, Kabbalah, Vedanta, Theosophy, Buddhist Vijnanas, Cognitive Development, Socioemotional Development, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Yoga Tantra, the systems of Huston Smith, Stan Grof, Piaget, St. Teresa, St. Dionysius, Maslow, Jean Houston, etc. So, levels.

Lines are specific, distinct aptitudes or abilities or programs that also develop through stages, but are not uniformly developed. Lines develop independantly of one another. Any individual or collective can be developed to any level in any given line. Examples of lines are cognition, morals, affects, needs, sexuality, motivation, interpersonal, artistic, self-identity, spirituality, etc. So, lines.

States are the states available to human consciousness. Waking is a state, dreaming is a state, deep sleep is a state, chemical alteration is a state, a trance is a state, deep meditation is a state, spiritual enlightenment is a state, transpersonal states are states of psychic, subtle, causal, and nondual awareness. So, states.

Types are modes of being or orientation. Examples of typological classification schemes are the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Enneagram, Jungian types, masculine/feminine, etc. So, types.

Levels, lines, states and types exist in all individuals and in all collectives. Also, every individual and collective has an external existence and an internal existence, has an objective and a subjective. Levels, lines, states and types exist in the objective and subjective of individuals and the objective and subjective of collectives.

A complete, comprehensive, integral metaphysical system must include levels, lines, states and types, as they exist in the objective and subjective of individuals and the objective and subjective of collectives. Any less is to have a deficient system, is to overlook an important aspect of existence, is to be partial.
 
 
Tuna Ghost: Pratt knot hero
18:09 / 09.03.07
I've seen the claim from time to time that the world has seen the collapse of metaphysics.

That claim has been made several times throughout the course of history, but people still write books on the subject and people still read them.

Doesn't Godel's theorem state that no sufficiently complex system can be both complete and consistent? Wouldn't that apply to a metaphysical system as well? At least for a Kantian view of metaphysics? Is "Kantian" even a word?

I'm in a metaphysics class right now. I'd ask the instructor, but he's a mean old bastard and hates getting off topic.
 
 
Lurid Archive
18:56 / 10.03.07
Doesn't Godel's theorem state that no sufficiently complex system can be both complete and consistent? Wouldn't that apply to a metaphysical system as well?

Its extremely doubtful that the highly technical usage of "completeness" from logic is what SMS means here. In fact, the technical usage probably doesn't apply outside logic. So, SMS, what *do* you mean by "complete"?
 
 
SMS
23:24 / 10.03.07
I intend to be using it in relation to claims about both the collapse of metaphysics and the need to rely upon the interruption of systems as part of the activity of philosophy. These are two different things, of course, but it seems that the people who talk about the one tend to talk about the other. A very precise definition of completion would probably answer my question. On the other hand, it is fair to ask for some clarity, so I’ll mention a few things that I might have vaguely expected as answers. I do so with some hesitation.

• In order to deal with the fundamental nature of reality, we have to use both subjectivity and intersubjectivity as a medium. Kant’s enquiry into the necessary condition for the possibility of experience, for instance, was always the experience of the subject. Yet the same subject, while encountering other subjects, can have no justification for presupposing sameness of subjectivity,and can therefore expect no sameness in the fundamental nature of reality dealt with through the subjective and intersubjective medium.

• The nature of fundamental reality must always be conducted within the historical process, which is always unfolding. To attempt to discover an ahistorical reality is to attempt to discover a fiction, for no such animal can ever be presented. The full nature of each moment contains within it that which it indicates beyond itself (its meaning, if you will), but the meaning of the past can now only be viewed through a glass darkly. Only at a hypothetical end of time could the full meaning — and thus the very nature — of any event ever be seen plainly, "face-to-face."

• One cannot yet think without the use of language and one cannot have language except within the context of some community. To investigate the nature of reality is always to do so linguistically, but language is always a negotiation between utterer and hearer. This negotiation is necessarily dynamic and thus the investigation into the nature of reality must always be ever unfolding — not as scientific discoveries continue to unfold, but with a constant re-evaluation of the very mode of investigation — the very meaning of language.

I’m not presenting any of those as my own, but trying to answer Lurid’s question. Does that at all clarify the kind of thing I’m asking about?

I'm guessing that Goedel’s theorem doesn’t apply to the transcendental logic of Kantian metaphysics. And "Kantian" is, in fact, a word, as are Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism.
 
  
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