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Friendship And Its Effect On Your Ethics And Morals

 
  

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All Acting Regiment
20:20 / 21.06.05
I've been thinking of examples recently where Person A beleives in certain ethical codes, but their friend, Person B, finds that because of the friendship they share, B can influence A to step away from a moral conclusion.

Do you see this as a common occurrence? Considering that "morals" could mean anything from Christian Fundamentalism to Anarchism, do you think that the moderating friend is a good or bad thing? Do they get in the way? Or are they neccesary? Do you have experiences of this?
 
 
Tryphena Absent
00:10 / 22.06.05
I find that people influence me linguistically but not morally, so I might change my opinion on the way that I use a word but the basic moral premise won't have changed, usually because I already apply it to something else in the relevant way. So I can be influenced morally but only in a very obvious and logical way by friends.

I don't think it's a particularly common occurence, it seems to me that you have to have some kind of doubt about that belief in order to eventually reject it through another's influence. I think it's more about the things that you personally are willing to give up for relationships with certain people.
 
 
TeN
02:23 / 22.06.05
I think it works the other way too. I know when I am around a certain conservative, fundamentalist christian friend, I'm less likely to express certain viewpoints simply because I don't feel like getting into an argument with him. Of course, my opinions haven't changed, they're just not being expressed. But perhaps that in itself is a bad thing? I'm not quite sure.
 
 
dj kali_ma
03:10 / 22.06.05
I find it easier to be "friends" with someone than "lovers". However, I find it difficult to take when an online "friend" reveals him/herself to have conflicting ethical values to mine.

Read: Morality = "their" values
Read: Ethics = "my" values

As far as what brand of ethics I particularly follow... that'll take some time to describe.

As you can possibly tell, I have an almost palpable fear of offending people. Weird coming from me, to be certain.
 
 
Evil Scientist
10:46 / 22.06.05
My friends and I differ on a lot of viewpoints and our discussions on certain subjects can get pretty heated on occasion. But we're generally feel that if you can't argue your beliefs in the face of direct opposition then what's the point of having those beliefs?

I certainly call my friends on actions which I believe to be morally invalid, as they do to me. But that kind of thing can always be achieved with a bit of subtlety and tact, rather than a slanging match.

Although those are fun too.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
11:58 / 22.06.05
Is it better to associate with people who share your views, or better to actively seek out friends who create a challenge?
 
 
Emerald
13:37 / 22.06.05
I think you can never actively seek to make friends with someone only for what ze thinks. But that could be simply my personal approach.

While, to consider someone a friend, your respective beliefs have necessarily to share a common core, at least concerning relationships among people. So the most enlightening discussions happen exactly with those friends of yours that have rather different beliefs, but you still consider much. That is, those that are something of a mix between similar and challenge.

Perhaps it's just because you don't usually engage in lofty discussions with strangers who explicitly have different views from yours...
 
 
nyarlathotep's shoe horn
14:58 / 22.06.05
I don't think you can change someone's mind/opinion - it's entirely up to them. All you can do is communicate your thoughts/feelings/impressions, most effectively done when both are open & receptive.

my friends and agree on much that is fundamental, although each of us has our different flavours of interpretation. I find that when someone who is familiar with my perspective challenges something I've said, it forces me to think about it. Often, I realise I hadn't considered my words mindfully.

Although, I find that with intelligent challenges (as opposed to "that's dumb" kind of criticisms), it has one of two effects: my point of view stands up to the challenge, and is thus strengthened, or my point of view doesn't stand up to the challenge, adjusts itself to incorporate whatever was overlooked, and is thus strengthened.

denouncing challenges indicates (to me anyway) a lack of faith in the strength one's opinion.

>pablo
 
 
dj kali_ma
12:17 / 01.07.05
Tenix, that is amazingly succinct and really heartening to hear. I too suspect that people's opinions and beliefs are there to be tested, strengthened, and metamorphosed into something both stronger and more flexible.

Sometimes I feel as if I'm missing some of the subtler cues of a person's message if I can't see his/her face, which is why Barbelith in particular both fascinates me and frightens me.

It might also be why I'm afraid to have a strong opinion here... which reveals a certain prejudicial aspect of my own personality of which I was not aware.
 
 
Longinus
03:33 / 02.07.05
I've been friends with people who are good in general yet hold beliefs I am personally sure are wrong. Self-righteous bastard I am I've engaged them in debate and—lo and behold—they’ve refused to change. I’ve even backed them into a corner, but they respond with the panacea “I just don’t care.” Tenix makes a good argument for debate, but I guess what I’m asking is: Is it worth conferring with people who will cling to ideas they know are indefensible? What does it say about our society that people like this exist?
 
 
Unconditional Love
15:52 / 02.07.05
i think it says change is uncomfortable.

an perhaps repetitive challenging is a way to try and change those who preserve, but in my experience some people construct themselves out of less flexible material than others.

some people know that a majority of there body is water, some people feel it, other people identify with there skeleton, and other people wish they had a carapace.
 
 
nyarlathotep's shoe horn
20:08 / 02.07.05
Longinus wrote:
Is it worth conferring with people who will cling to ideas they know are indefensible? What does it say about our society that people like this exist?


as for the former question, "there are none so blind as those who will not see." (dunno where that's from originally, but I hear it quoted often enough). If someone is clinging to "indefensible" ideas, then they're not open or receptive to anything useful you might have to share. As such, it's pointless argumentation

(no it's not!
yes it is!
no it isn't, it's just contradiction.
But in order to argue with you, I need to take up a contrary position.
But it isn't just 'no it isn't.'
yes it is!)

as for the latter question, it says that our society could do better not immersing itself in 60Hz waves of electronic miasma. I think it makes us jittery, defensive, and less open to change.
(this is residue from a conversation yesterday).

our society is what it is. If you foresee a direction in which you'd like to move it, make changes where you can, instead of testing your tenacity in trying to alter the steadfast. Better to test your resolve than tenaciousness.

ta
>pablo
 
 
Seth
13:09 / 04.07.05
Self-righteous bastard I am I've engaged them in debate and—lo and behold—they’ve refused to change. I’ve even backed them into a corner, but they respond with the panacea “I just don’t care.” Tenix makes a good argument for debate, but I guess what I’m asking is: Is it worth conferring with people who will cling to ideas they know are indefensible? What does it say about our society that people like this exist?

I don’t know what it says about society, but I can imagine what it might say about self-professed self-righteous bastards who back people into corners.

The word indefensible holds within itself the notion of an attacker, and the two people in conversation taking prescribed roles according to the attitudes of the person who sets the frame for the interaction. In this case attack and defense.

Is this the way to get the best out of people?
 
 
Quantum
16:00 / 05.07.05
Is it worth conferring with people who will cling to ideas they know are indefensible?

What? The combatative rhetoric aside (Seth covered that) nobody will consider their beliefs indefensible (note 'beliefs' rather than 'ideas') or they wouldn't believe them. When an argument/debate gets to that stage it shows you have hit a fundamental disagreement you can't resolve, you have got down to articles of faith. After that it's 'Yes it is' vs. 'No it isn't'.
 
 
Cat Chant
08:45 / 06.07.05
I think there's potentially an interesting discussion to be had here about, for want of a better word, intersubjectivity. So far there seems to me to be a tension in the responses of the thread between (1) the idea that friendship is a collective enterprise (Emerald's to consider someone a friend, your respective beliefs have necessarily to share a common core, at least concerning relationships among people) and (2) a sort of free-market model of friendship (kali ma's people's opinions and beliefs are there to be tested, strengthened, and metamorphosed into something both stronger and more flexible, which frightens the hell out of me).

Actually, rereading the thread, the private-enterprise model seems to be winning: the idea that ethics/morals/beliefs are something you have, your property, whose value can be increased by your friends' labour in working on those beliefs - and, of course, the surplus value ("something stronger and more flexible") reverts to the original owner of the belief-capital. Or, in Evil Scientist's case, appropriately enough, friendship functions on the agonistic model, a bit like peer-review (if you can't argue your beliefs in the face of direct opposition then what's the point of having those beliefs?)

I guess I'd argue (strongly) for a model of both beliefs and friendships as a way of being-in-the-world, even perhaps of worlding the world. A belief - especially a "moral" or ethical belief - seems to me not to be the private property of the person whose head it inhabits, but rather to be part of that person's interface with the world, something that goes through the person, that's part of what constitutes hir, and that binds hir into the world. And a friendship - an affective network of relationships - seems to be a similar kind of thing. Belief is always-already intertextual - it can't originate purely from your own head, it has to have come into being in relation to an 'outside', whether that be books or your experience of the world or your friends - and friendship is a mechanism for intersubjectivity.

I'm thinking here of friendship as a kind of polis, in Hannah Arendt's terms. Arendt says, in The Human Condition, that humans are all constituted by an originary plurality (she gets that from Aristotle, in fact - the idea that humans always come into a world already inhabited by many other humans, who make up groups and networks and cultures). She calls this condition of plurality the "in-between" in which humans always act and speak, and says:

This second, subjective in-between is not tangible, since there are no tangible objects into which it could solidify... But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less real than the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality the “web” of human relationships

But because the in-between is intangible, it's also impermanent, and the polis is the organization which archives speech and action. Arendt again:

the organization of the polis... is a kind of organized remembrance... The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together.

And, as Derrida writes in Archive Fever:

The archive as printing, writing, prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique in general is not only the place for stocking and for conserving an archivable content of the past which would exist in any case, such as, without the archive, one still believes it was or will have been. No, the technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future.

Which is to say that friendship is a sort of archival technology of intersubjectivity. Like Emerald says (hi, Emerald! I look forward to you posting more around here), if someone is your friend, you have to have some sort of ability to think in common, some shared tactics of communication, some degree of receptivity. And that structure of thinking-in-common and receptivity will condition the way in which you understand yourself and your beliefs, at least insofar as you address yourself and your beliefs to your friendship network.
 
 
Seth
09:43 / 06.07.05
if you can't argue your beliefs in the face of direct opposition then what's the point of having those beliefs?

Do arguing skills make the points being argued necessarily more valid? And is argument the best means of change?
 
 
Cat Chant
09:51 / 06.07.05
And why is validity (which maybe could be paraphrased as the adequacy of a belief in the face of the evidence - of the given-ness of the world outside the believer's [and any interlocutors'] heads) the point anyway? Is friendship really only a mechanism for testing the objective strength and adequacy of belief? Don't belief, collective thinking, and friendship have a more intimate interrelationship than that?
 
 
Unconditional Love
08:55 / 07.07.05
feeling, belonging, interemotionality(that isnt a word, is it?), togetherness, reinforced through shared and common, experiences,ideas,beliefs around common experiences,collective interemotionalism, empathy,sympathetic understanding. enough love to accept difference.
 
 
Longinus
23:24 / 09.07.05
Wow, that got way more of a response than I thought it would. The first time I’ve pissed people off on Barbelith; I guess I’ve officially lost my posting cherry.
I just came across an idea that applies to my previous rant, I think Nietzsche was the first to popularize it: The idea that you always believe yourself to be right, no matter what. Of course you make mistakes, but it is fundamentally necessary to consider yourself in the right and your thought process beyond reproach if you are to exist in the world and maintain some semblance of your own volition. It kind of comes back to that scene in the Woody Allen movie Crimes & Misdemeanors where the father character proclaims that even if, hypothetically, God didn’t exist, he’d still believe.
I’m all for Live And Let Live, but I do think it’s wrong for people to simply believe whatever they want regardless of empirical evidence, in which case morality becomes too relativistic for it’s own good. (Nietzsche again.) That seems to foster the kind of world Orwell dreaded, where two plus two equals whatever the powerful tell you it equals, the Hegelian night where all cows are black.
Is admitting you were wrong and believing you were wrong two irreconcilably different things?
To quote a quote: This is my truth, tell me yours.
 
 
Seth
00:27 / 10.07.05
There's no issue with the idea that beliefs should generally be evidence based. My point concerns the specific methods of challenging beliefs that I quoted from your post, namely backing people into corners. It's just not an effective way of working, you generally need someone's consent before they'll change and you won't get it by throwing them off balance and attacking them.
 
 
Seth
00:28 / 10.07.05
What makes you think anyone posting to this thread is pissed off?
 
 
nyarlathotep's shoe horn
00:31 / 10.07.05
Longinus wrote:
I do think it’s wrong for people to simply believe whatever they want regardless of empirical evidence, in which case morality becomes too relativistic for it’s own good.

why on earth would you believe this to be wrong? you seem to simply believe whatever you want - in this case, that it's wrong to simply believe whatever one wants.

what empirical evidence do you have of this?
morality is relative. how can you claim it otherwise? is there empirical evidence of this? if so, I'd love to read all about it.

why do you put so much faith in the empirical? reason/rationality/logic are all feelings. I believe this because they can be satisfied, and satisfaction is most definitely a feeling.

besides, what was that line from I, Robot, something like "your logic is infallible, and you're still wrong."

Longinus, I'm afraid I disagree with this particular "truth" so fundamentally as to want to see it die on the end of my pen.

but you seem like a decent enough person, so nothing personal, eh?

ttfn
>pablo
 
 
Longinus
19:47 / 10.07.05
It’s a very fundamental paradox: we all can only perceive and interact with the world from our own perspective, yet we must interact with other people that have other perspectives. The tenets of basic humanism dictate that there must be some level of concession made on an individual basis so society can exist. For example, we give up absolute freedom to create governments that’ll protect our more fundamental freedoms. (Ideally, anyway.)
By the same token, why can’t we agree that some beliefs do more bad than good, and abandon them, socially if not personally? Is it because beliefs are so fundamental to us, such an innate personal part of who we are? Sorry, I’m just posting questions again. Yes, beliefs are emotional, but there are degrees to which you allow emotions to intrude into your beliefs. I usually tout the importance of human feeling as often as I can, but many of our most important actions cannot be effectively guided by emotions, our entire idea of justice is based on that.
I think it is possible to believe things because they are right, not because its what you want to believe. If this weren’t true the pain of disillusionment wouldn’t exist. On one level morality is relative, but on another it isn’t. Pretty much all cultures have the same basic tenets of morality: It’s wrong to murder, or steal, right to help and love, etcetera. The problems of reconciliation reside more in the nuances.
For the record, I think people have the right to believe/do absolutely whatever they want as long as they don’t hurt anyone, but problems arise when they try to share those beliefs, which is inevitable during the course of human relationships. The problem for me is if beliefs are evermore irreconcilable it seems like there’s this glass ceiling of human interaction we’ll never be able to breach.
I believe you’re right about logic. The best morality results from a mixture of thought and feeling.
I used to have this running argument with my Modern Drama teacher about the play Oedipus the King. He said it would’ve been better if he never found out his wife was his mother, since he wouldn’t have felt miserable or known what he was doing was wrong. I insisted that, though a great deal of pain resulted he became a better person in the long run and not knowing the wrongness of his actions didn’t make them any less immoral. It might be cause for forgiveness, but it wasn’t license to continue.
It just struck me: a conversation about how beliefs change conversations about beliefs. This is all very postmodern.
 
 
Persephone
13:40 / 11.07.05
You know, I ordered that Deleuze on Spinoza book that was recommended in the other thread & for the first time I have graspable definitions for morals vs. ethics ...well we'll see, won't we, if I can write this out. But to wit, morals make a distinction between Good and Evil & ethics make a distinction between good and bad. Good and bad in the sense of "good for you" and "bad for you" as an organism. And this ties into the idea of friendship, because how do you define yourself as an organism --as a body, as a mind plus a body, as an individual, as a family, as a community ...all the way up to the universe. This implies that ethics are a complicated set of propositions, and further that they must always be changed and tested. Question: by whom? Whereas morals are set by God, who has it all figured out & where Good = obedience and Evil = disobedience. Not that you have to believe in God to have morals, I think that the difference between morals and ethics is the "setness" of the former. Theory: if what you have is morals (as defined), then you tend toward the collective enterprise model of friendship. If what you have is ethics, then you tend toward the free-market model. Or maybe I have it the wrong way around. Or maybe it all just intersects.
 
 
Quantum
10:45 / 12.07.05
morality is relative. how can you claim it otherwise? (tenix)
Just to note that the major world religions are based on absolute objective morality, so most people in the world *would* claim otherwise. For example 'Thou shalt not kill' is traditionally considered Not Relative for theologians, and since a lot of morality is derived from religion, it seems relevant.
Not everyone is a moral relativist (although a lot of people here are, myself included) and yet we get on. I have fundamentalist Xian friends, we have very different beliefs and yet similar ethics- but our shared value of tolerance means we get on despite these conflicting beliefs.
 
 
nyarlathotep's shoe horn
14:18 / 12.07.05
given that not everyone agrees....

if a major religion claims that "killing is evil, and thou shalt not kill" the subtext being that "if you're a good XXXian, thou shalt not kill."

however, there are any number of people worldwide who kill other people. some of them are even devout observers of faiths that denounce killing as wrong or undesireable.

so how is this particular moral stance not relative?

if we universally believed that killing was immoral, would there be any murder? some of us feel that killing isn't absolutely immoral, despite all the rhetoric, belief or faith in the world. that's why some of us kill some of us.

that's the position from which I made the assertion.

>pablo
 
 
Quantum
09:26 / 13.07.05
if we universally believed that killing was immoral, would there be any murder?

Only if people acted immorally. Which they often do. Or if they decided to act on the lesser of two evils, or if they don't accord moral status to heathens, etc. People often act contrary to their expressed beliefs, including morality.
 
 
nyarlathotep's shoe horn
14:43 / 13.07.05
quantum typed:
People often act contrary to their expressed beliefs, including morality.

so what defines morality? one's word, one's thought or one's behaviour?

as far as dealing with people other than oneself, you can only work with the word and behaviour. Thought is for oneself alone to muddle through.

In the case of expressed morality in conflict with behaviour (ie professing that killing is universally wrong, and then killing someone in self-defense), is this immoral? amoral? moral with exception?

ultimately, it's all worthy of forgiveness (but I don't want to take this thread off its course).

How does our circle (our friends, our intimates) help us to keep our integrity intact?

mine call me on my contradictions, which is infuriating, and welcomed. Helps to get the kinks ironed out.

X IX
 
 
Quantum
17:34 / 15.07.05
In a book I recently read (The Confusion, Neal Stevenson) a character swears an oath before God out loud, and is queried by another;
'If God hears all your thoughts why swear the oath out loud?'
'I need my friends to keep me honest'

I think friends, like family, leave an impression for good or ill, so it's best to surround oneself with people who hold the same values- things like compassion, honesty and integrity- and not worry so much about their beliefs.
 
 
Regrettable Juvenilia
19:46 / 15.07.05
So how do you tell the difference between the two? The idea that the line is clear-cut doesn't ring true for me. What if I know someone who treats the people in their immediate circle with compassion but who believes that, say, queer people have something wrong with them that needs to be 'cured', or that it's perfectly okay for the agents of a state to kill children who happen not to be citizens of that state, and actively propogates those views? That person may be 'truthful' in the sense that they always say what they believe to be true. They may have 'integrity' in that their (vile) beliefs are firmly held and important to them as a matter of principle. And they may appear to demonstrate compassiom.

But in truth such a person holds none of these qualities, in real terms. Moral relativity be damned. This is what it means to be politicised: to have an awareness of the wider picture and the ways in which even the things we choose to believe have consequences, rippling outwards. How could I take tea and politely chat with a member of the BNP? If I could not do that with a member of the BNP, how could I do it with someone who makes apologies for the monstrous killings sanctioned by the UK government, who have caused far more killings and destruction and hate than the BNP could ever hope to?

This is a hard stance to hold. It may mean losing friends. But it's the right thing to do.
 
 
Quantum
10:50 / 16.07.05
Obviously tolerance is going to be a high priority for the values I look for in friends.

I expect my friends to challenge me on my opinions in the same way I'll challenge them- if a seemingly sensible friend starts ranting about bringing back hanging or something, they can expect an earful. Ditto, if I am casually sexist or homophobic (God forbid) I expect my friends to pull me up on it.

But I'm not about to avoid someone because of their religion, or because they're a tory while I'm a liberal- that's too close to discrimination on the grounds of gender race or creed. Tolerance, you see. I'm not arguing for total moral relativism (far from it, I'm a Liberal Nazi, racists should be shot etc.) but there has to be some leeway for morality differences.
 
 
Regrettable Juvenilia
12:50 / 16.07.05
But I'm not about to avoid someone because of their religion, or because they're a tory while I'm a liberal- that's too close to discrimination on the grounds of gender race or creed.

But what does "their religion" or "they're a tory" actually mean? It describes an identity which will encompass a range of beliefs and values. Not always the same beliefs and values - there are homophobic Christians and there are radical queer-friendly Christians, for example. However, there are some such identity terms which I hope we can all describe certain key beliefs, otherwise the terms would be rendered meaningless. For example, if I say "I'm a Christian" but then reveal that I do not believe in any god at all, nor that any of the books of the New Testament have any value, but instead that a small potted plant I keep on my windowsill is God and tells me how to live my life every day, then regardless of what one thinks of my beliefs, you would have to conlude that I have chosen an unhelpful and inaccurate term to describe my beliefs. Equally, if I claimed to be a member of the BNP but went on to describe in detail my support for open-border policies, affirmative action programmes, and legislation against hatespeech, one might conclude that I am at best mistaken in having chosen to claim to be alligned with the BNP. Why? Because we know what the BNP stand for, and it is not that.

So what does it mean when we say "they're a tory"?
 
 
All Acting Regiment
20:47 / 16.07.05
Surely the question is not "Does this person think the same as me?"- we've seen in this thread that no two people beleive the same thing, even if they both subscribe to the same umbrella term (e.g. Christian, Communist etc).

Surely the question- at least for us here- is one of several closely related areas: civility, of adaptability, of understanding, and, primarily, humanity.

Civility: In this context, the ability to have a reasoned, non-agressive discussion about the beleifs in question. Respect for the right of others to hold conflicting views.

Which leads us on to Adaptability. The world changes all the time. Our lives change all the time. There are very few beleifs which can go on for a long period of time without modification. Adaptability in this context is the ability to alter certain beleifs as required by situation, or at least to allow for this possibility.

Understanding I use in both the sense of "fully understanding the other opinion", and in the sense of "having full knowledge of the situation/environment". Remember the two 16th century monks who argued over how many teeth a horse had? They argued day and night for a week and never reached a conclusion. Neither of them actually went to the stables and checked, so they had no real knowledge. Thus, their argument was pointless.

It's Humanity that really sums it up, though. Any beleif that ends up causing harm to humans needs to be looked at hard. When someone beleives something to the extent that they will kill for the beleif- as opposed to allowing suffering on the basis that there will be less in the long term- that person has entered a region where we cannot follow them.

I'll talk to someone who goes without food "because it will make the gods kind to us"- but when they starve their family or spoil their neighbour's food- or at least plan to- the chances of me being their friend are almost none.
 
 
Regrettable Juvenilia
10:53 / 17.07.05
You don't need to kill for your beliefs to cause harm to other human beings. In some cases, all you need to do is disseminate those beliefs.
 
 
Seth
08:50 / 18.07.05
How many people here have been told that they have have had a profound effect and influence on their friends' lives? Which of our friends have had the most influence on us?
 
  

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