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Missing: The Guardian's Spinal Column

  
  

Page: 12(3)

 
 
Jack The Bodiless
21:24 / 29.10.04
Aiee. Firstly, in the BNP example, yes obviously Fly is referring to a hypothetical other (HO), hence his ambivalence about effectively being on the same side as the HO as far as not voting for the BNP is concerned. This is blindingly obvious if you read Fly's post in precisely the way it has been written.

Secondly, no, there's no assumption of the BNP's policy of race hate being the reason that the HO would not vote for the BNP. In fact, as the premise is that the HO does not morally disapprove of voting for the BNP, the only reasonable assumption based on the information provided is that the HO in Fly's example does not disapprove of the BNP's policy of race hate, and is only objecting to people voting for the BNP because they do not have policy sufficiently workable witin Government - for example, according to the HO, their immigration policy is not immoral, simply inoperable.

This interpretation is further borne out as Fly is using his example to refer back to this thread, in which people have voiced the opinion that they do not morally object to the assassination of George W. Bush, but find that such an action would be impractical. Essentially both the Bush and BNP examples laid out are predicated on:

a) no moral objection to the premise, but

b) a practical objection to the premise.

What this boils down to is the simple statement: It's A Nice Idea, But It Wouldn't Work In Practice. This, to me, is a tacit approval of the premise itself, if not the actual carrying out of said premise.

Therefore, in the Bush example, this translates to a tacit approval of the premise - assassinating the President of the United States because he's a horrendous fuckhead, amongst many other reasons - with the caveat that it wouldn't get us anywhere good carried out in practice.

I respect Flyboy and the others quoted on this thread a great deal, but have to disagree on this point, as I've said.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
11:39 / 30.10.04
This hinges on whether it is possible not to object to something on moral grounds without believing it to be a Nice Idea. I believe it is. I do not object to pork scratchins on moral grounds, but I don't think they are a nice idea, for example. Therefore, I do not believe that simply by failing to diapprove of pork scratchins on moral grounds, I am expressing tacit approval for them. I do not disapprove of campaigns to keep the Pound on moral grounds - I do not believe that keeping the Pound is a moral issue. I do disagree in practical terms with keeping the Pound. This does not mean that I am expressing tacit approval for keeping the Pound. European integration? Reality TV? Regional assemblies? And so on...

The idea that a failure to disapprove approve of something on purely moral grounds means that one is necessarily approving of it, tacitly or otherwise, is, frankly, one you could drive a truck through, and I do wish that people on this thread would stop trying to kick lumps out of each other for long enough actually to look at the language and concepts they are using. As such, I would have to know a lot more about our hypothetical other in the BNP example before makign a judgement.
 
 
Lurid Archive
12:37 / 30.10.04
Therefore, I do not believe that simply by failing to diapprove of pork scratchins on moral grounds, I am expressing tacit approval for them.

I think that "tacit approval" may be a bit strong, but to my mind you are clearly implying that eating pork scratchings is something you think is more or less acceptable, even if you don't do it. That is a rather odd statement to make, of course, since you've chosen an example divorced from morality to demonstrate the lack of significance of moral preferences, but I think the function of specifically mentioning it leaves the listener with that impression.

Clearly we disagree, here, but I think you are mistaken Haus. In particular, when you say

The idea that a failure to disapprove approve of something on purely moral grounds means that one is necessarily approving of it, tacitly or otherwise, is, frankly, one you could drive a truck through,

I think you are missing the point. If you specifically mention that such and such an act causes no moral problems for you, you are implying some level of approval (even though it is possible to disagree with actions on grounds that are other than moral). I find it extremely hard to believe that you would treat the statement "I don't disapprove morally of the BNP, but I find their policies unworkable" as anything other than a statement implying racist sympathies. To summarise that statement as an opposition to the BNP, while correct on some level, would be a gross mischaracterisation, if you ask me.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
22:52 / 30.10.04
I find it extremely hard to believe that you would treat the statement "I don't disapprove morally of the BNP, but I find their policies unworkable" as anything other than a statement implying racist sympathies.

I get that. However, that is irrelevant to the question. My feelings are not relevant or necessarily accurate -I am simply pointing out the conceptual gaps in the positions being adopted. (Note - "racist sympathies" is not the issue here - it is specifically whether one by necessity approves of policies if one believes they are impracticable but does not take a moral position on other people voting for parties that espouse them. Sympathies doesn't come into it, but see below.)

You may not believe that there is a moral element to pork scratchins. PETA or any self-respecting militant vegetarian would, of course, disagree, because different people adopt different positions, including different moral positions. Likewise all the other examples I gave. You may further believe that there is necessarily a moral component to any opinion about the BNP - either you express moral dissapproval at their policies or you necessarily approve of them. How about voting Conservative? I disapprove of voting Conservative on moral grounds. However, somebody else may disapprove of voting Conservative because their policies are in their opinion unworkable, regardless of whether or not they are moral. How about Bush? Are you only allowed not to vote for Bush if you express moral disapproval of him, rather than a simple pragmatic belief that his policies do not work? Frankly, your argument depends on the idea that there can be no valid argument not based on moral grounds wiht positions on which your own argument is based on moral grounds.

You and I have probably taken a similar moral view on the BNP. It does not follow that everyone needs to take a moral view on the BNP not to want them to be in power. Very simply, for example, somebody may believe that, although they feel racism to be vile, it is an individual's free choice to harbour racist views or even to have the freedom to express them if they so desire, but also feel that the transmission of these views into actions and into government would both lead to a neglect of important issues as they attempt instead to apply inoperable policies and also ramp up racial tensions in an undesirable way. That's a pragmatic opposition that does not depend on a moral opposition to the BNP, but provides space for a moral and pragmnatic opposition both to racism and to racist policies. Bear in mind that Flyboy postulated an other who did not disapprove morally of other people voting for the BNP, but did disapprove of other people voting for the BNP on pragmatic grounds based on the undesirability of any attempt to apply their policies.

I would certainly find it difficult to work against the BNP with somebody who did not believe that their policies were morally wrong as well as impracticable, or indeed somebody who sincerely did not believe that the BNP's policies were racist - an option so far unexplored. Personally, I have moral issues with the BNP being on the ballot paper, much less with anyone voting for them. However, I would, I imagine, judge the need for cooperation in the balance against the potential consequences of not doing so.
 
 
We're The Great Old Ones Now
05:31 / 31.10.04
Flyboy postulated an other who did not disapprove morally of other people voting for the BNP, but did disapprove of other people voting for the BNP on pragmatic grounds based on the undesirability of any attempt to apply their policies.

Round and round it goes.

It seems to me that this argument is coming down, repeatedly, to a dispute about Consequentialism. I've never found the Consequentialist positions by themselves to be sufficient to describe the moral universe. Obviously, if you do, then Flyboy's position is unimpeachable because his practical objection to assassination is all there can be. The problem with Consequentialism is that it doesn't dodge the question of moral absolutes, it just moves the moment of assessment - instead of having to say whether a thing is bad for itself, you have to be able to say whether the effects are bad, and compare them with other possibles, which gets you into a world of hurt where George W. can tell you it's better to assassinate now than suffer terror attacks later.

If you don't look at the world in a purely Consequentialist way, then you want something a little more powerful than practical objections to things you assert are bads.

I wonder whether we should be asking which side of this argument the Guardian's on?
 
 
Lurid Archive
11:27 / 31.10.04
..."racist sympathies" is not the issue here - it is specifically whether one by necessity approves of policies if one believes they are impracticable but does not take a moral position on other people voting for parties that espouse them. Sympathies doesn't come into it, but see below.)

To a large extent we are in agrement then (and talking past each other). I don't believe that anyone on this thread actively engages in, promotes or agrees with acts of assassination in the real world. To me, that isn't the question, though I realise that Flyboy and others feel attacked on those grounds. Rather, I think that the appropriate analogue of "racist sympathies" is exactly the point. And all the examples given support that kind of inference about the values of the speaker, I think.
 
 
ONLY NICE THINGS
12:35 / 31.10.04
Lurid - I'm afraid I don't understand:

Rather, I think that the appropriate analogue of "racist sympathies" is exactly the point. And all the examples given support that kind of inference about the values of the speaker, I think.

It's not an analogue, as far as I can tell. It's a creation. You are creatingfor the hypothetical other and Second Spin invented for Flyboy) a set of motivations which do not exist in the original precept, because it is a lot easier to make a moral judgement appear convincing if the hypothetical other being judged can be identified as, say, immoral rather than amoral. One example has been given involving racism in any way, shape or form. All the other examples have been ignored, presumably as in some way "non-moral".
 
  

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