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Me Tarzan, You Jane: When Identities Attack

 
 
Cat Chant
09:22 / 20.02.04
I've been meaning to start this topic for ages, but was finally sparked by this thread and in particular Ex's comment:

womanhood comes from without, that gender is full of learnt roles, and that there is no fixed connection between the body and gender. Amazingly, in this scenario, transwomen still get it in the fucking neck, because they've taken the connection between bodily sex and cultural gender too seriously.

Because this is close to a sort of melancholy that transgenderism/transsexuality provokes in me, and I want to explain why there's a dimension to this transphobia that I think is worth discussing, in general. Briefly, other people's identities, the kinds of claims they make, affect the way we think of our own identities. I don't think this is an avoidable thing, but I do think it should form part of the way we think about antagonism and identity politics. This is partly because of being at a seminar with Stuart Hall a couple of years ago, which was probably the beginning of one of my more recent 'paradigm shifts': he was talking about how the problems with liberal-utopian ideals of multiculturalism is that their assumption of peaceful coexistence leaves them with no way of dealing with antagonism. So then antagonisms have no way of being expressed except through non-liberal frameworks - for example, racism and/or racist violence.

Okay. So what I'm trying to think through here is the ways in which a model of 'tolerance' doesn't allow for the fact that cultural shifts or exposure to other (sub)cultures leave a trace in the dominant culture, which can provoke quite violent and painful feelings of violation of an important element of one's individual identity.

In another thread, I used the example of lesbian marriage and parenting: if a heterosexual couple (consciously or not) experience their relationship to marriage and parenting as specifically a privilege of heterosexuality, then the existence of lesbian parenting will force the het couple to re-evaluate the basis of their own ability or right to parent. Now obviously the worst (yet common) response to this feeling of violation is the panicked defense of one's own psychic/imaginary relationship to parenting as a specifically heterosexual phenomenon by refusing the right to parent to non-heterosexuals. But most models of 'tolerance' don't have any more productive way of dealing with the ways in which tolerating a new form of something shifts, sometimes in ways which are scary or painful to the individual, the old form.

To put it autobiographically and bring it back to the trans stuff from which I started: I sometimes find myself resenting or feeling melancholy about women becoming transmen on the grounds that "there are enough men in the world already and not enough butch women". That is, I feel that by changing their sex, transmen are depriving me of the grounds on which I experienced myself as a butch woman: that they are taking away from me the right or the ability to perform masculinity on a female body, by associating the performance of masculinity with the male-ing of the body.

Does that make sense? I mean, I know it's complete bollocks - particularly as (a) I'm an extremely femmey-looking butch and actually I want to detach butchness from masculinity and (b) I have no compunction about taking cross-dressing butch women and cross-dressing femme men as models of masculinity, so why not transmen - but does it make sense?

Politically, of course, I don't think the impact on my imaginary relation to masculinity should be taken into account in discussions of trans legal rights etc. But I think there's a psychic/imaginary dimension here - and I'm drawing also on the work of Drucilla Cornell, a Lacanian/deconstructionist legal theorist, if you can imagine such a thing, and a huge genius who you should all read, if you haven't already - that needs to be taken into account somehow - and taken into account on a public or political level. I mean that I don't want to be theraped (vilified for my transphobia or congratulated on my attempts to overcome it - that's not the point): I mean that I think we need to come up with models for co-existence and "tolerance" that take into account this imaginary dimension and that can deal with the antagonisms it entails, rather than just declaring them irrelevant to the political dimension and up to the individual to solve on her own time. I mean, I can see that what I need to do is to recast my imaginary relationship to female masculinity (to coin a phrase) in a way which can be allied to FTM transsexuality/transgenderism, but how does that work in general - eg for the het parents I invented above - and how can we model and/or encourage a form of identity politics that would have this recasting as an integral part of it? That could deal with antagonism and provide models for overcoming it or resolving it that don't fall back on a simple self-other kill-or-be-killed friend-or-enemy hostility? Or maybe the psychic stuff could actually be the engine, the drive for creating new alliances and new, provisional, forms of identity? That is, by putting all this into words here, I'm starting to see more clearly how my own 'trans melancholy'/transphobia is based on a sense that butch women are "on my side" and men are not, and how that reifies exactly the sorts of divisions that are the real threat to my ability to experience myself as a butch woman. How does that translate?

Sigh. Maybe I'm not saying anything new here, and I'm certainly rambling a lot, but it's something I'm trying to work out. Help me please.
 
 
Ex
12:16 / 23.02.04
I’m not sure if I’m following the point or wandering offtopic into the fields, but I thought I’d try.

But most models of 'tolerance' don't have any more productive way of dealing with the ways in which tolerating a new form of something shifts, sometimes in ways which are scary or painful to the individual, the old form.

Entirely. Flawed starting example: it’s fairly futile for me to suggest that fundementalist Christianity leave me alone if I leave it alone - proselytizing is at the heart of its belief. To change tack even to ‘tolerance’ would play merry hell with the faith.
I know that’s a faith/belief rather than an identity. But I feel very similar about many identities - that they are rigidly defended, that they frequently automatically co-opt one into a world view (and that the co-opting of others is an intrinsic part of many identities).

Briefly, other people's identities, the kinds of claims they make, affect the way we think of our own identities. I don't think this is an avoidable thing, but I do think it should form part of the way we think about antagonism and identity politics.

I’m interested in how many identities are about reaching out and incorporating other people into your model, whether explicitly or not. I wonder a lot whether claiming identity automatically includes other people (with whom one identifies, claims similarity, or uses to identify against).
If the 'tolerance' model doesn't work, I also feel there are flaws in other models for co-existence. For example, in fluffy pomo circles (see below), I think people are going for self-identification, not imposing your meanings on other people, using labels but not expecting everyone who uses them to share an understanding of what they mean. This isn’t ‘tolerance’; it’s much more about admitting that your own view is partial (as in ‘a frgament’ and also as in ‘interested’, biased’). And you end up with a (possibly productive and hopeful) blur in which everyone identifies as something but admits that definitions of that something is multiple and changing, instead of constant and concrete.
That’s a difficult fucker. And I’m not sure it works in the way it’s often assumed to. Concluding anecdote: I was at a workshop last Summer in which the organiser said they always respected other people’s self-definition of gender, but reserved the right to think that gender as a whole was fictive. I wanted to know how they negotiated this, because some people’s identities depend on other people being involved. For example, my mother’s idea of “woman” probably includes me. If I start absenting myself from that definition, I trample all over her definition while claiming to respect her/it. In fact, I’ve imposed my understandings of gender - localised, cultural, individual and fictive - over hers - universal, a-historical, biological - before we even start the debate.
So using self-definition and a deconstructed idea of identity is not a magic short-cut through those discussions.

Or maybe the psychic stuff could actually be the engine, the drive for creating new alliances and new, provisional, forms of identity?

This could be good, but I’m wary (I'm thinking about the mainly 'good' things that identity politics provides on the pyshcic side - a sens eof belonging, community, same-sidedness). I feel that these kind of psychic rewards (that a totalising scheme of identity provides) are immediate and powerful for many people, and then lead to a whole bunch of exclusion, paranoia, and false expectations. So while I adore the idea of generating that kind of enthusiasm and sense of belonging and so forth around the idea of strategic and provisional alliances and identities, I don’t know if it’ll catch on, or if it can avoid getting bogged down. I personally feel perky and cheerleaderish about it, but can one take “I am woman, hear me roar” and effectively replace it with “I am forming an allegiance with other strategically chosen individual identities, hear us deconstruct”? And expect it to still pack a punch?

Ultimately I fear that possibly destabilised identity will only have instinctive appeal for people who’ve been effectively marginalised by identity already, and thus deconstructed-identity will become, functionally, an identity itself.

Sorry about the length of the post - overall, I’m optimistic but wary.
 
 
Bomb The Past
13:50 / 23.02.04
Entirely. Flawed starting example: it’s fairly futile for me to suggest that fundementalist Christianity leave me alone if I leave it alone - proselytizing is at the heart of its belief. To change tack even to ‘tolerance’ would play merry hell with the faith.

This example points to a problem of self-reference for liberal thought. If we analyse a liberal system we will find that it is necessarily intolerant of intolerance itself. Intolerant views cannot be absorbed into the system and so they find expression in non-liberal ways, as Deva notes. It's all very well for liberalism to construct a public/private divide, but when someone's private conception of 'the good' necessitates interference into the structure of the public realm then liberalism can't really maintain a semblance of neutrality. I think this is where liberal thought-experiments like the one underpinning Rawls' theory of justice fall down. Rawls asks us to imagine a "veil of ignorance", behind which he asks us to decide the values we should privilege as a society if we didn't know what our personal situation would be in such a society. We are asked to leave behind our own values and choose as simply rational agents, which strikes me as an impossible task. If you think being gay is immoral then you're not going to change your mind or advocate tolerance simply because someone asks you to imagine the possibility that you could have been gay. And so, the expression of an identity inimical to gay people, say Catholicism, is curtailed by the existence of a gay identity. More crudely, what do we do when being bigoted is central to a person's sense of self? I'm a little uneasy (but not a lot) with liberalism's answer of always deligitimising the bigoted identity by siding against it.

I hope that makes at least a little sense. Something a bit more constructive later perhaps.
 
 
Tryphena Absent
14:19 / 23.02.04
I think we need to come up with models for co-existence and "tolerance" that take into account this imaginary dimension and that can deal with the antagonisms it entails, rather than just declaring them irrelevant to the political dimension and up to the individual to solve on her own time

Currently I think it's particularly culturally difficult to do that because I don't think postmodernity lends itself towards that and it seems to be the dominant thing. Not so much a fault of it's original conception as of its current writers approaching things in a way that often appears to wash over problems. I emphasise 'appears' because I'm not certain that they do this but on the surface they do rather lend themselves to that interpretation. At the same time I completely agree with you, actually I feel like I should be brandishing pom poms and doing a pretty dance of girlish masculinity around the room but that's utterly beside the point and anyway I'm so feminine I beat Snow White in to a... I think we lack the theory that handles antagonism, not just in this area but a hundred and one other places that could do with it- I think we lack the theoretical language that can crush the antagonistic values of the right wing press and particularly papers like the Express and The Sun through the use of liberalism rather than around it. That language is not something that we should desire but something that we need because too many problems arise from this lack of expression. I don't know that it would work though, I think perhaps too many liberals stand in the way.

That seemed a bit jumbled, sorry about that.
 
 
grant
21:01 / 23.02.04
Briefly, other people's identities, the kinds of claims they make, affect the way we think of our own identities.
…ways in which a model of 'tolerance' doesn't allow for the fact that cultural shifts or exposure to other (sub)cultures leave a trace in the dominant culture, which can provoke quite violent and painful feelings of violation of an important element of one's individual identity.


Is this different in some way I’m not seeing from, like, "framing the debate," or the limitations that the act of definition always imposes?

Like, a lot of the discussion over gay marriage in the US revolves around defining what marriage is and what it isn't, inventing new terms ("civil union"), amending state constitutions to define the word "marriage," that kind of thing. Before, there was just a hazy idea of marriage as this thing out there related to families and love and home life; now, people actually have to think about what it means -- to make a box labeled "marriage" which has some relationships in it, and some relationships outside it.

I think that's kind of how our brains work -- you seem to be describing the same process with "man" and "woman" categories up there in your own head. Transmen are in the "man" box, right?

I don't know how to get out of that way of thinking except by swapping imaginary boxes when possible.
 
 
Lurid Archive
08:35 / 24.02.04
I think it is worth addressing what flowers calls the "problem of self-reference for liberal thought". "Tolerance", as I understand and use it, is not some inflexible and immutable principle that needs to be stretched to breaking point. It is not the absence of values. Rather, it is that set of values that welcomes diversity within limits. Those limits are imagined to be as distant as possible while preserving certain non-negotiable rights. All this is subject to change, of course, and is informed by history. So freedom of religion is tolerated to a large extent, while sexism and racism are not. What do you do about the homophobic Catholic? Well, glossing over the fact that not all Catholics are homophobic, one attempts to limit the expression of that homophobia. There are obviously tensions between different rights and abuses of them, say free speech and hate speech, but these are necessarily complex disputes which I'm not proposing to instantly solve.

Broadly, however, I think the guiding principle should be universality of rights. Now, before we go further, I should say that I don't mean that everyone is the same or that plurality and diversity should be ignored. No. What I do say is that the competing claims of different groups need to be assessed on some common ground. Seeing one's rights as being, at heart, oppositional to those of others strikes me as a weak foundation for those rights. I realise that that probably isn't popular and that treating people differently in order to treat them fairly is more usually emphasised. To an extent I think that is correct but is better framed as a broadening of universal rights - freedom of religion rather than freedom to worship God, for instance. Mostly, I think that the language of difference is more naturally the language of the Right.

But that still leaves us with what to do with the tensions that seem to arise. To an extent, I'm not sure what you can do. I would argue the rhetoric of universality till blue in the face. That is flawed in some ways, as different people will imagine these things differently and form exclusionary groups, but I think that documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are a good place to start. There aren't any easy answers, but there is some evidence that the argument can be partly won - in the existence of welfare states, for instance.

I think that David Goodhart's essay on the tension between immigration, multicuturalism and solidarity seems pertinent to the discussion.

Thinking about the conflict between solidarity and diversity is another way of asking a question as old as human society itself: who is my brother, with whom do I share mutual obligations?

Trevor Phillips has condemned this pretty strongly, but I think that Deva's point, that these tensions are brushed under the carpet by well meaning liberals is a fair one.
 
  
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