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Genetics/Ontology

  
 
Cat Chant
17:19 / 15.09.03
A few quotes from the "We don't 'need' love" thread:

it would be disingenuous to assert that "we" are only our physical characteristics. It may well be that consciousness and a capacity for abstract thought evolved as a survival trait, a particularly effective weapon in the DNA's arsenal

It is hard to imagine anyone who is [against this notion of humans as almost symbiotic clusters of ideational and physical genes].

the mind is a complex of conflicting and complementary memetic patterns seeking to reproduce.

I'm interested in the ways in which genetics functions discursively. I don't know much about the topic and am hoping to be informed and challenged by responses to this thread from people who know more about it than me, as well as people who 'know' nothing about it at all (since I think part of the way genetics functions discursively is in the ways it is appealed to in non-scientific or pop-scientific contexts).

Reading the "We don't need love" thread, it seemed to me that the term 'genes' (or the genetic model, as in 'memes') was being used to signify 'natural', 'physical', 'pre-cultural' or 'prediscursive' paths of information transmission - and also, in a way, as the 'baseline' of argument (that is, that genes have a verifiable existence and function, so that once something can be understood according to a genetic model, its existence is no longer in doubt).

What about the explanatory power of evolutionary arguments? Again, appeal to the evolutionary usefulness of a trait seems to me to be being used as a base-line, or 'state of nature'. I'm not saying that anyone posting to that thread (or any other) is a genetic determinist, or thinks that evolved behaviours or traits are not susceptible to interpretation, change, or cultural inflection - but it seems to be the case that, if a trait or behaviour can be modelled evolutionarily (is that a word?) then its existence is no longer in doubt, though its consequences, its definition, etc, might be.

(Hmmm. I wonder whether this is part of the reason that the belief that there are two and only two human sexes persists? I can't think of a chromosomal, reproductive or anatomical definition that definitively assigns intersex people to one sex or another, so maybe - cultural investment in the idea aside - one of the reasons we think there are only two sexes is because evolution relies on procreative heterosex?)

Anyway. If we accept this assumption that genetic/evolutionary argument serves an ontological purpose, what does that say about our ideas about existence? If our culture's understanding of natural, physical, existence, is filtered through a genetic model, then how is that model understood, metaphorized, and put to use? Is this, for example, part of a virtualization of the 'real world', such that information transmission (rather than, for example, tactile/physical sensation) is now the primary model of understanding reality?

I haven't put any of this very well, but I hope some of you can help me out with thinking about this.
 
 
The Knights Templar Boogie Machine
22:10 / 15.09.03
A goodie from the Wilson/Leary model of consciousness:

'Ontology recaptitulates phylogeny'
 
 
Cat Chant
06:30 / 16.09.03
Ontogeny, surely?
 
 
Lurid Archive
09:09 / 16.09.03
Interesting point, Deva. I think this is part of a broader issue in which terminology and jargon are used to support otherwise weak arguments. "Quantum" tends to be the most abused word in that regard and is used to justify whatever the speaker wishes because its all soooo *wierd*.

So, to that extent I think you are right. But I think that you may be overstating your case a little. For instance you say,

if a trait or behaviour can be modelled evolutionarily (is that a word?) then its existence is no longer in doubt, though its consequences, its definition, etc, might be.

which is partly right IMO. If one uses a well known mechanism as an analogy to understand something new, then the model by which one is intending to understand the new thing is clearer. Being more sharply defined, one might say that the new trait or behaviour is no longer in doubt, but surely the trait or behaviour can often be observed in separation from the explanation for it? Whatever explanation you favour is surely independent of the fact that Bonobos are matriarchal, say. (Of course, deciding to notice that is another issue..)

Hence, I really don't believe the idea that the two sex dichotomy is due to evolution. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I doubt that the dichotomoy was either absent or less sharp before evolution. I suspect it is rather the reverse.

But clearly genetics has had an impact. Memes and evolutionary psychology are very interesting areas. But they are very interesting areas with little to no support besides the metaphorical appeal to evolution. This is bound to be my slant, because I am fairly resolute in thinking that the content of an argument is most important part of it.
 
 
Cat Chant
10:58 / 16.09.03
surely the trait or behaviour can often be observed in separation from the explanation for it? Whatever explanation you favour is surely independent of the fact that Bonobos are matriarchal, say. (Of course, deciding to notice that is another issue..)

Mm. Yes, that's part of the question I'm asking: to what extent can a trait or behaviour be observed in separation from the explanation for it? Certainly the existence of a trait or behaviour can't be communicated outside the terms used to define it.

So on that level, I don't think there can be a secure distinction between content and form (or 'model') of an argument. For instance, I don't think that the statement "bonobos are matriarchal" can help but be inflected in its reception/transmission - and therefore in its meaning - by the ways in which the term "matriarchal" signifies in other contexts. That is, it is impossible to pick and choose which connotations/meanings of a word you want to be operative: if 'matriarchal' comes with a set of cultural baggage, you have to either choose another word, or accept that the baggage in the word 'matriarchal' becomes part of the statement 'bonobos are matriarchal'. Here, for example, 'matriarchal' might suggest certain features of social organization (such as inheritance) which are, in fact, absent from bonobo societies. Any statement, by being couched in language (which is not the possession of the user of language and hence cannot have meanings coextensive with the intention of the language user) is radically open to this, and it goes further than 'misunderstanding'.

So to bring all this back to genetics and ontology. Thanks for pointing out the nonsense in my argument about the two-sex dichotomy. I think it's clarified something for me, which is that although the argued reason for the existence of two sexes (or other behaviour, trait or 'fact') may not be derived from evolution, it seems to be at the evolutionary or genetic level that the argument often stops. Which means, perhaps, that an understanding of the way genetics, gene transmission, and/or evolution work is necessary to continue the argument, that being the central model/ metaphor/ vocabulary/ framework within which the issue is being thought... maybe this could be related to game theory? 'Genetics' as a language game within which ontological arguments are had? All this is just continuing and trying to extend your idea that weak arguments are shored up by appeal to genetic models (and/or other accepted theories/models), without deciding in advance which theories are "entitled" to use of a genetic/evolutionary analogy and which aren't... Hmmm.
 
 
Lurid Archive
11:56 / 16.09.03
Yes, that's part of the question I'm asking: to what extent can a trait or behaviour be observed in separation from the explanation for it?

This is a question where we know we disagree, isn't it? We can agree that the absolute separation of language and phenomenon is impossible, but we disagree as to the consequences of that. I think it is a surmountable obstacle. The matriarchal bonobos are a good example since the meaning of "matriarchal" is clearly inflected with history, cultural attitudes and value judgements. Sure. But it also communicates something fairly basic that requires a certain *elementary* observation to confirm. (Disconfirming it is probably tickier.)

Comprehension, at least as I do it, partly involves the separation of the imagery invoked by the language and the content of what is being said. While the boundaries are unclear, this is a useful exercise nonetheless. Information is imparted on many levels, but I reckon that there is often a fuzzily defined broad point being communicated that is largely unaffected by the subtleties of language. Like I said, I'm sure we disagree.

The upshot of this for me is that I am distinctly unimpressed by the use of jargon or established theories, unless there is solid support for that use. Analogies can be interesting, of course, but as you point out, one can end up validating a point of view too readily that way. (Evolutionary psychology is an offender in this regard.) So you don't decide in advance which theories are entitled to use evolutinary models, you evaluate. For the vast majority of arguments, this is actually quite easy.
 
 
grant
17:17 / 17.09.03
I'm not sure this is so, but if it is, I'd be unsurprised... I'm getting a weird semi-memory about Lyotard talking about communication in terms of biology & genes in that book called (uhhh) Communication, Conversation and Community, or whatever it was.

Genetics itself is occasionally metaphorized as a conversation -- DNA recombination involves two sets of information (codes) that are mingled to make a new set of information which is a mediation between both of the original codes. DNA recombination is Hegelian.

Actually, I think there was a really close relationship between Hegel and some philosophy-of-science contemporaries, the kind who steered the direction of research & inquiry.

----

You ask: Ontogeny, surely?

I think (although am not sure) that that's the joke.

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