Ah Groman—I like the cut of your jib!
“…’there is no difference nor division between the internal and external “world(s).”’ I am assuming that this is a central assumption. If not, I apologize.”
Yes, indeed a central assumption in the tale I am spinning: no apologies warranted nor necessary.
“(1) First, this seems to entail that only one mind exist.
Why? If there is no difference between the internal and external, then there exists only one thing. Since it is the inner world, it is mind. So, there is only one mind.”
Yes, it is a one object universe. However, we cannot say that this object is “mind” (what is ‘mind’—what does it pick out?), but neither can we say that it is “matter.” And while the reference of the word ‘mind’ is obviously mysterious & vague, we tend to delude ourselves into thinking that ‘matter’ has a clear reference: but what is matter? Is it atoms—no, not quite. Is it smaller bits or larger bits? But we know bits aren’t really bits, and even a wave isn’t merely a wave—the mysterious “quanta.” What is matter?
So here again we find another example of contradiction interwoven into the nature of our phenomenological experience. We, on the one hand, appear to have a dichotomy that runs “mind” vs. “matter.” Something “of the mind” is not “matter” and vice-versa (we see this division in so-called “concrete” vs. “abstract” objects). Yet, on the other hand, we have the idea (or tool) presented here (and in other places both by myself, and others—present, past, and future or, in a one object universe, this has merely been uttered by, say, “Self” for all time—which, if one object also means a single “unit” of time; i.e., no time at all) that these dualities are not pairs but singularities which—due to our nature (which , in turn, creates the world that we inhabit) must divide into seeming contraries. Of course, this “meta” physiologic creates itself a binary opposition: 2 = 1, which is merely another form of our P & ~P. Which came first—the head of the serpent or the tail?
“(2) Second, this seems to entail something like omniscience.
Why?: If there is no difference between the internal and external worlds then there are no things that my mind does not contain. So, I necessary have a necesarily complete and unextendable set of beliefs. (I would like to call this knowledge, but can't because of point 3.) So, it's not that I don't have a belief about the location of my keys. if I can't find them. My keys fail to have a location until I find them because how could they have a location that is not part of my mind, when the outer world is the same as the inner world.”
Yes, omniscience, but for whom?
I am finding your key example a little hard to follow; that is, I can’t quite make out the intended impact. That said, it strikes me as a v. interesting way of thinking about this. If I get you here, then you are saying that lost keys are lost because they no longer exist since they cannot exist in a place that is not part of the “knowledge” of your mind (which, we are saying, would be total?). That is kind of neat. However, we are clearly living in a fog; that is, we don’t appear to have reliable access to this omniscient well. This, I believe, hinges on at least this current and readily apparent understanding of our “bodies” coupled with the typical understanding of what it is to be a “thinking,” living, but most importantly experiencing human individual. So, since we can hold contrary beliefs, let’s suppose that it could also equally be that the “omniscient” aspect of our being has a True belief about the actual location of our keys in this possible world and we, say, “the little self,” hold a False—but stronger in our individual (i.e., discrete and dissected fragment of the whole) experience—belief about the location of these lost keys.
“You can invoke God a la Berkely…”
Or you could pop on over to The Magick forum and see who is invoking whom this week…
“…or have a single world-mind that does not have unified consciousness.
Not necessarily. I go a little Jungian here in my “grand unified system” (the system that is under construction after system building has become passé and demonstrably impossible, the system which explains all systems well it consciously deconstructs itself at every turn—thus, also unexplaining all systems, the system that will leave people reeling & diZzy). This is to say that I feel there is something like Jung’s “collective unconscious” which extends far beyond the scope that Jung allows (I think) and embraces the stars that gave birth to the stars that shine today.
"Do you have something to that effect to handle 1 and 2?"
You tell me! 
"(3) This collapses representation and represented. So, we lose concepts like meaning, truth / falsity, and interpretation. In fact, I think we even loose the concept of concept!"
Perhaps: the system that shits out what it eats and eats its own shit—if you’ll recover my intending meaning from the vulgar but alchemic formulation. I call it “parapostmodernism.”
“ All of these notions depend on a view where there are symbolic / representational things that represent something outside of the representational system.”
Nah, not for/to me. There are only representational systems insofar as there are systems to be represented and vice-versa. Think of it similar to how Relativity frames space-time: if there are no objects, then there is no space-time & if there is no space-time, then there are no objects—here we have “representational system iff system.” Or put differently, if the medium is the message, then that which is represented is that which is & that which is is that which is represented. However, here we rely on an extended notion of mind in the sense that any singular thing must be related to (represented by) another thing: no singularities (atomics), but only unified pairs, ya’ see. Universe as a wave front of information exchange. Picture: little Turing machines which read not tape but one and other, and none of which exist if there are no other machines to read.
“It seems to me that the collection of frogs and my thoughts about frogs have to be two different things in order to talk about thoughts being about frogs. If we say that there is no distinction, then how are my "experiences" (for lack of a better word) involving frogs about frogs or how could I be mistaken about frogs, since there is no distinct entity for me to misrepresent?”
I need to be a little quick and dirty here (like I’m not most of the time—sigh), so I’ll say: the distinction is a function of our limited (key word) perceptions (which we know are v. limited): we divide the word based on perception and interpretation, and so, the world arises showing this particular basis of partnerings (relatings) to us. It’s like a “boot-strap” thing. The Buddhists call it pratityasamutpada. |
