“‘Wibble floogle nifty Shazbad perkwangies, persnickety snack’ That's what happens when you abandon common meaning.”
You appear as being slightly extremist here: ignoring any degree of reason, occurrence, and complexity—this seems merely absurd in no illuminating way. Clearly we are not “abandoning common meaning,” but skillfully exploring the connotations and edges of particular meanings. In metaphor, we are using a laser scalpel to perform a little bit of linguistic brain surgery—we are not using an 11” circular saw!
“Check out Wittgenstein's private language argument- he says there's no such thing, as a language is necessarily consensual. A language of one is meaningless noise, thoughts out loud nobody else can understand.”
Hmm, ever think that maybe W is mistaken about this? The “Private Language Argument” is far from a settled deal. W’s argument, IIRC, relies on the fact that using language is an instance of rule governed behaviour; thus, if only one person is aware of the rules, there is no way to verify that a rule has been followed successfully. It’s not about understanding, but about application of a rule that corresponds to “correct usage” of a word within a Language Game.
I think W is a little off here, although it is consistent within his understanding, analysis, and explanations of Language Games. Since you are a “magician” you might appreciate the error of W’s view wrt Private Language—see, I think it is, Austin Spare’s work on the “Alphabet of Desire” (on my interpretation this is partly about the need for the magician to formulate a language that represents hir being—necessarily premised on something v. akin to a “Private Language”).
“You are still assuming your conclusion that objects are bundles of relations, and they aren't, that's what I'm trying to explain.”
I think here you might want to take a little more care in order to distinguish between arguing for a view & applying the view.
“I already had the picture, the idea of the universe being a unit is not new (in fact is implied by the prefix Uni-)…You are saying it is one object, but lots of relations. Why not say it is one thing, including objects and relations?”
If it is a one object universe, then there can clearly be no other objects. Otherwise you are wanting to hold the contradiction, “It is a one object universes, except—of course—for all those other objects that make it one object.” Where’s the sense here?
“Or if you insist on seeing it as relations, why not think of it as one vastly complex relationship?”
Umm…that’s sorta’ what I’m doing.
“1) If we have a singularity that bears no relation to itself, according to the results of the thought experiment, then we have no singularity at all. 0 = 1.
Here I am disagreeing with your premise again. My results of the thought experiment (if it's the one above) were that you could have a singularity, and that self-relation for an atomic is effectively identity (need I say it, NOT A RELATION) and that 0=1 is a contradiction that shows the proof leading to it is wrong.”
Yes, yes, disagree…can you link to the post where you argue for your results of the thought experiment? In reading over the thread I can’t seem to specifically locate it.
Please take a moment to refresh yourself with “Thought Experiment [1].”
Now please note that the 0 = 1 within the context of the thought experiment is being used to show that the possibility under consideration is not possible: any part of that argument where the contradiction is the conclusion is meant to show that the initial assumption is wrong. Look:
In 1c) the conclusion of holding the view “there is only identity” is 1 = 0. Thus, there cannot be a single thing that relates only to itself as itself because with only identity (relation or not) there is nothing to identify with. Therefore, holding the view that we “…could have a singularity, and that self-relation for an atomic is effectively identity” is wrong because it leads to contradiction. Here I agree with your “self-relation for an atomic is effectively identity”; however, that there can be only self-relation—and nothing else—is what is mistaken.
In 2) we hold the assumption “there is only one thing with nothing to relate to.” Again, this leads to 0 = 1: a contradiction; thus, the assumption is wrong. Therefore, we cannot hold the view that there can be an atomic that relates to nothing (not even itself).
So, you agree that 0 = 1 is a contradiction, and thus, the view that lead to the contradiction is wrong; however, you seem to fail to recognize from the thought experiment that the assumptions that a contradictory are the ones you appear to be holding on to.
“each singularity reflects and contains the whole of the structure: every singularity is the whole structure—a one object universe
A holographic universe (see Michael Talbot's 'Holographic Universe')”
Yeah sure: holographic, mana, fractal, strings, quanta, energy, or etc.—whatever name we want to give it today. I read that book several years ago, btw. I recall it being a good, thought provoking read. However, forth all its worth in its exploration and synthesis of modern conceptions and understandings of the universe (what we are also doing here, I would hope), the name “holographic” merely represents the analogy or metaphor of (what?—it was published a little over a decade ago, right?) that contemporary “buzz word.”
“In this instance we are using the term in a philosophical sense to stand for A=A etc. That is not a relationship, consider the linguistic equivalent "a dog is a dog" or "red is red" or "a relation is a relation". These are a priori, tautological statements that add no new meaning to the words used, and in fact say nothing. A tautology is Necessarily true, in that to deny it would be a contradiction (e.g. "a dog is NOT a dog") and therefore false.”
Well, I think you mentioned before that it might be good to start a different thread if we want to talk about identity in depth. Perhaps, if you want, you could start a thread? However, in brief:
By “linguistic equivalent” do you mean:
A ‘dog’ is a dog. or
A dog is a dog.
?
Because the first is a true statement qua English, but not true qua, say, French. And the second is simply false at worst and meaningless at best. False because it is nowhere necessarily true that “a dog is dog.” It is true that the animal referred to in English by the word ‘dog’ is what we tend to mean when we say “chien.” It is meaningless because it doesn’t say anything of value, but this doesn’t mean much towards identity as a relation.
Again, a ‘tautology’ is the word we use to refer to the relation of identity: Rxx. This can be written, as you note, as A = A. Consider:
5 = 5.
You say there is no new meaning to the words, but that is not the point. The point is to say that “this structure A is identical to this structure A.” The structure represented by five oranges or five dominoes or ///// is identical to 5. There can be novel information in 5 = 5. Also, ‘5 = 5’ guarantees that when we refer to 5 we mean ‘five’. Now consider:
2 + 3 = 5.
And this is Kant’s point: there is no instance of 5 in ‘2’, ‘3’, or ‘+’. Clearly, something is made manifest by the relation of identity that was not apparent before.
Now Kant’s whole program wrt “synthetic analytical” truth has basically been dismantled. However, I do believe that the notion of knowledge or information “a priori” is on it’s last legs. I mean, a priori to what? Experience?—not likely as there is nothing without experience. The a posteriori and a priori distinction is an old and moth eaten hat, Q.
Moreover, what do you mean by “Necessarily true”? True in this world? True in all possible worlds? How do you premise your distinction between “possibly true” and “necessarily true”?
“I fail to see how a “sensory experience” isn’t relational: one “thing” senses (interacts with) another thing—they are related. Without relations how is there sensory experience?
You're making a type and token identity error, using token identity to identify type. They may be related, that doesn't mean sensory experience is a relation. My shirt is red, that doesn't mean everything red is my shirt.”
A has a “sensory experience” of B.
This is what I mean when I say “sensory experience” is relational: the “sensory experience” relates A—the thing (or bundle of relations) doing the sensing—to B—the thing (or bundle of relations) sensed. I’m not sure what you are talking about…
“we call the person running our country by the name “Prime Minister,” but that unique title doesn’t negate this person from existing as a human.
Tony Blair is a human, I am a human, Tony Blair is Prime Minister, therefore I am Prime Minister. See the mistake?”
Umm, that’s not even close to what I had meant. You appeared to be saying (and still seem to be saying) that the title of “tautology” somehow detracts from identity being a relation . I was responding to this by saying that simply because so and so is referred to by a unique title doesn’t negate hir from being what s/he is: a human! See the mistake?
“It is like the strands intertwine and relate in ways to manifest a node.
That's not identity. The nodes might be bundles of relations, that doesn't make them relations.”
What are you beyond or outside of the relations between your “internal” structures & the relations of these structures to the “external” world? How are you more than a composite of relations relating to other composites?
I am made of cells, I'm not a cell. Same error again.
First, this is not my error because it is not in any reasonable way what I’ve said or meant. Second, you are made up of much more than merely cells. On my view, it is the some total of relations between bundles of relations which make up the composite Q, and in turn, Q is a “relation” insofar as he is only a “bundles of relations” ready to go for (enter into) relations (partnerships) with other bundles of relations. Do you see what I am saying yet?
They may have an underlying identity, in that they are both manifestations of something more fundamental (sensory experience, thought, whatever) but the things themselves are different.
If they are a manifestation of “something more fundamental,” then doesn’t this appear to mean that they are the same things, but merely interpreted as different by our current “sensory experience, thought, whatever”? I mean, if we take an example from science, then we see that electricity and magnetic energy were at one time seen as two different and separate things because of current “sensory experience, thought, etc.”. Then, it was realized that these two things (or “Forces”) were really identical; thus, “electromagnetism.”
Here's a parallel- I am atoms, because the atoms "intertwine and relate in ways that manifest" me. So since atoms are me and I am atoms, I can be split to produce nuclear fission, and have an electron shell... type and token identity are different things.”
Again, simply because you exist as a bundle of relations doesn’t mean you are or have the same properties and relations as the bits that relate to manifest you are or have. Nothing I have said implies this: do you see how you do not understand what has been said?
“…strands and objects are distinct, different things, not the same, so not identical, even though one is composed of the other.”
Yes, sure, this is my point directly above in response to your misinterpretation of what we have been talking about. Strand and nodes can be distinct at least insofar as: a) they display different properties, b) they appear as different and distinct to the senses, and c) they do not necessarily share a complete overlap of relations. Again, this doesn’t detract from the thesis that “things” are only “bundles of relations” and nothing more. |
. Remember I don't believe that a thing has to relate to exist. In my reality tunnel a thing can exist alone without relation (remember also I don't accept the identity relation is an actual relation).