“If I believed in an objective world I would say the shovel is more real than mathematics, which is a human construct that only exists in our heads. A shovel is more real than the word 'shovel', thus a shovel is more real than the number '1'.”
OK, let’s proceed slowly please. I’m pretty sure that I’ve articulated my position without reference to whether or not there is an objective world; that is, your belief is not in question.
Let’s go from the assumption that there is an objective world. Here I am saying that there is a pattern of material that is a one in the same way that there is a pattern of material that is a shovel. Further, there are words that more or less relate to these patterns of material: ‘one’ or ‘1’ for the former, and ‘shovel’ for the latter. The pattern that ‘1’ relates to exists as a group of relations in the same way that the pattern which ‘shovel’ relates to is a group of relations. On this view, we have “sense-reference” as exhibiting “meaning of word” to “object as external entity.”
Now, let’s go on the assumption that there is no objective world. Here I am saying that there is a pattern in consciousness that is a one in the same way that there is a pattern of consciousness that is a shovel. Further, there are words that more or less relate to these patterns of consciousness: ‘one’ or ‘1’ for the former, and ‘shovel’ for the latter. The pattern that ‘1’ relates to exists as a group of relations in the same way in that the pattern which ‘shovel’ relates to is a group of relations. On this view, we have “sense-reference” as exhibiting “meaning of word” to “object as internal entity.”
Please notice that the position I am attempting to articulate works the same on either an idealist or realist view. So again, “a shovel is more real than the word 'shovel', thus a shovel is more real than the number '1'” isn’t a valid move to make (see third paragraph of my previous post). We can point to an instance of ‘one’ in the same way we can point to an instance of ‘shovel’ regardless of whether or not these things are objective or subjective. For example:
When I go to work in the garden, I grab my handy spade. I say to my friend, “Hand me that spade,” and she says, “What?” I point to the spade, “Hand me that.” I have pointed to an instance of ones and an instance of shovels. There they are—whether as objects in an objective world or as objects in a subjective world—each has the same “reality.” The words ‘one’ and ‘shovel’ both pick out something.
I am saying that, subjectively or objectively, “things” are patterns, groups, sets, etc. of relations. If you want to continue to disagree with this, then you have to say why “things” aren’t patterns of relations and you have to say what we are going to assume that “things” are. To reiterate one more time:
“I am saying…[pick almost any noun or pronoun], [then it] refer[s] to [or bears a more or less definite relationship to]…[some] thing [or pattern of experience]…I am saying that…‘1’ [like ‘shovel’] picks out something in the world that is no more or less [of a] fiction...” Please, if you disagree, then your disagreement can’t be based on an idealist view, or realist, because what I am saying is independent of whether or not there is an objective or subjective world—I need you to explain why it is that you disagree that a noun or pronoun doesn’t bear some relationship to a pattern in, or of, our experience. And again, please include why you feel “things” aren’t patterns of relations and provide an alternative assumption to work with.
“Language is not in the world even if there is a world. Mathematics ditto.”
But this simply isn’t so. Language (and here we’ll take mathematics as falling under Language—we both agree!) is clearly in the world as it is present in our experiences—it is as much “in the world” as trees, dogs, people, cars, lakes, etc. Regardless of whether there is only an objective world or only a subjective world, language is an element of the world; that is, language is in the world. Perhaps you could say more about what you mean?
I don’t think a “view from an ‘I’” establishes or describes subjectivism—at best it points to solipsism. But solipsism is, in a sketch, only the doctrine that an I exists and nothing else. This I can be seen as either the entire objective reality or as the entire subjective reality; however, solipsism by itself does not establish idealism or realism—there needs to be some other assumptions to tip it one way or the other. Granted, solipsism is generally taken to lean towards idealism; however, I think this requires presuppositions and it seems that we could choose to think that only we, as an I, exist, and still maintain that this I exists expressed as all objective phenomena. A peculiar form of solipsism for sure, but not an untenable one.
To put this differently, idealism and realism need one another to define what they are; thus, they are not separate but interdependent. Again, “…think of it in terms of your namesake: a quanta is experienced as a wave, a quanta is experienced as a particle—the patterns of our experience are [ideal], the patterns of our experience are [real].” I see no distinction between realism and idealism other than a matter of taste, as a matter of our method of observation (like quanta will be wave or particle depending upon our method of observation): but method is not truth—method can only establish what it presupposes.
Switching gears a little, LVX, it appears that you’ve captured the infinite side of linguistic representation. It does seem as if any, as you say, “…description can go on an on in an infinite effort to adequately capture the essence of the experience…” And yes, it does seem that as we grow older we tend to allow words to become more and more rigid and finite in our interpretations of their meanings: we become habituated to the reflection of self as finite and discrete, and so, our interpretations follow suit. In a sense, this infinite side of linguistic representation is for us: it is a function of how we experience other things in the world.
However, I also have an intuition that the things are, in themselves, infinite. This side of infinity is inherent to the thing being considered. To use your example, I have an intuition that a dog is, in itself, infinite with respect to the composite of relations that make the dog, well, a dog. However, and for whatever reasons (biological, psychological, etc.), we do not normally experience the dog—or any other thing—as it is in itself: we experience the dog as it is for us.
“Language evolved to describe the phenomenal and it is our over-reliance on it which drives us to imagine that we can use words to describe the Absolute.”
I think this is where we go to “the map is not the territory” idea. I think we can use words to describe the Absolute, if there is such a thing, but the words will never adequately represent the thing. Where I feel that some words more or less relate to things, I also think that, in relation to the Absolute, words are only less of a relation and not more. But of course, this leads to another paradox to coexist with the one that you point out regarding ‘infinity’ as “…a descriptor…defin[ed]…as beyond description”: a dog is, it seems to me, in itself infinite, and so, a dog is the Absolute, which requires that the word ‘dog’ is less of a relation to the dog and not more, and yet, we use ‘dog’ as if it relates to the dog more and not less.
Like a dog chasing its tail, we move in eZ circles. |
