quote:Originally posted by agarchy:
Do you mean here that what exists, what has presence for you (we?), can simply be chosen on the basis of its usefulness? For example, in the category of edible food, you/we would choose a bannana over a bottle of motor oil.
Somewhat. But, if I have all the experiences associated with having a bananna sitting in front of me, then I should be able to say that that bananna is, and further, that it is not a can of motor oil. Because, if I were to say that it is a can of motor oil, I complicate my model, and then have to explain why all my experience point towards it being a bananna. I could, for instance, be crazy. Or maybe it is a very special type of oil, that behaves in every way like a bannana. This type of reasoning, though, would probably make the model pretty useless. I could refer to everything I see as very special elephants, most of which don't seem to behave like elephants at all. But, if, amazingly, I realize that, if everything in the world is really an elephant, that would explain why it is that the planet-elephants) revolve around the sun-elephants the way they do, and then I could go and predict that, if I do just the right thing with a telescope-elephant, I ought to experience seeing another planet-elephant.
So then I do that, and voila, I have that experience. And I have the experience of seeing my elephant-peers look into the elephant-telescope, and behave as though they had seen what I had seen. Then, the model is useful.
But I hadn't restricted the model to being useful in a predictive sense. Because for that to be the case, I'd have to prove "future." |