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Lacan for self-important nutters

 
  

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All Acting Regiment
12:21 / 23.07.07
I'm really enjoying Looking Awry, an introduction to Lacan through popular culture, by this man. I will post more as I get through it, but for now I'd also reccomend this to anyone who wants to get a hold of Lacan.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
15:10 / 20.11.07
Zizek on reistance/'resistance':

The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament (capitalism) is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left.

Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes,

history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes.

So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’?

These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles.

The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’


He goes on to Chavez:

It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital’s ‘resistance’ to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? ‘No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place’? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn’t such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as ‘Subcomediante Marcos’? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who ‘resist’ the state.

Your thoughts?
 
 
Lurid Archive
15:46 / 20.11.07
Watching the film, Zizek!, there are a few things that struck me. Firstly, he is fiercely intelligent and articulate, he is also immensely charming and funny. But perhaps more importantly, he uses his considerable intellect, charm and wit often in a rather provocative mode. There was, to my mind, a tension between his pretty convincing attachment to popularisation - or at least his distaste with academic obfuscatory self importance - and his impish delight in irritating or shocking his audience. So, while I strongly disagree with the review here - it is pretty terrible in fact, since both the man and the film are, as I said, remarkably charming - there is something to be said for the claim that Zizek was asking for this. OK, the reviewer just didn't seem to understand what was being said, much of the time - Zizek's admiration of Stalin, Mussolini and so on, are almost accepted uncritically by the reviewer. Having said that, if provocation is your mode of engagement, you can hardly complain if people are provoked by what you say. And for those of us less easily provoked, Zizek's mode of argument can leave you unsure as to how much of what is said is actually meant, and how much is simply a prod to stimulate reflection - for instance, there are quite interesting questions about Chavez, and to what extent we should criticise or praise his style of politics and Zizek is probably more motivated by his desire to dislodge the apathy in politics, than to accurately assess Chavez.

More generally, the obvious position to take is that you can't seriously expect to be given the answers from a great man theoretician and actually come out any the wiser unless you are pretty critical of what you hear. And the fact that Zizek makes it clear that you should be critical is, I think, intended as some form of deeper honesty. He lies so you can know how to tell the truth....or something. But then, you think again, and you wonder whether you shouldn't just cut out the middle man.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
12:58 / 22.11.07
Here's another highly relevant bit of Zizek, italics mine:

A small note – not the stuff of headlines, obviously – appeared in the newspapers on 3 February. In response to a call for the prohibition of the public display of the swastika and other Nazi symbols, a group of conservative members of the European Parliament, mostly from ex-Communist countries, demanded that the same apply to Communist symbols: not only the hammer and sickle, but even the red star. This proposal should not be dismissed lightly: it suggests a deep change in Europe’s ideological identity.

Till now, to put it straightforwardly, Stalinism hasn’t been rejected in the same way as Nazism. We are fully aware of its monstrous aspects, but still find Ostalgie acceptable: you can make Goodbye Lenin!, but Goodbye Hitler! is unthinkable. Why? To take another example: in Germany, many CDs featuring old East German Revolutionary and Party songs, from ‘Stalin, Freund, Genosse’ to ‘Die Partei hat immer Recht’, are easy to find. You would have to look rather harder for a collection of Nazi songs. Even at this anecdotal level, the difference between the Nazi and Stalinist universes is clear, just as it is when we recall that in the Stalinist show trials, the accused had publicly to confess his crimes and give an account of how he came to commit them, whereas the Nazis would never have required a Jew to confess that he was involved in a Jewish plot against the German nation. The reason is clear. Stalinism conceived itself as part of the Enlightenment tradition, according to which, truth being accessible to any rational man, no matter how depraved, everyone must be regarded as responsible for his crimes. But for the Nazis the guilt of the Jews was a fact of their biological constitution: there was no need to prove they were guilty, since they were guilty by virtue of being Jews.

In the Stalinist ideological imaginary, universal reason is objectivised in the guise of the inexorable laws of historical progress, and we are all its servants, the leader included. A Nazi leader, having delivered a speech, stood and silently accepted the applause, but under Stalinism, when the obligatory applause exploded at the end of the leader’s speech, he stood up and joined in. In Ernst Lubitsch’s To Be or Not to Be, Hitler responds to the Nazi salute by raising his hand and saying: ‘Heil myself!’ This is pure humour because it could never have happened in reality, while Stalin effectively did ‘hail himself’ when he joined others in the applause. Consider the fact that, on Stalin’s birthday, prisoners would send him congratulatory telegrams from the darkest gulags: it isn’t possible to imagine a Jew in Auschwitz sending Hitler such a telegram. It is a tasteless distinction, but it supports the contention that under Stalin, the ruling ideology presupposed a space in which the leader and his subjects could meet as servants of Historical Reason. Under Stalin, all people were, theoretically, equal.

(...)

It is here that one has to make a choice. The ‘pure’ liberal attitude towards Leftist and Rightist ‘totalitarianism’ – that they are both bad, based on the intolerance of political and other differences, the rejection of democratic and humanist values etc – is a priori false. It is necessary to take sides and proclaim Fascism fundamentally ‘worse’ than Communism. The alternative, the notion that it is even possible to compare rationally the two totalitarianisms, tends to produce the conclusion – explicit or implicit – that Fascism was the lesser evil, an understandable reaction to the Communist threat. When, in September 2003, Silvio Berlusconi provoked a violent outcry with his observation that Mussolini, unlike Hitler, Stalin or Saddam Hussein, never killed anyone, the true scandal was that, far from being an expression of Berlusconi’s idiosyncrasy, his statement was part of an ongoing project to change the terms of a postwar European identity hitherto based on anti-Fascist unity. That is the proper context in which to understand the European conservatives’ call for the prohibition of Communist symbols.


So, Stalinism - not nice, but also not Nazism. To be considered properly different. A good point, what do you think?
 
 
petunia
20:29 / 23.11.07
I'm gonna be a prick here and ask what you think. I know you're intelligent and can write, but the past two posts you've made in this thread have consisted of you copy-pasting some Zizek, then asking people what they think about it.

I don't want to snark, and I'm aware that you may well be asking for opinions on a tricky writer in order to help form your own, but. Well, you know....

---

In regards to the Stalin article you quote, I'm not sure what I think...

I can agree with his statement that the notion that it is even possible to compare rationally the two totalitarianisms is a false notion and one that may lead to some form of attempt to minimise or even explain the Fascist movement. I can see that the argument that Fascism was just a response to an even bigger threat is worrying, not only because it seemingly validates the move towards Fascism in the 30s, but also because it could be used as some kind of validation for the increasing trend towards totalitarian states we see at the moment (i'm still not sure this link of mind holds together, but...)

I may just be being anti-commy, but I see a certain trend in Zizek and other commentators to try to weaken the damage caused by Stalin's communism (and other communisms taken/taking place in the world). It seems that Zizek (along with others) wants to say that, though communist countries have done some Bad Stuff, they essentially meant well and we should forgive them somewhat. For instance, his differentiation between the fake-trials of Stalin's Russia and the non-trials of Nazi Germany seemed a little odd. What is Zizek trying to say? That the Russians were less honest? That they still wanted to be Good People?

I may be reading stuff into it that isn't there. It might be that Zizek just wants to point to the differences between the two totalitarianisms - one was cruelly rational and fully conscious of its actions as controlling and murderous, the other was confused and irrational but genuinely wanted to take humanity to better places. Perhaps he is not valuing one over the other, but he lets slip with his comment that Class antagonism, unlike racial difference and conflict, is absolutely inherent to and constitutive of the social field; Fascism displaces this essential antagonism. He seems to be in two minds as to whether he considers Stalinism to be flawed, but with an honest grounding and will, or whether he sees it as inherently irrational.

As for his claim that It is necessary to take sides and proclaim Fascism fundamentally ‘worse’ than Communism, I'm not sure I agree. I'd go with the statement I quote above about the impossibility of properly comparing the two. I agree with him that we need to avoid a return to Fascism at all costs, but I'm not sure what is solved or done by trying to say that Communism 'wasn't so bad'.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
10:20 / 24.11.07
For instance, his differentiation between the fake-trials of Stalin's Russia and the non-trials of Nazi Germany seemed a little odd. What is Zizek trying to say? That the Russians were less honest? That they still wanted to be Good People?

You see, I don't think he's trying to say that Stalin wasn't a cock-up - rather that he's of a radically different order to the one containing the cock-up we call Hitler, that the theoretical directions they were moving in and the values they espoused (either genuinely held or simply to look impressive) work so differently that pushing them together constitutes obfuscation (even if these divergent forms both resulted in forms of mass-murder) - like a doctor confusing broken bones with cancer.

It's also to do with the way that power can use our memory of mass-murder to goad us into knee-jerk rejection of anything approaching serious leftist thought and action as 'like Stalin, which is just as bad as the Nazis'. Take the hammer-and-sickle versus the swastika - the swastika stands for Nazism and nothing else (in the European context, obvs) whereas the hammer-and-sickle stands for Stalin, but also for all the good things about the Russian revolution.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
10:27 / 24.11.07
Class antagonism, unlike racial difference and conflict, is absolutely inherent to and constitutive of the social field; Fascism displaces this essential antagonism.

Just out of interest, what's actually wrong with this assertion?

Race is a social construct, not something that constitutes us - it doesn't exist down at the roots. Dig deeper than 'race' and you find economics - race is nearly always a blind to distract us from economics: "Let's go and better these savages!" being an excuse to go and steal a load of resources and take over land.

Fascism claims race is a) a real, objective thing and b) essential - neither of these assertions are true. Whereas class warfare is demonstrably real (who put together my trainers, who cleans up my shit, who's going to clean up this library when I've gone home and who will still be doing this when I've got my cushy teaching job?) and fundamental to the social field.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
12:48 / 24.11.07
/threadrot
What, exactly, was good about the Russian revolution?
/end threadrot

Is there a good thread somewhere for that debate? No obvious candidates that I can see through , except maybe a Stupid questions thread.
 
 
petunia
10:16 / 26.11.07
You see, I don't think he's trying to say that Stalin wasn't a cock-up - rather that he's of a radically different order to the one containing the cock-up we call Hitler... [they] work so differently that pushing them together constitutes obfuscation

Yeah, I think you may be right. Though, as an aside, I think it's both pretty icky and also theoretically obfuscating to refer to the two regimes as 'cock ups'.

I realise you probably didn't mean to imply anything by using the term, and it's awkward to talk about these things (the classic british way of understating that which makes us uncomfortable), but it's important not to fall into the trap of referring to these things as 'mistakes'.

I've heard it less in reference to the Nazis, but frequently people will try to refer to genocide in 'communist' countries as 'mistakes' - the whole 'they wanted the right thing, just got it wrong' of the Left West who would love to romanticise these revolutions and pretend there is still something good about them.

It's important to remember that all the 'cock-ups' of Stalin's Russia, Pol Pot's Cambodia, Hitler's Germany, etc were fully willed actions, nearly all of which were sanctioned by the policies of the time. To pretend or insinuate otherwise is to refuse to properly engage with the issues raised by these actions.

'Class antagonism, unlike racial difference and conflict, is absolutely inherent to and constitutive of the social field; Fascism displaces this essential antagonism.'

Just out of interest, what's actually wrong with this assertion?


The point I was raising was not specifically to do with the validity of the statement, but more that, in giving a certain 'ontological' grounding to the situation which gave rise to the Russian revolution, Zizek is flying his colours. It seemed to me to run in line with what I saw as a reading of Stalinist Russia as 'obviously a mean, bad thing, but they meant right, not like those nasty Nazis'. It's not a reading that I necessarily agree with.

As for the right/wrongness of the statement itself - I'm not sure.

I think it's a good reading of the situation in Nazi Germany - economic strife used as a grounding for a party based in National Pride at the expense of the Jewish, Communist, Romani etc Others. It's be interesting to follow way that people will do anything if put in a position of economic concern.

But I find myself disagreeing with the claim that class conflict is inherent to, or constitutive of society, though I'm not sure why. I can see that class coflict is a major part of our culture, and I can see that the essential unrest, within which our culture resides, is used as a tool by policitians to justify War on Fear, persecution of poorer people and/or foreigners, etc. I just feel an unease when I see people try to use this as either a Universal Theory or a means to say capitalism is a Bad Thing.

When you say
Race is a social construct, not something that constitutes us - it doesn't exist down at the roots.
and
class warfare is demonstrably real... and fundamental to the social field.

I'd have to disagree. I can only see that class is just as socially constructed as race. Antagonism between classes is no more fundamental than is antagonism between races.

Both situations are historicaly constituted facts which rely on the past having taken the course it has done. To subsume racial conflict to economic considerations of wealth and need seems to be a little short sighted. Yes, there are times when race is used as a 'cover' for what are, at core, economic problems (Blair's blaming of London shootings on 'a distinctive black culture' comes to mind...) but I think there are certain other forces at play when we construct ideas of race, and when we use these ideas to discriminate.

So I'm not sure that class warfare is any more a) a real, objective thing or b) essential than is race.

As I've probably made obvious here, I should probably read more Marx(ian theory) to get a better understanding of this stuff. I just find myself slightly knee-jerky when it comes to people trying to valourise any of the murderous 'communist' movements by placing them in a theoretical field of correctness or necessity.

As for Nolte's question - What, exactly, was good about the Russian revolution? - I'd respond that it was a good display of potential. It showed the ability of a people/some people to rise against a regime and put another one in place. I don't see much good in everything that follows, but this initial act of displacement and change can stand as a good reminder of what we can do.

Of course, there is the counter argument of 'yeah, but look what happened!' It could be said that any revolutionary attempt is doomed to end up a repetition of what came before. This might be true...
 
 
All Acting Regiment
14:59 / 26.11.07
the whole 'they wanted the right thing, just got it wrong' of the Left West who would love to romanticise these revolutions and pretend there is still something good about them.

Examples please? Specifically of 'romanticisation'.
 
 
All Acting Regiment
15:06 / 26.11.07
And apologies if the above seemed snarky, but I really can't bring to mind anyone who literally Romanticises glorifies Stalinism - even Zizek here, and otherwise when he talks about Lenin, is being incredibly careful to point out that he's finding one or two valuale points in a highly problematic whole, and that's where he is finding value (rarely) and not just pointing out different kinds of problems.

What I can think of is the propensity for the left-wing to be utterly disaparaged in mainstream discourse, for anything vaguley revolutionary, for anything that involves interrupting the current power-structures to be treated with either mockery or revulsion - and in fact a Romanticism that we see in Dawkins where there's this magical, mythical thing called 'The Enlightened West' which incorrigibly stands up to Hitler, Stalin, and Osama Bin Laden who are of course all the same.

Though, as an aside, I think it's both pretty icky and also theoretically obfuscating to refer to the two regimes as 'cock ups'.

I meant 'cock-ups' as in a mistake made by human beings, as opposed to a mistake made by otherwise well-meaning Stalinists, but I take the point about it being bad language.
 
 
Closed for Business Time
15:28 / 26.11.07
Again, sorry for slightly off-topica extrusion, but
What I can think of is the propensity for the left-wing to be utterly disaparaged in mainstream discourse, for anything vaguley revolutionary, for anything that involves interrupting the current power-structures to be treated with either mockery or revulsion

could one of the reasons for this be the classic problem with any kind of revolutionary theory: what do you do the day after the rulers have been deposed?
Meaning, it's one thing to instigate a revolution (and to critique existing power differentials, inequalities, unfair set-ups etc.). It's a very different thing to not only design a different political/economic/social system, but also implement it.

So in my experience (YMMV), what puts people off les revolutionnaires is the rhetorically fancy but substantially weightless and baseless (because untested) answers to that basic question: if you destroy the power mechanisms of the society you're in, how do you go about replacing it with something else, not to mention better, all the while NOT killing thousands or millions?

#

I realise this should go someplace else, since I'm not talking Zizek at all. Any suggestions where? A new thread?
 
 
All Acting Regiment
16:07 / 26.11.07
Yeah, I reckon it probably deserves a new thread - if you copy across the pertinent quotes from here we'll carry on the discussion over there.
 
 
petunia
19:33 / 26.11.07
Examples please? Specifically of 'romanticisation'.

I may well have slipped too high a dose of rhetoric into that sentence. What was intended as a criticism of arguments I have heard from some people ended up reading as a universal statement on the Left West, which is a bit stupid.

My thoughts here were actually spurred by reading Zizek's Attempts to escape the logic of Capitalism, specifically where he says:

What is of special interest here is the lack of understanding between the Western Left and dissidents such as Havel. In the eyes of the Western Left, Eastern dissidents were too naive in their belief in liberal democracy – in rejecting socialism, they threw out the baby with the bath water.

I have encountered IRL arguments with various people - some, your run-of-the-mill unthinking stoners; some, studied lecturers - who have espoused the view that Stalinism (or other kinds of communist society) was a Good Thing. There seems to be a certain willed blindness where the ideology masks the reality.

On a more basic level, we can see bags worn around Manchester that hold the face of Mao - sold as a fashion item. There's a perceived level of cool given to the revolutionary societies by those with subcultural leanings. I used to have a genuine Soviet army belt which I rocked the world with...

In more theoretical examples - as I say, I am not very well versed in Marxian (or other political) theory, but I am aware that Sartre advocated most of the regimes through 'communist' history.

Though as you say, this is going somewhat off-thread.

To head back to Zizek, I found his piece 'Let's be realists, Let's demand the impossible!' to be an interesting reading of the Israel/Palestine conflict.

What I enjoy about Zizek's writing is his ability to find the hypocrisies kept in play by various arguments. In this short article, he calls into question the hypocrisies and contraditions being held in the conflict and the discourse surrounding it.

Offering such tidbits as:

Let’s try a mental experiment and imagine that, instead of Lebanese women and children, the human shields used by Hezbollah were Israeli women and children. Would the IDF still consider the price affordable and continue the bombing? If the answer is “no,” then the IDF is effectively practicing racism,

The misfortune of Israel is that it was established as a nation-state a century too late, in conditions when such “founding crimes” are no longer acceptable

and

The very need to evoke the Holocaust in defense of Israel’s actions implies that its crimes are so horrible that only the absolute trump-card of the Holocaust can redeem them.

Zizek comes to the view that the only real solution for the Isreal/Palestine conflict is to 'demand the impossible', that is; full withdrawal of Isreal from Palestine, the creation of a properly recognized Palestinian state and the withdrawal of both sides from Jerusalem, so that it can become a properly holy 'non-state' city. A pretty contentious view (rather improbable, too), but one that holds a truth.

I find that Zizek packs an insightful rhetoric into a tight space. Many of the arguments he makes have been made before, but he has a knack for piling views from proliferate sources and disciplines into two-page pieces for online magazines. His obvious enthusiasm for the topics on which he writes and speaks can be both inspiring and amusing. Though I disagree with some of what he says, and I have yet to read any of his more theoretical works, I like the fact that he is offering (or trying to offer) new political possibilities into the ring.
 
 
_pin
20:52 / 26.11.07
The odd thing about the linked piece above from petunia is that it contrasts with the one AAR posted, the review of Simon Critchley's Infinitely Demanding - a book which, it might be worth pointing out, carries a pull-quote from Zizek on how great the (well, a; quite naughtily, if doesn't say which) book by Critchley is great (albeit on the topic of reaffirming that ethical responsibility demands we love the Otehr more than ourselves)

I hadn't bought that up until now, not least because I've not yet actually read ID, but because the topic of the quote doesn't really contradict what he says in the review, but that piece does.

His, for want of a better term, finite stance on political engagement seemed to feed in to some of his statements about some totalitarianisms; namely, at least they follow the imperative to fucking do something. That, at heart, we should take action.

And yet elsewhere the dream of some form of pacifism (which is a theme of the resistance in ID, and Zizek's rejection of it seemed to form a subtext to his bringing Chavez, etc, in his review) is a legitimate stance.

Does this illuminate something in his thought? Have I gone off on one a bit?
 
 
Jackie Susann
21:51 / 26.11.07
I think Zizek's argument about Stalinism is totally disingenuous - I don't see any coherent basis for saying 'if you accept that it's possible to compare Stalinism and Nazism, you end up thinking the Nazis were better'. In fact, he doesn't even say this, he just lets it sit there as an argument without defending it. Why would you come up with 'I guess the fascists were okay, then?' It's an irrational conclusion.

Really, I think the point of Zizek's argument here is to suppress the point on which it IS possible to rationally compare Stalinism/'actually existing socialism' and Fascism - they are both terroristic attacks on working class power. But he's a Leninist, so obviously he can't acknowledge that.
 
 
_pin
06:34 / 27.11.07
Is it really possible to be a Leninist and also have the only point of your comments in favour of post-Lenin totalitarianisms be to suppress comparisons between them and Rightier fascisms?

I don't really know a lot about Leninists, which is why I'm asking this, but surely they must be in some way attached to these things that, as you say, they can't admit or their structure would fall apart. Or do you mean admit to himself; that his thought itself can't admit the similarity, rather than that he just can't publicly take that position in print?
 
 
petunia
10:17 / 27.11.07
I don't see any coherent basis for saying 'if you accept that it's possible to compare Stalinism and Nazism, you end up thinking the Nazis were better'.

The only explanation that I could figure out would have been based on a straight-out statistical level. I had understood Stalin to have killed many more people than hitler did, though on reading this site, it seems that assumpion is up for question - estimates on the death toll of Stalin's regime range from 3.5 to 60 million, there the estimates for Hitler's germany range from 10 to 25 million, but then you have to bear in mind that some 28M civilians and 14M soldiers died in the European War. That's 42,000,000 deaths which can probably be blamed on Hitler to one extent or another.

So, unless you count the higher figures quote for Stalin's Russia, I suppose all you have to go on is length of time. That the Russian regime lasted longer and caused a more sustained damage to people's lives (through fear, intimidation, regular near-starvation), and so was worse. Not exactly clear grounds to claim that The alternative, the notion that it is even possible to compare rationally the two totalitarianisms, tends to produce the conclusion – explicit or implicit – that Fascism was the lesser evil,

Zizek does hint at one other possible reason for this statement when he says, in the same sentence as that just quoted:
[Fascism was] an understandable reaction to the Communist threat.
This argument relying on the logic used by many supporters of interventions in current warfare - that it's okay to go and fuck people up if they're under threat from a Worse Thing (comunism/socialism/islam, etc). However, I'd be very suprised if anybody ever tried to bring this argument into play...

As you say, the whole position is rather specious and seems to be thrown in there to suppress the point on which it IS possible to rationally compare Stalinism/'actually existing socialism' and Fascism. This may be because he believes the ideals of communism, leninism and maybe even stalinism deserve to be held in the political discourse, without being shoved away as 'just as bad as Hitler', or maybe he's just giving a strange argument to try to protect his own ideology.

Bizzarely, in trying to combat the rhetoric of 'Communism is just as bad as Hitler!', he makes a near-identical move in claiming that 'comparing Fascism and Communism is to say that you like Hitler!'. The classic 'you're not one of those, are you?!' line of argument - embarrass and shut off.
 
 
Jackie Susann
19:06 / 27.11.07
Pin, I think I am at risk of stating the obvious here, but Leninists believe that the Russian Revolution was a proletarian revolution, and therefore, basically progressive, so their critique of Stalinism is based on its perversion of the historical mission of Leninism. (Obviously I am being v. reductive here.)

I follow the traditional ultraleft line of argument, that the the October Revolution was really a counterrevolution aimed at destroying/usurping workers' power and concentrating it in the state.
 
 
petunia
20:01 / 28.11.07
A random thought occurred today:

Is reason that totalitarianism seems to be such a major obsession for Zizek (and other lacanian theorists?) the the image of the totalistarian leader allows for a vision of a person in which all parts of the trinity are allowed full expression of themselves?

The totalitarian leader is, all at once:

- a self-fullfilling pride-of-ego, congratulated and worshipped as a 'great man'.

- a rampant Id, allowed to do what the fuck it wants - joyfully rampant in its irrational displays of sheer libido.

- a massive superego, permitting and restricting the actions of his subjects to an 'almighty' degree

So the totalitarian leader represents, in a strangely repulsing/attracting way*, the 'god' of psychoanalytic theory in that he combines all three levels and becomes a full manifestation of them all?

*Horrible to be subject to him (or risk being subject to him), but imagine if we could be him!


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Does this make any sense, or am I misreading stuff?
 
 
Anna de Logardiere
16:36 / 25.09.08
An interview with Zizek on Radio Open Source

This featured on Boing Boing today. I really enjoyed it, I think some of the people here who lean towards identity politics or people who used to post here would find a small section of it controversial. I recommend listening to it if you don't know much about Zizek though.
 
 
oryx
14:27 / 18.01.09
I must say, I've not been overly impressed by Zizek. He dribbles, and personally speaking I struggle to take a dribbling grown man seriously.

Even if we set aside his dribbling for the moment....

I've read some of his stuff, and it is, for the most part, terribly repetitive - Looking Awry, Enjoy Your Symptom, The Parallax View, and several others, all say more or less the same thing. He's written one book, and cut and pasted it into other books and given it a different title. He also cited Freud without acknowledgement in an article entitled Freud Lives in the London Review of Books a year or two ago. (Why? Did he think no-one would notice?!) I'm also not convinced by his reading of Lacan - if you're that certain about Lacan, you haven't read Lacan properly, because the whole point about Lacan's work is inherent instability. Anyone who claims to have mastery over it quite clearly doesn't.

I've had this conversation with several colleagues and friends, and the consensus is that Zizek is an intellectual charlatan. A very media-savvy, charismatic charlatan, but a charlatan nevertheless. I've yet to come across someone who takes him seriously.

If you want to know about Lacan, read Lacan, not Zizek. Start with the Écrits and take it from there.
 
  

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