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US / Soviet involvement in Afghanistan: 1979 - 1989

 
 
Ray Fawkes
14:04 / 02.10.02
Nick suggested a new topic to see if I could defend a comment I made (see the "Wrong Bastard" thread) about a reading of America's legacy in Afghanistan.

In short: I stated that America was, arguably, assisting and arming the Afghani people to fend off the threat of Soviet encroachment.

Let me elaborate.

In 1973, the king of Afghanistan was overthrown, and a shaky republic was established. Within a few years, the country had descended fully into civil war. In 1979, the Soviet Union decided to intervene, sending in troops as an "peacekeeping assist" to the government in Kabul - a defacto invasion, in keeping with the Soviet-sponsored peacekeeping missions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1969). Their reasons for this action alternate depending on what you're reading - either they saw the opportunity to quell a violent civil war that threatened to spill over into their central asian territories, or they took advantage of the instability to expand Soviet influence in the area by force.

The American response was, by all accounts, prompted by fears that Afghanistan would prove a stepping-stone for the Soviet regime, and that further territories would be claimed. President Carter signed a directive for secret aid to the Mujahadeen, and CIA activity began in earnest. The Afghani rebels were armed, trained, and pointed at the Soviet forces, engaging in what would become a decade-long guerilla war.

While this was a tactical decision on America's part - the objective was clearly to hurt the Soviets, not necessarily help the Afghanis - it did force the eventual withdrawal by the Soviet forces.

Here's where it gets sticky: did that help or hurt Afghanistan? In broader terms: Should America have gotten involved at all?

Arguably, had America refused involvement, the Soviet forces would have rolled over the Afghanis, and the territory would fall behind the Iron Curtain. Soviet rule, and what it did to the people under it, is well documented - there is little doubt that it would have been harmful to the nation. Would it have been as harmful as the war? Who can say?

America did not involve itself directly in the conflict, for obvious reasons - to put their own troops into a nation bordering on the USSR would be a declaration of war - something nobody wanted, because it would explode into global conflict. But does that mean they should have stayed completely away? Tactically speaking, arming the Mujahadeen was a brilliant move. Morally speaking (assuming we're willing to speak morally about war - something that perhaps deserves a debate all its own), was it defensible?

Would remaining uninvolved have been defensible?

Is this all a "load of cobblers"?
 
 
We're The Great Old Ones Now
15:07 / 02.10.02
It is so incomplete as to be misleading. So yeah, basically, it's cobblers. Even your topic abstract 'America's history with the Mujahadeen: assistance or abuse?' - is slightly biased.

The PDPA overthrew Mohammad Daud in 1978. Afghan loyalty to the government can scarcely be questioned wrote the Washington Post. It was a very popular - in the literal, as well as the figurative meaning - and successful coup. The new government introduced a reform programme which abolished feudalism in the countryside, included medicare, freedom of religion, and equal rights for women and various ethnic minorities. By the end of the 80s, women made up half the university places and 40% of Afghan doctors.

The problem? The PDPA was supported by the Soviet Union. The government was not a puppet, nor was the initial coup backed by the USSR, according to Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State under Carter. On the other hand, according to Zbigniew Brzezinksi - Carter's National Security Advisor - Aghanistan was a threat; the 'threat of a promising example' of a non-US-style (non-free market) state in Asia, from which Iran (under the Shah) and other allies must be protected.

On July 3rd, 1979 - before the Soviet invasion - Carter's government authorised $500 million of covert action money in support of the mujaheddin - tribal groups opposed to the government - the aim being the overthrow of Afghanistan's first progressive regime.

Brzezinski again, interviewed in '98: 'According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujaheddin began during 1980, that is after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan... But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise.'

The sudden funding of the mujaheddin to the tune of $500 million was hardly going to meet with Soviet approval. The 'civil war' to which you refer was essentially created by the US. It has even been suggested that he wanted to lure the Soviet Union into a Vietnam of its own. That the Soviet Union intervened can have come as a surprise to no one.

This was a stitch up. Afghanistan was a chessboard. There are no clean hands and no good intentions - and even if there were, the consequences are reverberating around the world. Brzezinski referred to the possibility of a 'few stirred-up Muslims', and dismissed the problem. It's relatively clear that the US, in order to strike at a progressive regime whose presence on the international scene now would be a boon, created a terrorist organisation which then found itself increasingly at odds with its initial sponsor, culminating, directly or not, in the WTC attacks. (I ask again - who are we incubating now, who'll come back and haunt us later? Expediency, it seems, is a less than expedient political approach.)

Now, whether the USSR would have come crashing down without the Afghan war, whether that conflict brought us the thaw, is another question - as is whether, if such is the case, one could call it a necessary sacrifice. How it can be such, when those involved in plotting the war were also those unable to recnognise the thaw when it came, and who believed it just another ruse, is a further question. But the idea that America's involvement in Afghanistan has been anything other than shameful or self-serving is not one I see a great deal of life in.
 
 
Ray Fawkes
16:07 / 02.10.02
It is so incomplete as to be misleading. So yeah, basically, it's cobblers. Even your topic abstract 'America's history with the Mujahadeen: assistance or abuse?' - is slightly biased.

No less biased, then, is your response. Note that the civil war in Afghanistan, arguably begun in 1973, climaxed with the PDPA coup in 1978 - hardly "created by the US".

In response to your other points:
It is unutterably naive to suggest that America shouldn't have expected Soviet Expanionist policies to apply to a neighboring territory that had been seized by a Soviet-supported governing party. Are we going to play "who unzipped first"? Okay:

As referenced in papers compiled by Vasily Mitrokhin, the KGB were reportedly engaging in a directed campaign of sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and assassination in Afghanistan from 1978 onwards - beginning fully one year before CIA involvement. They interfered with both the PDPA and the burgeoning opposition, in service to their primary function: to forcefully align Afghanistan with Soviet policy, and to prepare for the possibility of invasion. As early as January of 1979, Soviet advisors to the Afghani government were demanding positions as "shadow ministers" and joint responsibility for planning economic policy.

There was no "progressive regime". If the coup had paved to way for one, the Soviets quickly saw to it that the only regime that would be allowed to survive was one that fell in comfortably and completely with their own policy.

The question that is raised by what happened in Afghanistan is one that often comes up in foreign policy debate: where do you draw the line? America could have chosen not to get involved - and would have faced the collapse of a nation into undisputed Soviet rule. Their allies in Central Asia and the Middle East were getting nervous, and the Americans themselves were worried that success in Afghanistan could fuel further expansionist impulses in the Soviet Politburo. How long do you remain detached when observing the actions of an aggressive enemy?
 
 
Ray Fawkes
18:26 / 02.10.02
One further question: how would you word the abstract in a more objective manner?
 
 
We're The Great Old Ones Now
21:19 / 02.10.02
Ray, Afghanistan was in a state of greater or lesser conflict for the entire century. I took you use of the term to mean the conflict between the Afghan government and the mujahaddin - a war which was created by the US, in the sense that without $500 million, it would have been rather less fierce. And since the treaty between Afghanistan and the USSR which allowed the Kabul government to require direct military assistance if the need arose was signed in 1978, there can hardly have been any doubt that Soviet entry into Afghanistan was a likely consequence of supplying the Mujahaddin with that much hardware - not to mention the exciting training they recieved under Project Cyclone (yes, it's a dumb name, don't blame me).

I reiterate, Afghanistan was not seized by a Soviet-supported governing party - it was seized by a populist movement which later acquired Soviet backing, but which was independent. That it was progressive is indisputable in that in addition to the figures regarding women and other social reforms I have already quoted, the PDPA 'immediately took measures to create a ceiling on landholdings, reduce rural indebtedness, limit the brideprice and set a minimum age for marriage. A mass literacy campaign was also embarked upon as part of a secular education programme...' (Peter Marsden, The Taliban)

In fact, that very progressiveness was the root of the rejection of the PDPA in rural areas - it was conducted too quickly and without much concern for the social niceties of tribal life - a trait which was much in evidence in most modernisation programmes of that time. The anger which solidified the Mujahaddin and which the US exploited was directed at reform.

That the KGB was active in Afghanistan - as you note, operating against everyone in sight - is not a defence of the funding of the Mujahaddin and its noted bastards, such as Hekmatyar, known for opium trading and throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil. Nor does the fact that Carter gave this large sum of money in '79 mean that the CIA was not already on the ground long before - in fact, it makes it almost certain. I don't have a reference to hand to testify to this, but if you dispute the likelihood I'm quite sure I can find one.

Your contention that there was no 'progressive regime' is as far as I can ascertain simply wishful on your part. Can you offer anything in support of it? What is certain is that those backed by the US were considerably less palatable.

You suggest that the US, uninvolved, would have seen Afghanistan fall to total Soviet rule. All we can say for certain is that the US funded the Mujahaddin to the tune of five hundred million dollars and extensive training in professional terror warfare, shattering the possibility of a left-reformist government in Afhganistan, and making a civil war - another one - absolutely certain. Into that mess came the USSR, making it look like the right policy all along, and perhaps the social strain of a foreign war did something to bring about the collapse of the Soviet state in Russia. If so, no one was more surprised by it than the CIA, who were briefing that the thaw was a dirty commie trick right up to the moment when it all came crashing down.

And how would I have phrased the topic abstract? Well, for starters, I'd suggest you put 'Afghanistan', not 'the Mujahaddin'. This is not only about the relationship of America with the Mujahaddin, after all - though God knows, it might have been better to leave them well enough alone, given what has followed - but about Afghanistan as a whole, and the extremely heavy price it has paid for an aggressive doctrine of "encirclement" - for which read, as Stalin did in the translation, "strangulation" - and the stamping out of a possible alternative to the US/Free Market system. A heavy price shared by Chile, and any number of other nations around the where the CIA engaged in political engineering - for which read "regime change" or "foreign imperialism" or "assassination and terror", whichever suits.
 
 
The Monkey
23:06 / 02.10.02
It doesn't work to think of Afghanistan as a nation-state in the sense of Europe. The reason that I'd characterise both analyses of Afghan history as flawed is that the history and policy-making of the center, Kabul, has little or no relationship to how the rest of the region functions.

The PDPA were a bit of a joke in terms of bringing democracy to Afghanistan. A more accurate description would be that they brought fair and just rule to Kabul...external to which they had little or no infrastructure for the enforcement of their changes. The monarchy worked because it didn't try and intercede in struggles between clans and the old way of doing things.

"Democracy" didn't because the only liberals and democrats in Afghanistan were the central elite situated in and around Kabul, who were largely schooled in Europe: the coup occurred without the knowledge or ideological consensus of the semi-nomads tribes who make up most of the Afghan populous, so when the hegemonic center tried to enforce it's rules outside of Kabul, the tension began.
It also didn't help that in the hinterlands the coup was seen as a transition from Muslim to secular rule, and in particular that the new leaders were Western-educated and thus pretty close to kafir themselves...having Anglicized their persons and the social culture - then trying to foist those values on the periphery - the native democrats of Afghanistan resembled nothing more than the dozens of other interlopers who had in the course of history tried to seize control of the trade routes through the region.

As for the Soviets, their interest was for by hook or crook to get a warm water port into the Indian Ocean. When talks failed, they tried to take what they needed - a route to and from the ocean. Had they succeeded, it is very likely that they would have followed the patterns of prior dynasties of control...controlling the transport routes they required and disregarding the rest of the space and people. What they did not count on was being that the Afghan tribals considered them an even greater threat than the PDPA.


Yes, the US supplied Stinger missiles to the Afghans, but it was not this action that instigated nor set the tone for the Muhajiddin's resistance of the Soviet incursion. As to the statement "America created a terrorist organization," well, it's a typical oversimplification that denies agency to the Afghans. Quite simply put, the defeat of the Soviet Army wasn't a function of technical superiority, but of tactics and determination. Like the US dealing with the Vietnaminh, the Soviets dramatically underestimated how an understanding of the terrain would impact the war. Nor did they understand how defense of their territory was locked up intrinsicly in Afghan tribal culture and religion.
 
 
Tom Coates
05:55 / 03.10.02
As to the statement "America created a terrorist organization," well, it's a typical oversimplification that denies agency to the Afghans.

I think this is a tremendously difficult statement to support. After all when we refer to America in these things, we don't mean your average citizen, we mean state-sanctioned interventions. Whereas one wonders about the agency of the "Afghans" as opposed to a group of individuals or section of the community who could be subsequently turned into rulers by outside intervention. Afghan 'agency' as a country must remain at least grey, surely?
 
 
We're The Great Old Ones Now
08:01 / 03.10.02
It doesn't work to think of Afghanistan as a nation-state in the sense of Europe.

Which implies that certain attributes of the Nation State might not be relevant... like sovereignty and the right to choose your own government and be thought of as an 'all grown up' country? Many European nations are hotch-potch countries, too, and the US is a federation of states, each with its own laws, some of which are in conflict. Now, I'm not keen on Nation State analyses in the first place, but as I said, that view of the world is one aspect of this discussion.

The PDPA were a bit of a joke in terms of bringing democracy to Afghanistan.

References, please. My history books say otherwise. I don't find your characterisation of the Kabul elite unlikely - but I think you exaggerate when you suggest that the rest of Afghanistan was against them. Don't forget these were largely Pashtuns, with the support that implies from the southern tribes - and also, don't ignore the figures for the schooling and emancipation of women - at least one large part of the population throughout the country was pleased with what was happening.

it was not this action that instigated nor set the tone for the Muhajiddin's resistance of the Soviet incursion.

Not my point. Afghanistan could be expected to resist the Soviet invasion - they've had a lot of practice. My point was that the arming of the Mujahaddin in summer '79, the funding to the tune of five hundred million - probably still enough to make the difference between standard internal unrest and a genuine civil war - was intended to bring down the PDPA and may well have triggered the Soviet invasion.

As to the statement "America created a terrorist organization," well, it's a typical oversimplification that denies agency to the Afghans.

Poppycock. The Mujahaddin were a traditional tribal group who would have fought a traditional tribal war. Instead, they were funded and trained by the CIA in tactics of terror, guerilla insurgency and modern insurrection. They were transformed into a both a modern guerilla force, and a terror outfit. Tactics and determination, you say? Quite true. Without US intervention, they would have had the latter, but not the former. Now as I said, it's possible that the Soviet losses in Afghanistan were integral to the thawing of the Cold War and the eventual fall of the Soviet Union. It's also possible that the Afghan war was sought by US agencies on the basis of the likely logistical cost to the USSR. And it's possible we all benefit - accidentally, because no one knew the USSR could be brought down at this time.

But to suggest, as Ray did, that Osama Bin Laden was trained 'against the encroaching Soviet dictatorship' is to evade a world of machination and soi-disant realpolitik. The US did not act for Afghanistan. The US acted against the Soviet Union, and as in many other cases - Chile, for example - did so at the cost of a regime which was essentially humanitarian and progressive.
 
 
Ray Fawkes
17:04 / 03.10.02
A sort of reverse-order addressing of points here...

But to suggest, as Ray did, that Osama Bin Laden was trained 'against the encroaching Soviet dictatorship' is to evade a world of machination and soi-disant realpolitik. The US did not act for Afghanistan.

Nick, I think you're reading an attribution of altruism in America's actions that I never suggested. My statement, as alluded to in the topic abstract is this: America chose to involve themselves in Afghanistan, propping up the battle against the Soviet Union (in your argument, they caused the battle). The question: was this to Afghanistan's benefit or detriment?

America's actions were purely tactical. This we agree upon. What, exactly, their actions were - there we seem to differ in opinion.

But not strictly by the facts though - there's no disputing the hard stats and names and dates - what we seem to be arguing over is the how and why. That brings us back to our differing views on the question at hand.

...the extremely heavy price it has paid for an aggressive doctrine of "encirclement" - for which read, as Stalin did in the translation, "strangulation" - and the stamping out of a possible alternative to the US/Free Market system.

Interesting that our discussion (as you noted in the chessboard analogy earlier) involves two superpowers applying an aggressive "encirclement" strategy - but your comments seem to focus only on America's. Let us not forget that while America's involvement was hardly altruistic, the Soviet Union was pursuing an aggressive annexation/invasion plan.

You suggest that the US, uninvolved, would have seen Afghanistan fall to total Soviet rule. All we can say for certain is that the US funded the Mujahaddin to the tune of five hundred million dollars and extensive training in professional terror warfare, shattering the possibility of a left-reformist government in Afhganistan, and making a civil war - another one - absolutely certain.

That's not all we can say for certain. We can also say that the Soviet Union was preparing to take Afghanistan - by coercion or by force - and without outside interference, were likely to succeed. This is made clear from both CIA and KGB analyses of the territory.

You must understand, as I pointed out earlier, that the Mitrokhin documentation clearly states that the left-reformist government would not be allowed to stand. The Soviets had every intention of subverting, subsuming, or destroying it.

Your contention that there was no 'progressive regime' is as far as I can ascertain simply wishful on your part. Can you offer anything in support of it?

I refer to the above comment when I speak of the absence of a progressive regime. Let me say it this way: What progressive government was in early formation was immediately doomed by the involvement of the superpowers - whether by American or Soviet aggression: that is open to interpretation. Personally, I say both.

What is certain is that those backed by the US were considerably less palatable.

I'm not sure we can be certain of that. Granted, the brutal treatment the citizenry's been subject to would seem to make your point for you, but do keep in mind the treatment newly absorbed nations tended to receive at the hands of the politburo. Under Soviet rule, the Afghanis could look forward to a round of "counter-revolutionary" purging, the forceful elimination of a religious infrastructure, and the directed redistribution of resources to serve the Soviet military-industrial hierarchy.

That the KGB was active in Afghanistan - as you note, operating against everyone in sight - is not a defence of the funding of the Mujahaddin and its noted bastards, such as Hekmatyar, known for opium trading and throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil.

On this point, I must concede. That funding is morally indefensible - especially because they didn't make sure it was put to purely military use. We are now in the murky "enemy of my enemy" territory - one where America has made some significant historical mistakes. The Mujahadeen are typical of mercenaries - distasteful, violent, and only useful in conflict.

Once again, the central question is raised: America trained, armed, and funded the Mujahadeen, directing them against the Soviet forces. Did this help or hurt the Afghani people? Was it better or worse than leaving them alone?

The anger which solidified the Mujahaddin and which the US exploited was directed at reform.

Yes. It just so happens that those policies of reform were being exploited by the Soviet Union.

Maybe we should re-word the issue: Did Afghanistan ever have a chance? With the Soviet Union pushing on one side and America on the other, could there ever have been any kind of genuine progressive reform? Nick, you seem to believe that the Soviets would have been happy simply backing the anti-free-market government. Obviously, I disagree - based on KGB reports, and based on the pattern of Soviet involvement in central asia.

And since the treaty between Afghanistan and the USSR which allowed the Kabul government to require direct military assistance if the need arose was signed in 1978

One final point: the mujahadeen was already active in Afghanistan before America provided military assistance. KGB reports indicate that the Soviet Union was preparing to invade before this treaty was signed. I think we can safely state that Soviet entry into Afghanistan was likely whether or not that $500 million came down the pipe. What it did was make the conflict a lot bloodier, a lot longer, and keep the Soviets at bay.

In essense: Arming and training Afghani rebels against the encroaching Soviet dictatorship.
 
 
We're The Great Old Ones Now
16:44 / 04.10.02
Profitable discussion. Thanks, Ray.
 
 
Ray Fawkes
17:04 / 07.10.02
And thanks to you, Nick.
 
  
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