(Disclaimer: perhaps the fact that this worries me at all is an indication of my own naivety.)
Reaction to the bombings are the biggest, most recent example of this, but I remember sensing it also during the Louise Woodward trial. I'm talking about the fuzziness around the edges of the latter part of 'innocent until proven guilty'.
It seems to me that, in hugely emotive circumstances, the enormity of the victims' suffering demands punishment of someone - and the question of whether or not they can be proven beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty becomes a secondary issue, almost an afterthought.
In the case of Louise Woodward, the evidence against her was equivocal, but the parents repeatedly stressed the extent of their suffering - understandable enough, but not directly relevant to whether or not Woodward had actually committed the crime. In the case of the 9/11 bombings, the scale of the tragedy is obvious, the collective suffering enormous but, despite vague talk of 'percentage certainty', we've yet to hear exactly what the 'hard evidence' is - and I think it's important that we do.
Does enormity of suffering on the part of the victim(s) obviate the need to prove conclusively that X is responsible? In such situations (where, arguably, there's a real need for vengeance) is it more important to punish X - as a scapegoat who has likely committed other crimes - than to fully establish that he committed this one?
Will 'near enough' justice have legal implications in future? |
