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Coca-Cola & free will

 
 
E. Coli from the Milky Way
19:01 / 16.05.06
Got it! I was drinking Coca-cola and got the final ask to the debate of free will/determinism. The final ask it that: it doesn't matter at all!

Let's suppose we trascend time. That it is a hard supposition, but, well, some physicists are saying that time doesn't exist.

So well. If we put ourselves outside the time stream and take a look to the actions of the universe. On the time stream, we perceive the world in terms of free will. But if we step outside, well: we'll perceive it in therms of determinism.

So asking if there's free will or not it's ... to waste time!

What a shit of thought!!!
 
 
Dead Megatron
20:20 / 16.05.06
Wow, that's great. But could you explain how do you step outside the timestream? Because that'd be one major magick trick!!!!

But, once you're outside the time stream and look back at it, aren't you then doing something out of free will?

Can you smell the snark? (sorry, I need to relax)
 
 
Isadore
20:49 / 16.05.06
Free will and determinism aren't mutually exclusive when you add chaos theory (the mathematics, not teh majgick) into the mix.

Look at the three-body problem of celestial mechanics. Poincare says it best:

If we knew exactly the laws of nature and the situation of the universe at the initial moment, we could predict exactly the situation of that same universe at a succeeding moment. But even if it were the case that the natural laws had no longer any secret for us, we could still only know the initial situation approximately. If that enabled us to predict the succeeding situation with the same approximation, that is all we require, and we should say that the phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by laws. But it is not always so; it may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon. - "Science and Method", 1903

I have no idea what this topic has to do with the Temple, though; seems to me like it belongs in the Head Shop.
 
 
*
06:48 / 17.05.06
s3r3bro, I'd like to ask you to, following the incredibly cool (and hopefully intentional) play on words in your screen name, actually take the time to think through your ideas before you post them. I realize that first rush of excitement after you think of something that's new to you makes you want to post it immediately. But it really would be better if you think it through enough that you can communicate it clearly, and also know that it's not something that's already been talked to death, or has obvious and glaring logical problems. Because "OMG IF THER iS NO TIME THER IS NO CAUSALITEE" is not a new concept, and if you make reference to other things that have been written about this idea, your post will be more substantive, not to say comprehensible. I find your posting style to be like that of an excitable, drug-addled child. I am unfortunately impatient with children, and more so with children who appear to be on methamphetamines. I wish you would calm down, think things through a little better, and post your thoughts in a more comprehensible style, because I'd like to be able to give your ideas some consideration.

Celane, thanks for your post. I wasn't aware of that facet of chaos theory and determinism. Can you explain how, or if, fortuitous events equate with free will? I'm not sure I'm understanding that.
 
 
Isadore
07:37 / 17.05.06
That's where it gets a bit more funky, and frankly that's a connection I have a damn hard time making. I'm no philosopher, and I tend to go with Hobbes in that the actual term 'free will' is an absurdity. How can something as intangible as the will be 'free'?

That said, if you can iron out the sticky issue of whether or not people have choices in what they do, which I'd simplify down to "Is there more than one possible option for some situation X?" -- and in this, I tend to go with personal experience, which screams "YES!", as well as with the math/sciency concept of 'variables', which wouldn't make much sense otherwise -- then small choices will have big effects.
 
 
Isadore
07:44 / 17.05.06
Rather, small choices could have big effects. Or they could be trivial. You never quite know...
 
 
E. Coli from the Milky Way
13:41 / 17.05.06
following the incredibly cool (and hopefully intentional) play on words in your screen name
Can you explain it to me, please? it is not intentional. "Cerebro" in spanish means "brain". "Serebro" is a slang word for "cerebro". And then adding the digital concept, you get s3r3bro. Reading it on english i get "us three are three, brother". Are you referring to it? How cool!

Sorry you don't like my style, but i think the post is clear enough. And yes, sure it as been thought before. Like, otherway, like all things we are commenting here. I have not enough time to get deeper on the idea, so i post and wait for people who thinks about it.

Taking my ideas in consideration is your choice, bro.

Peace
 
 
Orrin's Prick Up Your Ears
13:48 / 17.05.06
"What a shit of thought!!!"

Genius.

Pointless topic ... a shame!
 
 
Quantum
14:11 / 17.05.06
I *am* a philosopher and I think it might be a more complicated issue than you think, us3are3bro.

For example, it does matter because without free agency we cannot be morally responsible. Rephrase it like this Could I have done otherwise than I did? If you think you could have, you have to explain the apparent causality that determines the motion of inanimate bodies (for example), if not you have to explain the subjective experience of freedom.

Sensitivity to initial conditions (or 'The Butterfly Effect') does not free us from determinism. Chaos mathematics predicts the actions of chaotic systems pretty accurately. There *are* interesting implications from Quantum physics and such for the freedom vs fate debate, but it does take a firm understanding of the basics to pin them down IMHO.
 
 
Isadore
14:55 / 17.05.06
Ah. Well, thank you. I guess I should have learned by now to keep my stupid mouth shut. Sorry. Won't happen again.
 
 
*
15:07 / 17.05.06
Can you explain it to me, please? it is not intentional. "Cerebro" in spanish means "brain". "Serebro" is a slang word for "cerebro".
That's exactly what I meant.

Sorry for being grouchy.
 
 
Less searchable M0rd4nt
15:17 / 17.05.06
Does anyone mind if I change the topic summary to something that isn't a jolly Holocaust reference? Sorry, let me rephrase that: I am changing the summary and if you don't like it you can feck off.
 
 
Lurid Archive
15:45 / 17.05.06
Chaos mathematics predicts the actions of chaotic systems pretty accurately.

Not sure it does, you know. I mean, in some cases it does, but I'm pretty sure things can essentially get as complex and unpredictable as you like. I usuall take the opposite view regarding QM, in that I don't think it tells you very much about free will. Partly, though, the weak point in this debate tends to be about the definition of free will itself - if I am totally unpredictable, then in what sense do I have a self? Whereas if I have desires and so forth that allow my actions to be somewhat predicted, how can I be entirely free?
 
 
Hallo, Paper Spaceboy
15:48 / 17.05.06
Well, presumably we're self-aware enough of our own predictability to fight against it. Even when unsuccessful, the awareness is an example of free will. Will does not always necessarily equal outcome or action, after all.

Celane, mind firing off some more ideas about the chaos theory stuff? I'm working my brain around it.
 
 
E. Coli from the Milky Way
16:53 / 17.05.06
@Quantum: I *am not* a philosopher and i think it may be as simple as i'm saying (the difficult thing is, as someone points, how to get outside the time stream, but that's another story).

@Mordant: Vale chula.No problem.(To feck off = cagar?)

Happy to share my position on free will with Thomas Hobbes.
 
 
Quantum
22:54 / 17.05.06
Celane, I completely agree with this you wrote above I tend to go with personal experience, which screams "YES!", and I'm a Free Will proponent personally- I don't believe in an omniscient God and I don't believe our actions are determined by physical causation, we are moral agents and responsible for our actions.
As Lurid points out though the tricky part is the grey area between consciousness and matter; matter seems to obey predictable physical laws, our minds have tendencies but aren't predictable with the same certainty (Derren Brown notwithstanding).
Oh, and of course I may not be a very *good* philosopher, I'm not claiming to be Socrates or anything. I aspire to competence.
 
 
Quantum
23:10 / 17.05.06
I misrepresented Lurid there slightly I think-
if I have desires and so forth that allow my actions to be somewhat predicted, how can I be entirely free?

It's definitely a mix of the two akin to the nature and nurture debate (another perennial favourite). We are often less free than we like to think, as Derren Brown shows for example, and often rationalise and justify things to ourselves. We could be said to be slaves to our fears and desires, but we do have rational thought and willpower. My self is not just an arena where differing desires battle to determine my actions (e.g. my desire to give up smoking vs my desire for a fag, or fear of prison versus desire for cash).
I think of it as your brain and heart, a dynamic interaction between reason and passion, where the faculty of reason has free will. My conscious, reasoning self is what is free, although my freedom is heavily influenced by my own motives and the actions of others.
 
 
Quantum
23:14 / 17.05.06
Sorry, the free will example to debate in this thread should be choosing a Coca-Cola over a Pepsi of course. What was I thinking.
 
 
Seth
23:32 / 17.05.06
Fizzy cola drinks are good hangover cures.
 
 
Quantum
16:44 / 18.05.06
Dude, you chose to get drunk, and the hangover is your fate. Perfect compatibility right there. Like a metaphysical Pepsi-Coke cocktail.
 
 
Isadore
05:44 / 21.05.06
Sorry, that was me being overly sensitive. I will endeavor to grow up.

Papers, there's not much more I can add; chaos theory was only briefly covered in the introductory differential equations (diffeq) course I took, and I haven't gone further into it since. My major of study, when I choose to accept it, is more focused on applying diffeq in various circumstances, which means using qualitative methods that aren't very interesting from a philosophical standpoint. It is something I'd like to study further at some point, though.

I can, however, go more into the background of it. Differential equations is basically calculus backwards; instead of looking at an equation and solving for its slope (derivative) or area (integral) at any given point, diffeq takes a relationship of one or more variables and the derivatives and integrals thereof. This is complicated. Whereas a derivative may be found for any equation, there are certain equations which are unintegrable, and there are very few differential equations which can actually be solved. As was unintentionally demonstrated many times in the course I took on the subject, simply miscopying a problem out of the book can, and usually will, result in something unsolvable.

When a linear first-order differential equation is solved, the solution comes as a set, or family; you then have to supply initial conditions to get a single meaningful solution. There's a lot of possible equations out there that have the same relationships within themselves, and a differential equation is just a description of those internal relationships. You can graph the tangents of the solution set and then connect the dots to see how a solution will behave at a certain point.

For more information I'd suggest SOS Math's subpage on differential equations. They explain it better.

How chaos theory ties into this is that some equations produce wildly different solutions depending on a very small variance in the initial conditions. In engineering and physics, significant figures are very important; given experimental error, human error, and equipment limitations, there's no such thing as perfect accuracy. And some numbers that have nothing to do with experiments just keep going -- pi and e are two obvious examples. Yet if the exact initial conditions are not plugged into the solution set, but rather are approximated due to experimental and/or computational limitations, the resultant 'solution' will be meaningless. This renders approximation techniques useless and the solution set a cryptic curiosity.

I hope that helps a bit. I've always been interested in how chaos theory could intersect with concepts of free will, as math certainly intersects with philosophy, but as Lurid and Quantum so aptly point out, there's a major problem with the definition (or even existence) of free will that would have to be solved first.

Can't really add anything on the quantum mechanics front as I do not get QM. From what little I can tell, the Hindus were right.
 
 
LVX23
14:30 / 21.05.06
Re: stepping out of time... I think there's an assumption here that one can step out of time and still retain an individual perspective on it, like you suddenly see this line of causality extending out into the future from your currnet location. Yet for me, the occassions when time has ceased have always been characterized by a collapsing of space and self as well. Thanks to Einstein it's logical to suspect that stopping time would also stop space and hence, end determinism & free will (ie the entire universe would likely fall back into a soupy wavefunction - you included). The sudden perception of eternity - stepping out of the timestream - would probably negate the observer completely. At best one might be able to apprehend the field of probability underlying the manifest universe but, again, I continue to suspect that it's impossible to step out of timespace completely and still retain any sense of individual identity or relational perspective on eternity.
 
 
E. Coli from the Milky Way
14:44 / 21.05.06
All that I say is that i think it's impossible not to feel we are under 'free will'. But at the same time, all could be determined.

If we call the notion of "determinism", we're calling something it's above human individuality and possibilities. The collapse of space/time is lived in a human prespective, because you don't have another. But to a another form of conciousness, free will/determinism could be only a dualism.

Lets' see ... what if the ECCO of Lilly's exists as well?
 
 
petunia
15:27 / 21.05.06
I tend to stick with Nietzsche on this one: I'm suspicious of belief in free-will along with belief in unfree-will.

My own personal mythology/philosophy holds that free will was essentially a necessary invention for the founding of guilt and morality ("you could have done different - you could have done the right thing but you didn't. You are a bad person"). It's obviously impossible to have any kind of morality system if people can't choose their actions. We hate something someone did, we want to vent our anger and hatred but want to feel justified in doing so. Therefore we need to say that action X was their fault, and that they are just as bad as the action they 'caused'. Causality, self, guilt - morality.

Confusingly, a morality which creates free-will in order to punish people 'righteously' needs to create causality (or use causality) for its argument. However, if one thing is caused by another in a long string of events, then all of our actions are caused and defined and unfree - we cannot be held accountable for our actions; just as a rock cannot be held accountable for rolling down a hill.

So we have free-will and determinism. For free-will to counter the arguments of determinism, it must tell us why freely-willed actions are important. If we are morally responsible for our actions, then our actions must be caused by us, but if actions are caused how can there be free-will?

So the debate goes on, with silly ontologies where the human is capable of free thought but not action and so on. Or where there is a self that is free but just observes the world around it. Or.. blegh, whatever.

And determinism doesn't see to cut it, because (for me at least) it is based on a causality which was spurious anyway. The determined world is one long string of events - an infinite line of billiard balls hitting one another. Cause, effect, cause, effect. It's a handy scientific model; like an atom. But it falls apart if we consider it real.

And determinism and free-will assume a world with inert matter - a world where things can be pushed around. Determinism says that all is just pushed and jostled by 'causality' which has been going on forever. Free-will says some things choose to push, and others are jostled. Little building blocks with wonderful humans and God telling them where to go.

But I like Nietzsches model - of all being will. Not free or unfree will, because neither concept makes sense if everything is will. I like this because it makes both the world and myself alive. I don't need to hark to some ideal of a christian self to feel responsible in the world, and I don't need to pretend that the world is pushing me everywhere without my imput. The world is mutual codependence and better for it. This model also seems a bit more suited to Temple style thought - i dont end up thinking myself Teh King ov All the Wordlz! because i can use my will in a non causal fashion and i don't deny that majic can and does happen, because it doesn't fit into an antiquated model of a causal universe.

But if that doesn't convince you, you can look at it this way: What would a world with free-will look like? And a determined world? How would the two differ? What evidence could one point to that would make one think it a free/determined world?

Is there actually any defining characteristic that would be able to sway an argument?

If there isn't, how can we know that there's an argument at all? Can we ask a nonsense question?
 
 
Quantum
18:52 / 21.05.06
a necessary invention for the founding of guilt and morality
You still have to explaint the subjective experience of free action- it seems like I intend to move my arm and then it moves. I don't know if that's ascribable to a need for guilt.

What evidence could one point to that would make one think it a free/determined world?
Subjective experience of agency? Proof that the future was predetermined e.g. building an infallible predictor? Examining the likelihood of determinist arguments and evidence?

Is there actually any defining characteristic that would be able to sway an argument?
If there isn't, how can we know that there's an argument at all?

Traditionally the defining characteristic is the existence of an omniscient God or the necessary chains of causation i.e. natural law, is our consciousness (or anything) subject to certain prediction.

Can we ask a nonsense question?
Depends what you mean. Fnord? is a nonsense question, but I think you mean something like the Logical Positivists' verification principle; "The statement is literally meaningful (it expresses a proposition) if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable." However, the verifiability principle is not empirically verifiable...
 
 
petunia
20:43 / 22.05.06
Yeah. My little guilt/free-will thing is a little difficult to hold as a position. I associate the whole idea(l) of a singular ego/self as formed and sustained by a societal system of morality - ego enforcing itself on others in order to sustain its own worth. How ego/self comes about then becomes the crucial question and my main stumbling block.

But free-will is obviously linked to an ego-subject which intends its actions. If one holds to a cosmology that is not made of seperate ego-subjects or specific held entities, the need for free-will/determinism vanishes.

The subjective experience of free agency you point to could be interpreted as illusion. I may feel that the whole world hates me, but this may be utterly untrue. We can imagine a situation where a paranoiac believes the whole universe hates hir when they are infact loved by every entity capable of love.

We can imagine a robot which is programmed to 'feel' that it 'intends' the actions it commits - it even registers the code passing through its microprocessors prior to the action taking place. It ascribes this prior knowledge and 'urging' of an action to its potential for free will ("Johnny Five is ALIVE!!!!"). Yet all of this has previously been programmed by the robot's owner.

Many people experience their lives as free of any internal agency/will. The fact that you can experience both extremes seems to point to a certain element of belief or psychological process inherent to our experience of action. This seems to mean our subjective experience of the matter may not be a good guide to the objective/ontological validity of an argument.

OR it may point to the fact that the whole free-will/determinism debate is akin to a christianity/buddhism debate: a matter of personal preference or faith which cannot be 'solved', just as we cannot 'solve' which is better out of The Beatles or The Rolling Stones. (Yeah, i know. The Beatles every time, but you get my point.)

Any 'infallible predictor' could never count for 100% proof towards determinism due to time - it would have to account for every event ever to happen until time ended, otherwise we would be able to say 'yeah, but what about tomorrow?'. Even if it did get it right until time ended, there are still the events which happened prior. As for it proving free-will, people could always argue that it would get it right if it had all the facts...

Traditionally the defining characteristic is the existence of an omniscient God or the necessary chains of causation i.e. natural law, is our consciousness (or anything) subject to certain prediction.

Was it Hume who proved (or sought to prove) that we can never know a 'necessary law' in nature? As all laws could conceivably be changed tomorrow (or at any other point in the future) we can't call them necessary. Would 'certain prediction' fall under this constant possibility for change? (Apologies if i have bastardised Hume...)

My comment about nonsense questions is probably similar to the logical positivists - I think it was influenced more by Wittgenstein and his ideas of nonsense. If there is no objective or mutally agreed fact or observation that we can point to to ground what we mean by free will/determinism, then we risk asking nonsense questions. It's like asking 'who made the best music?' - i can state my preference for the Beatles and you for the Stones, but as we can't take our preferences out and compare them we can't really form an objective measure. We don't 'know what best looks like' in a shared sense, as 'best' is personally defined (in this instance).

If we want to ask whether it is free-will or determinism which applies to our universe, we need first to have some idea of what a freely-willed (or determined) action would 'look like'. We need to be able to define what would count as free-will or determinism before we can try to prove one or the other. Otherwise we end up doing the equvalent of arguing for a 'transubstantially filtered universe' over a 'plumpened unripe timeflux'.

I'm not sure that we can give the words 'free will' and 'determinism' a meaning beyond the personal, so i'm not sure a debate about them can make much sense.
 
 
petunia
20:44 / 22.05.06
And by the way. You are wrong.

FNORD? Is not a nonsense question.

YU DIND'T DO TEH EXERSISES DID U?!!?!1?!!?1
 
 
foolish fat finger
22:01 / 28.05.06
I have thought about this a lot and I have no answer...

by the way, I found out a while back, 'Buddha' is a Sanskrit word which means 'Christ'- 'Christ' is a Hebrew word which means 'Buddha'- it's the same. that cleared up a lot of stuff for me.

free will and determinism, I guess my opinion is that it is neither and it is both. I doubt that that will be helpful to anyone, but that is what I feel. it is a choice that is no choice, if you see what I mean...
 
 
EvskiG
00:01 / 29.05.06
I thought

"Buddha" means "awakened" (from Sanskrit budh) while

"Christ" means "anointed" (from Greek Χριστός).
(Or "creamy" or "greasy," if you prefer).

Go figure.
 
 
foolish fat finger
12:00 / 29.05.06
you are quite correct Evski, altho I am not sure about the creamy or greasy meanings... those are the translations.
from what I read tho, the title is equivalent- it means the same thing, even if the direct translations into English are slightly different.

a quote that I am fairly sure I have heard attributed to both Jesus and the Buddha is 'I know all things'. I think... I can't say any more. I am entering my own personal realms of stupidity...
 
 
EvskiG
22:47 / 29.05.06
(Always liked the idea of Greasy Josh, the Palestinan mystic.)
 
  
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