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Doc says many very sensible things like:
When the doctrine is clarified as denying a STABLE, UNCHANGING self, I've got no issues. That makes total sense to me. But to deny the existence of a self--period--seems basically like a denial of phenomenal consciousness, which is actually the only thing in existence I feel 100% sure of.
Sure. It depends what you mean by the words self & consciousness in the end doesn't it? Generally what they're against is the idea of a permanent self, but maybe even what we think of as consciousness is in some way illusory.
If my future selves are iterations based on my karma then they aren't me, but maybe they aren't me in the same way that the little five year old kid, back there isn't. Generally speaking, the problem in Buddhism, as you articulate it, is the self as reference point. You employ this when you say "Why bother?" ie "Why should I bother when that future person isn't me?"
My understanding of this is that there is an illusion of self while something else, beyond our concepts, unfolds. But even if those future selves aren't me, is that justification for the apathy & selfishness of maybe not engaging with a path of spiritual knowledge?
At the beginning of many important expositions of Dharma, traditional & modern we are often exhorted to avoid the Two Extremes. They are usually translated as Eternalism & Nihilism. The first is explained as the error of a belief in an "immortal soul" as subject or object whose identity continues. The second is the belief that there is no kind of continuity at all, no cause & effect, no karma & that death is annhiliation so we need not worry about the future effects of our actions. Modern lamas often equate this with the secular reductionist materialism of the west, a la Dawkins, for instance.
Then there's interdependence, which is another way of looking at it - going to look at Trouser's link now. |
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