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There's more to these things than just liking them, isn't there. As Quantum and others have suggested, the kind of quality we debate is a different sort than that which makes us think 'Mmmm, me like that'. For instance, if someone tells me they don't like sugar in their tea, it never occurs to me to argue with them about it, however much I fail to understand how they can enjoy it unsweetened. Not just because I don't think I'll be able to convince them to come around to my way of thinking on the preparation of hot beverages, but because it just doesn't feel like the sort of aesthetic judgment to be argued over. On the other hand, I will argue with someone who says that they don't rate Bob Dylan's lyrics. Not just because I like the way I feel when I hear them, but because I believe them to be good, in a way I don't think sweet tea is good. I can't help feeling that there is some objective component in that kind of quality. And while the fact of disagreement over these things nudges me towards a suspicion that that just isn't the case, the fact of widespread agreement nudges me back the other way.
As for how knowledge can alter an aesthetic appreciation, again I'm conflicted and inarticulate on the matter. While on the one hand I think that a painting, say, should be amenable to a full appreciation qua an aesthetic object without any special knowledge of Art, on the other it seems plain that additional information can not only deepen one's appreciation of work (eg. its context and so on), but also change it's most fundamental qualities. A fart smells a lot worse when you learn that it isn't yours. |
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