Lurid, you are saying that science as metaphor necessarily leads to all metaphors being of equal value “…because the property of being a "good" metaphor or being a "bad" metaphor is a matter of taste.”
But is it really—in every instance? It seems to me that at least some metaphors are able to convey more useful information than others: especially if the particular metaphor occurs within the interpretive domain of a structure of knowledge, is sensible and made sense of, by its relation to other metaphors in that same structure. Thus, there seems to be a quasi-quantitative value that any metaphor has in virtue of its relation to an interpretive structure that doesn’t seem to be a mere “matter of taste.” It could possibly be measured by its degree of relevance and sense with respect to an interpretive structure.
I don’t understand why you are bringing in the “fact that planes fly.” We all see that, I think, so I don’t see this as an issue. Are you saying that it is a scientific fact that planes fly? Or are you saying something else? Please elaborate.
“It is true that science is only concerned with certain things - a domain of discourse - but there are potentially many ways in which to talk about those things. Science chooses a particular way.”
Sure, nobody is disputing this. But the point is, as you say, that science chooses a particular way to talk about the things that it is concerned with. What about the things that it is not concerned with? How does science deal with metaphors which reference things outside its domain?
“You can call this a choice of metaphor, but I fail to see how this is an illuminating description rather than an ideologically driven one. In the same way that it would be unhelpful to distinguish between a plumber and a poet by their range of metphors.”
It can be an illuminating distinction insofar as it falls within the view of language as metaphor: it provides a distinction in that framework. You reject the framework, so is it any wonder you see it as unhelpful?! In other words, it is helpful as part of an “ideology,” perhaps in the same way that the distinction between a proton and an electron is useful as part of an “ideology.” So, with respect to language as metaphor, it might be helpful, if one wished to “distinguish between a plumber and a poet,” by examining the range, and perhaps function or purpose, of their metaphors. Like I said before, to address your point that if taking the language of science to be metaphorical, then we cannot distinguish it from other disciplines, “science is at least differentiated from other disciplines by virtue of the metaphors it deals with.”
“ What you are saying is that to have any viewpoint is to be conservative. This makes everyone conservative.”
Certainly, if we want to go to the extreme. To hold any viewpoint we seem conservative about something or other. I mean, by following acceptable and established methods to explore the domain of a particular discourse we preserve those methods and the domain. We appear to conserve much of a particular structure of knowledge when we base our investigations and actions upon that knowledge. So, if you want to label everyone as conservative, then go ahead; I would rather say that in relying on a given method to explore a particular domain we are being, in some way, conservative, but not necessarily only conservative.
“You are assuming that discovery can only be revolutionary when it is external…I suppose it depends what you mean by "determined". Predictable, failing to contradict previous theories?”
No, I am saying that some revolutions come from external sources, while others come from within. By “determined” I mean what is already present in the current data and method, but has not yet been established or comprehended. Science is a series of propositions about stuff. These propositions can be manipulated in conjunction with acceptable methodology and produce what is already implicit in them, but not yet recognized as such: discoveries not necessarily predictable nor failing to contradict previous theories—but possibly some discoveries would fall under one, the other, or both. Put differently, we can see that many of the discoveries within any structure of knowledge occur as a result of what is already implicit in it: as we conserve the structure, our understanding of the implications and limitations of that structure—ideally—undergoes change. Again, there is conservation and motion.
“Is a poet "conservative" by not fixing pipes?”
No, it would seem that a poet is, in some sense, conservative when writing, for example, in Haiku. Or mimicking the style of so and so. Or perhaps by re-expressing, expanding, and discovering further transformations of a particular pattern of metaphor embedded within a domain of interpretation.
“I think by "key metaphors" you mean something akin to paradigms?”
Certainly, if you want, but I would also include the individual propositions of a structure of knowledge—the ones that, at a certain time, have a high degree of being sensible in and making sense of the structure in which they occur.
“The current structure of method of course undergoes refinement all the time but it seems we are close to using the definition of science against it.”
Yes and no. I certainly agree that method undergoes refinement, but I doubt that it is, as you say, all the time. Further, refinement of method still occurs largely within the structure of knowledge: we’ll find better ways to do or comprehend X—better ways to fly planes or understand aerodynamics, for example; however, we still are dealing with a similar or same X over time. But I wouldn’t charge this only to science: it seems to be more connected with the preservation and conservation of any so-called “body of knowledge.”
“One point I'd make is that most scientists believe some kind of evidence… is required.”
I agree. But arguably this is true of most, if not all, structures of knowledge. What is to count as evidence for or within a structure of knowledge? And by whom is it counted? These questions certainly arise within the asking of “who or what decides what is science and what isn’t?”
As for the requirement of, as you say, “falsifiability,” I think it would be productive if you said a bit more about what this actually is.
“This seems central and is not always accepted by those on the outside.”
I’d probably agree, depending on what is meant by “falsifiability.” But I do agree to the extent that what is central to science is what is agreed upon by most scientists, but of course this will, in a way, come back around to questions of who counts as a scientist and who doesn’t, and how that is established. I also agree that what is central to science is not always accepted by those outside of science. Granted, what is acceptable to them may or may not be acceptable to science (and if it isn’t then we can also “turn this on its head”—what is acceptable to those outside of science is not always accepted by those within science); regardless, what seems more important is not whether or not “what” is accepted by “whom,” but rather, what are the imports and functions of the metaphors within a structure of knowing. I think it might have been Patricky who had said, “what’s a meta—for?” What are the metaphors within a structure of knowledge accomplishing? What work do they do?
So we agree that “science is more concerned about explaining what it can explain,” and I’d even agree that it is, as you say, “close to tautology.” Again, this seems less a symptom of science and more a symptom of any structure of knowledge.
I’d certainly agree that we can take the view that “alternate theorists” likely employ metaphors that are “outside the realm of science” and so these “theorists” are “unable to see [the] invalidity [of their view] because of the ‘conservative’ nature of their methodology.” It seems to me that this follows from what I’ve been saying: some metaphors will fall outside a given domain of knowledge, as such, these same metaphors are incomprehensible to, or absent from, that domain.
“Essentially, you don't seem to accept (or even acknowledge) the validity of trying to distinguish between empirical statements.”
I don’t think I’ve said anything about “the validity of trying to distinguish between empirical statements.” I’m not even sure if I know what you mean here! If we take ‘empirical’ to mean relying and/or based upon experiment and/or experience, then I agree that knowledge that does not correspond to, affects or is affected by, experiment and experience is not very important knowledge. |
